Defamation of religions by Gattermeier, Matthias
DIPLOMARBEIT
Titel der Diplomarbeit
Defamation of Religions
The Concept of (Combating) Defamations of Religions in the Context of the 
United Nations and its Compatibility with the Human Rights Framework 
Verfasser
Matthias Gattermeier
angestrebter akademischer Titel
Magister (Mag.)
Wien, 2010
Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 057 390
Studienrichtung lt. Zulassungsbescheid: Internationale Entwicklung
Betreuer: Ao. Univ-Prof. DDr. Ingfrid Schütz-Müller

Matthias Gattermeier
Defamation of Religions
The Concept of (Combating) Defamations of Religions in the Context of the 
United Nations and its Compatibility with the Human Rights Framework
Thesis submitted for the degree of
Magister (Mag.)
supervised by
Ao. Univ-Prof. DDr. Ingfrid Schütz-Müller
Vienna, 2010

This thesis is dedicated with the deepest respect and gratitude to:
Martin and Irmgard Gattermeier
Stefanie Andruchowitz and Fatima Hasanain
Ao. Univ-Prof. DDr. Ingfrid Schütz-Müller

Table of Contents
Abstract.................................................................................................................................1
Acronyms..............................................................................................................................3
 1 Introduction...................................................................................................................... 5
 1.1 Theoretical Framework.............................................................................................................7
 1.1.1 Public International Law and Human Rights...................................................................7
 1.1.2 International Relations – Neo-Institutionalism and Neo-Gramscianism.........................8
 1.1.3 The Intersection of Public International Law and International Relations...................13
 1.2 Methodological Approach.......................................................................................................15
 1.2.1 Clarification on Terminology..........................................................................................15
 1.2.2 Political Analysis............................................................................................................ 15
 1.2.3 A Consideration of International law............................................................................. 16
 1.2.4 Hypotheses Formation....................................................................................................18
 2 Defamation, Religion and Defamation of Religions................................................... 19
 2.1 Defining Religion .................................................................................................................. 20
 2.2 The legal term 'Defamation' and the term 'Defamation of Religions' in the UN System.......25
 2.3 The Relationship between Defamation of Religions and Blasphemy....................................29
 3 The Human Rights Concept..........................................................................................31
 3.1 Introduction: A short History of Human Rights......................................................................31
 3.2 The international Human Rights framework.......................................................................... 34
 3.3 Human Rights and Religion....................................................................................................40
 3.3.1 An Islamic Understanding of Human Rights ................................................................. 43
 3.4 Contradicting Ideological Viewpoints.................................................................................... 50
 4 The Defamation Resolution and its Political Context................................................ 61
 4.1 Status of the Defamation of Religions Resolution..................................................................61
 4.2 Claims made by the Resolution.............................................................................................. 64
 4.3 Critique of the Resolution and Concept of Defamation of Religions.....................................69
 4.3.1 Elements missing in the Critical Debate ....................................................................... 80
 4.4 Development of the Resolution within the UN System..........................................................82
 4.5 Analysis of Voting Patterns ..................................................................................................101
 4.5.1 Regional Groups in the United Nations .......................................................................103
 4.5.2 The African Group........................................................................................................ 106
 4.5.3 The Asian Group........................................................................................................... 110
 4.5.4 The Latin American and Caribbean Group.................................................................. 112
 5 Compatibility with the Human Rights Framework....................................................118
 5.1 Protection of Individuals, Groups and Ideas.........................................................................119
 5.2 Freedom of Expression......................................................................................................... 121
 5.3 Freedom of Religion and Belief ...........................................................................................126
 5.4 Rights of Persons belonging to Minorities........................................................................... 129
 5.5 Rights of Women.................................................................................................................. 140
 6  Conclusion and Hypotheses Formation ..................................................................145
 6.1 Hypotheses on the Political Developments ......................................................................... 147
 6.2 Hypotheses concerning Human Rights Implications............................................................149
Bibliography..................................................................................................................... 152
German Summary – Deutsche Zusammenfassung......................................................158
Curriculum Vitae.............................................................................................................. 159

Abstract
Abstract
Since 1999 the concept of 'Defamation of Religions' has consistently been introduced by the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference as a Human Rights resolution in various fora of the 
United  Nations.  The  resolution  highlights  concerns  over  what  is  perceived  as  the  negative 
stereotyping of religions,  primarily of Islam and through popular media.  The approach is  to 
declare the act of defaming religions a violation of human dignity, further frame it as a Human 
Rights  violation  and  therefore  recommend  the  outlawing  of  defamatory  expressions  against 
religions to counter such occurrences.  Concerns have been raised with regard to the concepts' 
incompatibility to the pivotal ideas of Human Rights, particularly specific fundamental freedoms 
and rights such as the freedom of expression.  Thus it  has to be clarified to what extent the 
concept of (Combating) Defamation of Religion as it is proposed and foreseen in the resolution 
is consistent with the Human Rights framework.
To answer this main research question, a legal and political analysis of the Resolution within the 
UN system was conducted. The legal analysis assessed the implications of the concept for the 
enjoyment of Human Rights, above all in connection to the freedom of expression, freedom of 
religion and the rights of persons belonging to vulnerable groups. Additionally the question of 
women's rights, which has been neglected in relevant critical reviews so far, was considered. 
Political analysis was conducted to assess possibilities of further development of the resolution. 
This  analysis  included  a  review  of  the  changing  positions  of  Member  States  towards  the 
initiative and an examination of voting patterns in a number of UN bodies.
The findings reveal that the concept articulated by the resolution is incompatible with existing 
Human Rights standards, and has severe implications for the enjoyment of a number of identified 
Human Rights. Moreover, a strong case can be made to hold defamation legislation equivalent to 
existing national blasphemy laws. It was further found that the political situation is characterised 
by a deadlock as negotiations take place in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust. 
These results point to the need for a re-conceptualisation of the phenomenon of Defamation of 
Religions to the more legally appropriate 'incitement to religious hatred' in order to adequately 
address  the  legitimate  issues  raised  in  the  resolution.  Moreover,  there  is  a  critical  need  to 
incorporate  a  gender  perspective  and  minority  concerns  into  subsequent  analysis  and 
developments relating to this resolution and its concept. 
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Acronyms
Acronyms
1981 
Declaration
Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief
CDHRI Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CHR Commission on Human Rights
EE Eastern European Group
EOV Explanation of Vote
EU European Union
GA General Assembly
GRULAC Latin American and Caribbean Group
HRC Human Rights Council
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ILO International Labour Organization
NAM Non Aligned Movement
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UIDHR Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations 
UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
US United States
VDPA Vienna Declaration and Program of Action
WEOG Western Europe and Other Group
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 1 Introduction
 1  Introduction
When Pakistan, on behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) first introduced a 
draft resolution entitled 'Defamation of Islam' in 1999 in the Commission for Human Rights, 
little  critical  attention  was  given  to  the  potential  implications  for  existing  Human  Rights 
instruments.  While the resolution was at  first  adopted in consensus after minor amendments 
under  the title  'Defamation of  Religion',  the perception of  the concept  and its  discourse has 
changed  significantly  over  time.  The  resolution  grew in  substance  from a  text  highlighting 
qualms over what was perceived as the negative stereotyping of Islam in media, to a resolution 
with  unusually  strong  language  demanding  legal  measures  to  address  the  issue.  As  a 
consequence, apprehensions were formulated in regard to the concepts' incompatibility to the 
pivotal ideas of Human Rights,  specific fundamental freedoms and rights such as the freedom of 
expression. 
Criticism arose  over  time to  the  point  that  even state  representatives  were  bluntly accusing 
proponents of the resolution of aiming rather at undermining Human Rights, than at protecting 
them as claimed in the resolution. And while the support for the initiative has been declining 
constantly ever since, the OIC is continuing its efforts to turn the idea of combating Defamation 
of Religions into legally binding state obligations.
However, surprisingly little concrete scientific research has been conducted up to date to clarify 
the question of the compatibility of the concept of 'Combating Defamation of Religions', as is 
proposed within the resolution, with the Human Rights system. To fill this gap, this paper aims at 
providing a comprehensive answer to the main research question: 
How consistent is the concept of Defamation of Religions with the Human Rights framework?
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To clarify this question, I will test the central claims raised by both its supporters and its critics.  
To date, these areas of dispute regarding the Defamation Resolution and its concept include:
• The  erosion  of  freedom  of  expression  as  a  fundamental  freedom  for  the  benefit  of 
protecting mainstream religious opinion;
• The  tendency  of  aiming  at  the  protection  of  religious  ideas  rather  than  individual 
adherents of the respective religion, which would expand the scope of human rights from 
the level of the individual to group rights and beyond. 
• The  tendency  of  the  resolutions'  language  to  blur  and  conflate  boundaries  between 
defamation  of  religion  and  incitement  of  religious  hatred,  effectively  putting  both 
phenomena on an equal footing. 
• A narrow focus on the protection of Islam, leaving out the concerns of adherents of other 
religions and implying a certain understanding of the term 'religion' itself.
Taking  into  account  these  major  concerns  which  determine  the  status  quo,  I  subsequently 
conduct my research with consideration to the following four assumptions, that are to be verified 
in the process of the research and will be taken up again in the last chapter of this thesis:
• There  is  no  significant  difference  between  legislation  to  'Combat  Defamation  of 
Religions' and traditional 'Anti-Blasphemy' laws.
• The  proclaimed  means  of  combating  Defamation  of  Religions  as  proposed  in  the 
resolution,  are  incompatible  with  international  Human  Rights  law,  in  particular  with 
respect to the right of freedom of expression and the enjoyment of freedom of religion by 
persons belonging to vulnerable groups. 
• The  strong  language  in  the  resolution  recommending  means  to  address  the  issue  in 
combination with the lack of a clear definition of Defamation of Religions, opens the 
concept to  misuse,  particularly because it  puts  the State firmly in charge of deciding 
which ideas may be expressed in the public square and which may not. 
• The terminology of the concept  is  inherently flawed in proclaiming the protection of 
religious ideas rather than human beings, and as such is misplaced for the Human Rights 
discourse. 
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 1.1  Theoretical Framework
The topic at hand is clearly complex as it deals with Human Rights, international politics and 
religion, 3 spheres that are vast and comprehensive in themselves. Hence, it is not surprising that 
there is no 'grand theory' that incorporates, connects and explains all those elements sufficiently. 
To adequately tackle the topic,  it  is  necessary to work with 2 highly interlinked disciplines: 
public international law and international relations. This chapter will discuss the relevance of 
public international law in the realm of international relations and argue that both disciplines 
must be considered in conjunction, with respect to the Defamation of Religions resolution. 
 1.1.1  Public International Law and Human Rights
The theoretical  framework of public international  law finds its root in the term jus gentium, 
dating back to the Roman Empire. This jus genitum was not referring to an 'international code of 
conduct' per se, but described a set of rules and norms for the interference with non-Romans 
within the borders of the Roman Empire. Only later those roots were translated into what came 
to  know  as  jus  inter  gentes in  the  18th century,  a  first  outline  of  universal  norms  for  the 
interaction between the dominant powers of their time. With the crystallisation of the concept of 
the Nation-State in the 19th century the modern terminology of  public international law came 
into  use1 and is  today  understood  applicable  not  only  to  nations,  but  to  international 
organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and even transnational cooperations.2 In 
this  thesis,  international  law essentially  refers to  public, not  private  international  law,  which 
deals predominantly with matters of corporate regulations. 
More  important  for  the  topic  of  Defamation  of  Religions  is  a  relatively  new inclusion  into 
international law: the cross-cutting thematic issue of Human Rights.3 
While previously the role of international law was limited to regulate the interaction of nations, 
the theoretical shift  that followed the second World War came with a new understanding of 
international law: Human Rights were conceptualised as legal norms that States had to comply 
with,  to be part  of the new international  community.4 Human Rights were given the special 
1 Stephan Hobe, Einfuhrung in das Volkerrecht, 8th ed. (Tubingen [u.a.]: Francke [u.a.], 2004), 7.
2 Ibid., 8.
3 Ibid., 392.
4 Hobe, Einfuhrung in das Volkerrecht, 393; Janet Madigan, Truth, politics, and universal human rights, 1st ed. 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), XIII.
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characteristic of being defined as ante- and supra-state rights and hence, inevitable conflict with 
the  concept  of  national  sovereignty.  With  these  developments  in  Human  Rights,  public 
international law and indeed the very sovereignty of nations has become subordinate to these 
rights.  In  the  end,  States became increasingly involved in  upholding Human Rights through 
international law in other States as well. Hence, these processes of modernisation necessarily 
affect international relations. I will elaborate upon this nature of Human Rights in more detail in 
Chapter 3.
 1.1.2  International  Relations  –  Neo-Institutionalism  and  Neo-
Gramscianism
To explain the dynamics and positions of States towards the concept of Defamation of Religions 
within the international community, theories of international relations are essential components 
of the analysis. Against this foundation, it becomes clear that the subject of this paper is a matter  
of international politics, not simply of legal affairs.
International relations is not a stagnant field and no theory or school of international relations 
may be referred to as being commonly accepted or wholly authoritative.5 
Since  the  1980's  and  especially  since  the  1990's,  a  whole  variety  of  approaches,  concepts, 
theories and schools have coexisted, cooperated, or competed with each other for validity. Most 
prominent among these theories are Neo-Realism, Neo-Institutionalism, World Systems Analysis 
and Neo-Gramscianism to name only a few. 
The  theoretical  developments  are  above  all  attributable  to  the  changing  geopolitical 
circumstances: from the cold war logic of the superpowers, towards a gradual, globalisation-
driven albeit partial erosion of the relevance of the Nation-State. Essentially, theory construction 
in the field of international relations reflect the historical realities  of their time, and strongly 
influence  political  decision making.6 Crucially,  theoretical  concepts  of  international  relations 
must adequately project the political realities and developments to be of value for the scientific 
and political debate. Consequently, the failure of Neo-Realism to predict the significant historical 
5 More on the theoretical debate on international relations:Woyke, Handworterbuch Internationale Politik, 473-
487; For modi of the epistemological dimension: Schieder, Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen, 16-24.
6 Siegfried Schieder, Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen, 2nd ed. (Opladen [u.a.]: Budrich, 2006), 26.
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event of the end of the east-west conflict, led to a social-constructive re-interpretation of the 
existing models and a further differentiation of the theories in the field of international relations.7 
Those new approaches were meant to better reflect and explain the mechanisms that determines 
the political decisions on the international stage. 
While  the  field  of  international  relations  has  differentiated  into  a  pluralism of  theories  and 
approaches,  most  of  them  share  some  elements  and  commonalities.  The  lowest  remaining 
common denominator is an understanding of international relations as an integrated transnational 
interaction of state and non-state actors on a global scale.8 Another common expression shared in 
different theories on international relations is the term 'anarchy', understood as the state of a lack 
of supra-state authority,  which would have the monopoly and means to enforce and oversee 
compliance with international regulations and agreements.9 Traditional schools of (Neo-)Realism 
reject  claims  of  any  autonomy  or  influence  of  international  organisations10,  and  hence  see 
'anarchy'  as  being  dominant  and  remaining  unregulated  in  the  international  arena.  This 
perspective is  of little  relevance  for this research as this  thesis'  topic,  or more precisely the 
concept and the resolution that is analysed, is directly build upon the structures of the United 
Nations and in its meaning and effect dependent on its bodies, such as the UN General Assembly 
or the Human Rights Council.  This paper further grants international law and specifically its 
Human Rights instruments  as  developed and agreed upon under  the  umbrella  of  the  United 
Nations  a  certain  independent  role  in  regulating  international  relations.  Under  these 
considerations, Neo-Institutionalism theories appear to be better suited to explain the political 
dynamics and emerging conflicts surrounding the concept of Defamation of Religions.  
Neo-Institutionalism  in all its variants predicts a 'civilising of conflict' by the containment of 
conflicts and the juridification of its management and resolution. Hence, in practice, anarchy is 
'tamed' by establishing international institutions and regimes.11 Indeed, considering the approach 
of a 'codification of conflict management' through regulation by international institutions, one 
could be tempted to claim that public international law is subject to international relations12, but 
as  I  will  argue  in  the  following  sub-chapter  elaborating  on  the  intersection  of  international 
relations and international law, there are valid reasons to reject this view. 
7 Wichard Woyke, Handworterbuch Internationale Politik, 5th ed. (Opladen: Leske Budrich, 1993), 474.
8 Schieder, Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen, 15,16.
9 Ibid., 16.
10 Ibid., 339.
11 Peter Filzmair et al., Internationale Politik : eine Einfuhrung (Wien: WUV Universitatsverlag, 2006), 81-83, 90.
12 Ibid., 90.
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The actor-centered approach of Neo-Institutionalism, provides much of the basis for the analysis 
in this paper. It aims at understanding the behaviour of players against the backdrop of those 
institutions they manoeuvre in.13
But  in Institutionalist  perspective,  not  only  are  formal  institutions  valid  structures  for  the 
behaviour  of  actors,  but  'regimes'  understood  as  informal  networks  of  entities  aiming  at 
consensus-building, can be considered determining elements of international relations as well.14 
This 'Regime Theory' claims the natural establishment of informal networks and cooperations of 
actors, which reflect the regulative interests of these actors in specific fields of policies.15 This 
can be one explanation for the dynamics of group consistency of regional groups such as WEOG, 
GRULAC or ideological defined interest groups such as the OIC. Those regimes may overlap 
and complement, but also undermine each other and super-ordinate institutions. This perspective 
is particularly helpful when trying to understand the dynamics and voting behaviour of groups in 
connection to their integration within the OIC. 
But Neo-Institutionalist theories have their limitations when it comes to aspects of identity and 
ideology as elements of (irrational) decision making and behaviour of actors. In their dominant 
variants Neo-Institutionalism assumes that decision making processes are in general determined 
by rational-choice considerations16 and economic cost-benefit calculations,  where an  absolute 
'win' is more important than a relative one.17 
But under this premise, the positions and pursued strategies of the actors involved in the topic of 
Defamation of Religions could not be accurately explained.  This is because of the optimistic 
emphasis  of  Neo-Institutionalism  on  absolute  benefit,  which  would  lead  quasi  naturally  to 
cooperation and stability18, and behaviour of the players would be determined (and explainable) 
as “a function of rules and incentives”19. Such an assumption ignores (at least partially) those 
elements,  which  are  not  explainable  through  a  common  understanding  of  the  relevance  of 
rational-choice in  decision making: States may stick to  their  policies due to their  ideologies 
although these  policies  do  not  prove  to  be  beneficial  on  a  rational  level.  Essentially,  Neo-
13Georg Simonis, Studium und Arbeitstechniken der Politikwissenschaft (Opladen: Leske   Budrich, 2003), 114.
14Woyke, Handworterbuch Internationale Politik, 288.
15Filzmair et al., Internationale Politik : eine Einfuhrung, 290-293.
16Simonis, Studium und Arbeitstechniken der Politikwissenschaft, 114.
17Woyke, Handworterbuch Internationale Politik, 287.
18Ibid.
19B Peters, Research methods in politics, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
24.
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Institutionalism is  criticised  as  being  focused  too  greatly  on  economic power,  leaving  aside 
(elements of)  ideological power and interests20,  which play a crucial  role in the positions of 
States towards the matter of Defamation of Religions. 
In its traditional  rational variants,  Institutionalism to a great  extent,  ignores the relevance of 
ideology  per  se  and  questions  of  collective  (religious)  identity  that  have  proven  to  play an 
essential role in the dynamics surrounding the concept of Defamation of Religions. Objectives 
concerning ethical  values are not perceived by this  theory as the real  interests  of players in 
decision-making processes. Crucially,  Neo-Institutionalism sees the main interest of (rationally 
behaving) States to be to regulate interests, not change them.21
This is particularly problematic as my research indicates that actors in the process relating to the 
concept of Defamation of Religion, are in fact not aiming at the regulation of their own interests 
but the implementation of the concept as a commonly accepted idea. Neo-Institutionalism has its 
limitations for explaining the State's objectives of creating ideological hegemonies that support 
their own ideological identities. 
Considering the importance of cultural and religious ideas and ideologies, Neo-Gramscian theory 
provides valuable understanding of the specifics of the political  dynamics that have evolved 
around the concept of Defamation of Religions. In particular, the Neo-Gramscian understanding 
of hegemony as being constructed and maintained by a combination of ideological consensus 
and political force22 provides an explanation for the internal state of consistency within regional 
groups and 'regimes', such as WEOG or the OIC. 
The social-constructive perspective of Neo-Gramscianism provides a valuable addition to Neo-
Institutionalist  theory  by  overcoming  the  object-subject  distinction  regarding  hegemony23 in 
terms of a consideration of 'historic materialism' as the roots for consensual secured hegemony24. 
Moreover,  it  provides  supplementary  explanations  for  the  struggle  for  ideological  consensus 
within and among different actors on the international institutional level. The results of this paper  
reflect this relevance of 'consensus' in the struggle for ideological hegemony, as the concept and 
resolution have proven to essentially  remain effect-less,  if  consensus-building for ideological 
20 Andreas Boeckh, Internationale Beziehungen : hrsg. von Andreas Boeckh. (Munchen: Beck, 1994), 229.
21 Woyke, Handworterbuch Internationale Politik, 287.
22 Sonja Buckel, Hegemonie gepanzert mit Zwang : Zivilgesellschaft und Politik im Staatsverstandnis Antonio  
Gramscis, 1st ed. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 24-27.
23 Henk Overbeek, “Transnational historical materialism,” in Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories  
[e.d. Ronen Palan], n.d., 168.
24 Schieder, Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen, 338.
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(counter-)hegemony  cannot  be  accomplished.  Essentially,  this  critical  approach  also  better 
reflects matters of north-south conflicts and as a 'class-theory' connects economic and ideological  
interest and hegemony.25
Therefore, a combination of Neo-Institutionalism and Neo-Gramscian perspectives seem most 
suitable  for  research  on  the  subject  of  Defamation  of  Religions.  Both  greatly  support  the 
approach of international law, regarding its role in international relations. The interconnectedness 
of international relations and public international law will be elaborated upon in the following 
section. 
25 Filzmair et al., Internationale Politik : eine Einfuhrung, 90; Buckel, Hegemonie gepanzert mit Zwang :  
Zivilgesellschaft und Politik im Staatsverstandnis Antonio Gramscis, 145.
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 1.1.3  The Intersection of Public International Law and International 
Relations
The at times  ambiguous relationship between international law and international relations has 
been  extensively  discussed  in  academic  discourse.  Some  of  the  practical  intersections  and 
commonalities  have  been  mentioned  above.  As  discussed before,  the  codification  and 
juridification of conflict in international institutions and regimes, might tempt an understanding 
of public international law as part of international relations rather than distinct discipline on its  
own. This understanding must be rejected as although both disciplines elaborate upon the same 
subject, their approaches to tackle the subject matter differ significantly:26 
Political science tends to understand international law as a product of the reciprocity of political 
powers,  articulated  mainly  through  international  institutions.  Experts  in  international  law 
however,  concede  to  international  law,  a  political  power  of  its  own.27 Institutionalisation  of 
international affairs in fact provides a corridor or space for actors to manoeuvre and pursue their  
objectives,28 with the structure of this corridor arguably being determined by international law.
While  on  the  one  hand international  relations  are  concerned with  understanding  why actors 
behave  in  certain  ways  and  aims  at  explaining  underlying  power-relations,  experts  in 
international law tend to disregard essential  questions of political  science contributing to the 
creation of public international  law itself.29 However,  for the purpose of this thesis a deeper 
understanding  of  public  international  law  seems  barely  possible  without  incorporating 
explanatory models of political science.30 This is even more so the case as international law must 
be understood as  political  law. For its  effectiveness,  it  is  to  a  high degree  dependent  on its 
recognition  as  legally  binding by its  subjects  themselves – the  States.  The lack of  a  global  
government  or  in  other  words,  the  existence  of  'anarchy'  and  the  necessary  containment  of 
conflicts  into codified norms, therefore demands a political-science approach to international 
law. 
The regime theory provides added value from a legal  perspective, and further connects both 
approaches,  international  relations  and  international  law.  Norms  and  standards  of  public 
26 Woyke, Handworterbuch Internationale Politik, 545.
27 Hobe, Einfuhrung in das Volkerrecht, 5.
28 Roland Czada, “Theorie politischer Institutionen,” n.d., http://www.politik.uni-
osnabrueck.de/POLSYS/Archive/instit14.htm.
29 Hobe, Einfuhrung in das Volkerrecht, 5.
30 Ibid., 6.
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international  law which  have  not  been  universally  accepted  as  valid  on  a  global  scale,  are 
nonetheless  often  implemented  on  a  regional  scale,  even  under  the  roof  of  such  'universal 
organisations'  as  the  United  Nations.31 This  is  often  seen  as  a  necessary  step  towards  the 
complete realisation of concepts that have not (yet) been commonly accepted.32 This again, is 
closely interlinked with questions of the struggle for hegemony of ideas, as advanced by Neo-
Gramscian theory. Such a regionalisation can in fact impair the search for a common canon of 
values, and lead to a deepening of the rift between competing ideological perspectives and their  
regimes, as for instance between WEOG and the OIC, in case of the idea of Human Rights and 
the relevance of the concept of Defamation of Religions therein. 
An essential  tenet of public international law is  the 'cultivation of conflict'  as a principle  of 
conflict resolution. Here an intersection is found with social constructivist and Institutionalist 
theories of international relations. The maxim advocates the peaceful settlement of conflicts by 
outlawing the use of force though formally revoking the 'right to war' (liberum jus ad bellum) 
from States;33 and in essence thereby stipulating a general prohibition of the use of force for the 
realisation of political goals.34
This intersection of international law governing peaceful settlement of conflicts between States 
finds it ultimate practical implementation in form of the umbrella of the international community 
of  States  –  the  United  Nations.  The  UN  Charter  ultimately  governs  international  relations 
between  States  by  stipulating  the  principle  of  prohibition  of  force  as  well  as  its  possible 
exceptions.35 Although those rules have been violated constantly, due to divergence in interest 
and power on the one hand, and law and reason on the other, the legal provisions stipulated in the 
Charter became the fundamental point of reference for international relations today. 36
In a similar fashion, the UDHR although essentially a core foundation for international Human 
Rights law, is as much a political instrument and heavily draws on international relations, as a 
legal one. As such it is evident that this paper, although first and foremost aiming to clarify the 
legal compatibility of the concept of (legally) combating Defamation of Religions as stipulated 
in UN resolutions, is as much a political analysis. 
31 Ibid., 55.
32 Ibid., 56.
33 Woyke, Handworterbuch Internationale Politik.
34 Hobe, Einfuhrung in das Volkerrecht, 50.
35 Ibid., 306-308.
36 Woyke, Handworterbuch Internationale Politik, 542, 543.
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 1.2  Methodological Approach
As argued in the previous chapter, theories of international relations and public international law 
are most crucial for the objectives of this research. As such, the methodological approaches 
employed in this work closely relate to the theories outlined above.  
 1.2.1  Clarification on Terminology
For  the  purpose  of  creating  the  necessary  framework  to  answer  the  research  question  and 
meaningfully undertake the goals of this paper, Chapter 2 was devoted to setting boundaries for 
the  terms  in  question  –  'Defamation',  'Religion'  and  'Defamation  of  Religions'.  This  further 
included an in-depth discussion of the nature of Human Rights. I have argued, that this nature 
and  the  interpretation  of  certain  provisions  of  the  Human  Rights  Covenants  are  mutually 
dependent upon each other. Hence, a Human Rights law based approach is required to clarify the 
validity and compatibility of the various perspectives on the subject. Nonetheless, any research 
would remain incomplete if it did not include an in-depth political analysis of the international 
relations  (and  negotiations)  attached  to  this  concept.  This  is  because  of  the  explanatory 
limitations of international law, as theorised in the previous chapter. Specifically the notions of 
ideology and more precisely Islam and Human Rights, as well as the relationship of Defamation 
of Religions to the concept of Blasphemy are essential to be elaborated on.
 1.2.2  Political Analysis
A political analysis is necessary to understand the changing perspectives regarding the concept, 
the suspicions that exist  between its proponents and critics and the discourse within the UN 
system. This crucial  political  analysis  is  conducted through a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative research methods, while giving special attention to a qualitative document analysis 
to assess the development of the concept and the Member State perspective towards it. 
This  content analysis is conducted using  primary sources including the resolution series itself, 
statements made by Member States and UN officials; as well as  secondary literature such as 
reports and minutes of diplomatic meetings. This approach carves out the underlying connections  
between discourses regarding the universality of human values such as human rights and the 
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discourse of the concept of Defamation of Religions itself. While the examination of the content 
of  the  sources  does  not  include  a  comprehensive  quantitative  data  assessment,  but  selected 
quantitative indications are given to compliment the picture. But this alone could not give a 
sufficient understanding of the voting behaviour of actors in their embedded regional contexts. 
An addition of a more empirical-analytical approach37 was required:
In this second phase, quantitative and qualitative approaches are utilised in conjunction: In 
Chapter 4.5, hard data of voting results are connected with the official explanations of Member 
States regarding their voting. The quantitative data, such as bail-out numbers, voting results, etc 
are analysed in relation to patterns and developments of selected regional voting groups, 
particularly considering the influence of the 'non-formal' interest-network, the OIC. To 
compliment this analysis, the data is connected with and explained by a qualitative analysis of  
the Member States given 'Explanation of Vote' (EoVs), to draw conclusions concerning the 
dynamics of the regional group. The sources in use are mainly primary ones such as video 
records of oral statements made in UN fora. By applying a mixed method investigation of 
regional voting patterns together with official statements deliver an understanding of the 
discourse about, but foremost make it possible to formulate hypotheses regarding the further 
development of the concept of Defamation of Religions.
 1.2.3  A Consideration of International law
In a third step the carved out nature of the concept of Defamation of Religions is analysed for its 
Human Rights compatibility by testing it against the content of the so-called 'International Bill of 
Human Rights'. This includes inter alia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). For this purpose I focus on a  normative-
ontological approach, which connects  hermeneutic research and conceptional interest with an 
orientation on moral values (of universal validity).38 Such approach is normative as it embeds its 
explanations with ethical values. In the context of this thesis the universal values providing the 
orientation and guideline for  hermeneutic content analysis are Human Rights. Practically, the 
claims and calls of the resolution and the intentions of the proponents, as are worked out in the 
37Ulrich Alemann, Politikwissenschaftliche Methoden : Grundriß fur Studium und Forschung (Opladen: Westdt. 
Verl., 1995), 22.
38Ibid.
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political analysis of this thesis, are tested against the provisions and intentions of international 
Human Rights law. The in-depth legal analysis is carried out to clarify the potential implications 
that the concept of Defamation of Religion might have for the enjoyment of Human Rights in 
practice, above all in the cases of the right to freedom of expression, and the manifestation of 
religion and belief  for  religious  minorities.  The testing is  conducted  with a  consideration of 
articles 31 and 32 of the 'Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' on the general rules and 
supplementary means of the interpretation of treaties. The General Comments provided by the 
Human Rights Committee (the de facto standard reference for  the interpretation of the ICCPR 
provisions) are additionally useful to back or reject the various arguments  made in regard of the 
concepts  Human  Rights  compatibility.  The  Vienna  Declaration  and  Programme  of  Action 
(VDPA)  served  as  the  standard  reference  for  the  'nature'  of  Human  Rights as  such.  For 
elaborating on the consequences for vulnerable groups,  primarily  women and minorities,  the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and 
the Declaration on Rights of Minorities (A/Res/47/135) were essential. All together, these central 
declarations, covenants, conventions and comments provide the main framework to conduct a 
plausible  and  meaningful  legal  analysis  of  the  compatibility  of  the  concept  of  (Combating) 
Defamation of Religions with Human Rights standards and relevant international laws.
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 1.2.4  Hypotheses Formation
A posteriori, the results of this research and the conclusions drawn from the research question led  
to  the  formation  of  explanatory  hypotheses.  Based  on  the  results  of  this  research,  these 
hypotheses were formed in an explorative approach through abductive reasoning, as suggested 
by Charles Peirce.39 In his own words Peirce outlines the merits of this approach in distinction to 
the common approaches of deduction and induction: „Deduction proves that something must be;  
Induction shows that something actually is operative; Abduction merely suggests that something  
may be.“40 Hence in this work, the hypotheses formulated are only generated by scientific work, 
rather than tested by it. These (essentially explanatory working) hypotheses I suggest for further 
testing in additional research. 
The hypotheses are formulated under consideration of the ideal qualities they should to fulfil, 
which are: 
1. Principle falsifiability of the claim made
2. High level of generalisation in its prediction
3. High level of specificness qualifying the expected relations 
4. High level of specificness qualifying the determining assumptions
5. High level of verifiability through conclusive operationalibility41
39 A Aliseda, Abductive reasoning : logical investigations into discovery and explanation (Dordrecht ;;London: 
Springer, 2005), 170-172.
40 Charles Sanders Peirce, Charles Hartshorne (ed.), and Paul Weiss (ed.), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders  
Peirce, Volumes V and VI: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism and Scientific Metaphysics, vol. 5 (Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1935), para. 171.
41 Jurgen Kriz, Lexikon der Politik : Politikwissenschaftliche Methoden, vol. 2 (Munchen: Beck, 1994), 169.
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Accurate  research  regarding  the  compatibility  of  the  concepts  of  religion,  defamation  and 
defamation of religions to the Human Rights framework is highly dependent on well defined 
terms and the manner in which they are articulated in discussions. Unfortunately, the resolution 
itself does not supply definitions for either the terms 'Defamation', 'Religion' or 'Defamation of 
Religions' itself. Nevertheless, respective UN resolutions, official statements of Member States 
and  the  reports  of  the  mandated  Special  Procedures  of  the  UN  System  provide  a  useful 
framework to  understand what  the  the  term 'Defamation  of  Religions'  signifies  and what  is 
included  within  it.  ,It  is  crucial  for  further  research  to  evaluate  such  sources  and test  their 
proposed understanding of  the  concept  against  widely accepted  definitions  of  the  individual 
terms of 'Defamation' and 'Religion'.
Fractionalising the term into its elements
Part of the difficulty in defining Defamation of Religions is based on the problem of how to deal 
with  a  compound  expression  like  this.  Defamation  of  Religions as  a  term consists  of  two 
interconnected terms, which do not follow the simple equation of 1+1=2, but influence each 
others meaning in their own context. The undefined nature of Defamation of Religions created 
considerable discomfort among diplomats within the UN; a fact that became more than obvious 
during  informal  negotiations  on  the  Defamation  Resolution  in  the  64 th GA session,  where 
questions regarding the imprecise terminology were frequently voiced. To accurately understand 
the concept as a whole, the individual terms ‘Defamation’ and ‘Religion’ must be understood 
first, followed by a discussion of their interrelatedness.
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 2.1  Defining Religion 
Defining 'religion'  on a  scientific  level  has  always been an uneasy task.  Although everyone 
seems to immediately know what is meant when speaking about a particular religion or religions 
in general, a scientific definition that withstands legitimate criticism is hard to come by. Even the 
most respected and prominent pieces of scientific reference such as Encyclopedia Britannica 
admit to the difficulties inherent in any attempt to define this term.42 Historically, many attempts 
from different angles were made to define religion, most notably from a religious perspective 
itself. In the theological Christian tradition, such attempts to define religion remained clearly 
insufficient. Their scholars could not provide a definition that was broad and inclusive enough to 
find acceptance across different religions, cultures, traditions and beliefs. Their own religious 
perspective, in particular Christian theology, always remained a hindrance for reaching an overall  
cross-cultural agreement. In the end, the limitations of their own religious horizon consequently 
led to biased ideas about the nature of religion.  Today their  formulation of religion must be 
considered  as  unacceptably  euro-  or  christianity-centric,  rather  than  universally applicable. 
Throughout time,  the understanding of religion was not only dependent on specific religious 
traditions, but was closely linked “to the predominant understandings of humanity and human 
nature”43. Consequently, changes in the perception of humanity and the essence of what human 
nature stands for today, altered the understanding of the term religion accordingly.  Not only 
within the course of time has the term inevitably evolves; the understanding of humanity and 
therefore, of religion differs across various cultures, societies and religious schools of thought 
around the world. They all have or try to have, wittingly or unwittingly, an impact definitionally 
on  the  approach  to  religion.  It  is  no  surprise  then  that  attempts  within  a  specific  religious 
tradition to formulate definitions have resulted in terms and concepts that remain limited to the 
understandings of their time as well as their cultural and religious horizons. To circumvent this 
dilemma,  some  theologians  have  tried  to  come  up  with  extremely  minimalistic  working 
definitions. Paul Tillich for instance, “defined religion in terms of man's ultimate concern[..]”44 
But although such minimalist definitions avoid the problems of limiting religious horizons or 
compromising on ones own religious teachings, they would then include political ideologies such 
as communism “as proper objects of the study of religion”45
42 The new Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 26 (Chicago [u.a.]: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1986), 509.
43 Seth Kunin, Religion : the modern theories (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), vii.
44 The new Encyclopaedia Britannica, 26:510.
45 Ibid.
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In addition religious approaches very often lack the necessary scientific methods and principles 
to provide a rigorous and sound definition. This is because their results “ultimately rest on belief 
and therefore on assumptions that are not testable or verifiable”46 Consequently, a definition that 
remains out of reach for scientific evaluation has little value in a scientific debate. 
As I have mentioned above, the difficulty in defining the term 'religion' accurately is a general 
one and does not remain limited to theological hindrance. Various suggestions claim their merits 
side by side, none of which are truly satisfactory. The World English Dictionary defines religion 
as:
belief in, worship of, or  obedience to a supernatural  power or powers considered to be divine or  to have 
control of human destiny47
Oxford Dictionary, providing one of the most often referred to definitions, views religion as:
the belief in and worship of a superhuman controlling power, especially a personal God or gods48
And the Merriam Webster provides an interesting addition, characterising religion as: 
a cause, principle, or system of beliefs held to with ardor and faith49
All of these definitions may be successful in catching an essential notion of religion, but fall 
short in being all-inclusive. While none of them can be called wrong, none of them is complete 
either.  The difficulties are manifold: One hindrance clearly is related to the aim to catch  all  
notions of what makes religion so special among human culture. But the sheer amount of variety 
of religious concepts spread throughout human cultures makes it impossible to accommodate all 
relevant notions of religion in a single definition. Rather than pin down the essential meaning of 
religion  for  human  beings,  other  attempts  have  been  made  to  circle  out  a  single  essential  
ingredient which  would  be  commonly  shared  by all  religions.  But  as  it  turns  out,  elements 
considered paramount  in one religious traditions, were often considered peripheral  at  best  in 
others.50 Not being capable of finding an essential core that all religions would universally share, 
attempts have been made to focus on the institutional level, ending up with technical definitions 
such as the one suggested by Encyclopedia Britannica: 
46 Kunin, Religion : the modern theories, vii.
47 “Religion,” in Collins English Dictionary, 10th ed. (HarperCollins Publishers, n.d.), 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/religion.
48 “Religion,” in Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, 2010), 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0699400.
49 “Religion,” in Merriam Webster, n.d., http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/religion.
50 The new Encyclopaedia Britannica, 26:509.
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In practice, a religion is a particular system, or a set of systems, in which doctrine, myths, rituals, sentiments,  
institutions, and other similar elements are interconnected.51 
While this approach avoids the risk of becoming overly broad that is faced in the impossible task 
of including all notions of religion, such technical definitions have been criticised for missing the 
spiritual nature of religion. A general problem is that narrow definitions would shut out many 
groups, ideas or faiths which are widely considered as legitimately within the ambit of religions; 
but broad definitions would encompass ideologies, such as communism, which the majority of 
religious scholars and students would not acknowledge within their scope. Some scholars have 
attempted to find a middle ground and suggest compromises such as:
A religion, first and foremost, is a collection of beliefs.52 
But additionally to 'beliefs', the term religion is widely understood to incorporate organizational 
structures, rituals and practices which distinguish one from another and contribute to a collective 
identity.  As seen in the short  summary above of attempts to define the term, the discussion 
usually revolves around two major aspects of religion: belief and faith on one side, and practice 
and its institutional nature on the other. Certainly the United Nations, when drafting the most 
basic Human Rights instruments, recognized the dilemma and worked around it by avoiding a 
strong  and  explicit  definition  of  religion,  and  instead  preferred  to  list  aspects  that  religion 
encompasses. In addition, the discussion surrounding Defamation of Religions that is currently 
taking place , renews the boundaries for what the UN membership actually interpret to rightly 
fall  under  the  term 'religion'.  The  resolutions  adopted,  the  reports  submitted,  the  statements 
made, are all a testimony of the underlying understanding of what religion means to the nations. 
Naturally, most relevant for the aims of this paper is to use a working definition that comes 
closest to the understanding of religion as is reflected in the discussions around the concept and 
resolution of  Defamation  of  Religions.  Therein a  very  traditional  understanding is  reflected, 
which  mainly  points  towards  a  few  main  religions  such  as  Islam,  Christianity,  Judaism  or 
Hinduism.  The  resolution,  while  trying  to  remain  inclusive  by  maintaining  general  remarks 
applicable to 'all  religions',  does not refrain from naming some of these religions either,  and 
maintains  a  strong emphasis  on Islam in  particular.  This double-sided approach towards  the 
51Ibid.
52Brice Dickson, “The United Nations and Freedom of Religion,” The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 44, no. 2 (April 1995): 1.
22
 2 Defamation, Religion and Defamation of Religions
understanding of religion is not a surprise, considering that the resolution is first and foremost 
aimed  at  protecting  'Islam',  while  simultaneously  working  to  gain  universal  agreement. 
Consequently,  the  resolution  refers  to  dominant  religious ideas  pooled  together  as  collective 
branches. The resolution lists the religious idea of Christianity, but does not differ between the 
various religious groups contained therein, such as Roman Catholicism, Russian Orthodoxy or 
various types of Protestantism. And while having a strong focus on Islam, the resolution does not 
differ between Islamic sects e.g. between Sunni or Shia. Despite the obvious difficulty of listing 
all existing religions, it is further noteworthy that only a few main religions within the discussion 
are explicitly referred to as such: namely, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. It would be wrong to 
say the resolution envisions religion as a term referring primarily to specific faith groups, but  
should be understood as a reference to religious ideas, which differ from each other and are 
labelled with commonly accepted names.
This understanding is also supported by statements given by Member States in the fora of the  
UN bodies, above all by those in support of the concept who were prominent in drafting the 
language of the resolution.53 
The discussions of religion within the wider UN System are not limited to the question of ideas 
or who the term might apply to. Very often they are connected to the question of what activities  
and  which  communities  within  which  these  activities  are  exercised,  ought  to  be  rightfully 
labelled 'religious'. The Human Rights framework with its outline of freedom of religion and 
belief and the General Comments elaborating on the subject, give good indication of a broader 
understanding  of  the  term  religion,  widely  accepted  by  the  UN  membership.  Included  are 
activities  meant  to  manifest  ones  religion,  such  as  to  worship,  observance  of  dietary  rules, 
wearing of particular clothing, et al. It also must be pointed out that these practices are found to 
be socially organized and often outlined in rules applicable for ones own religious community. 
The characteristic of exercising religious practices not only in private, but in community together 
with  others,  and  inter  alia  in  public,  is  essential  and  an  undisputed  notion  within  the  UN 
membership. Taking into account the considerations voiced by the nations representatives, the 
perspectives within international law, and the language used within resolutions adopted by the 
UN bodies, we may draw the conclusion that any working definition of the term 'religion' must 
include: that they are ideas which are not verifiable, that they are socially organized, and that 
they provide a spiritual value. 
53 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 62nd Session, 52nd meeting,  
(A/C.3/62/SR.52) (New York: United Nations, January 2008), para. 11.
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Hence,  the  working  definition  for  this  paper  will  be  an  adaptation  of  Kunin's  approach,  to 
articulate the meaning of the term as it is understood and reflected within the context of the 
United Nations: 
A religion is first and foremost a socially organized collection of spiritual beliefs and ideas, while remaining  
unverifiable.
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 2.2  The  legal  term  'Defamation'  and  the  term  'Defamation  of  
Religions' in the UN System
In legal  terms,  defamation  is  defined simply as  “the  act  of  making untrue  statements  about 
another  which  damages  his/her  reputation”54.  It  should  be  noted  that  legally,  the  act  of 
defamation must also include the necessary aspect of  intent.  Essentially defamation does not 
occur randomly but is an offence only by its intent.  The case of defamation has jurisdiction 
worldwide and to a great extent, is publicly accepted as a punishable offence. Defamation affects 
the reputation of the individual targeted by it, and international law puts State Parties in charge 
of  protecting  the  reputation  of  their  citizens.;  for  this  purpose  it  is  within  the  legitimate 
instruments of State Authorities to stifle freedom of speech, but only to the extent necessary and 
as provided by law as Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil  and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) stipulates55. In the debate surrounding the terminology of Defamation of Religions and 
its underlying conceptual framework, it is noteworthy that international law is concerned solely 
with individuals in the matter of defamation, and not with objects, ideas or beliefs itself.56 
While the cited definition is legally well articulated regarding what should be included in the 
concept of defamation, the resolution on this issue fails to specify the boundaries of the special  
case of Defamation of Religions.57 Instead, one can gauge how the resolution defines these terms 
by  looking  at  the  issues  it  highlights  as  symptoms  of  the  phenomenon  of  Defamation  of 
Religions and the perceptions behind these issues. Also the initiatives welcomed and urged in the 
resolutions' language give clues as to the kind of responses to the issue that are seen preferable 
by supporters of the concept. The reports and statements of the Special Rapporteurs appointed by 
the Human Rights Council (HRC) to research on this topic, and the reactions of Member States 
towards those results (in form of statements as well as notes in the resolution) further contribute 
towards an understanding of the concept within the UN System.
54 law.com -  Law Dictionary, “Defamation,” n.d., http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=458.
55 United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2200A (XXI), 1976, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm Article 19.
56 Matt Cherry, “Speaking freely about religion: religious freedom, defamation and blasphemy,” n.d., 
http://www.iheu.org/speaking-freely-about-religion-religious-freedom-defamation-and-blasphemy.
57 Liaquat Ali Khan, “Combating Defamation of Religions,” 2007, 4, 
http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/282795813&referer=brief_results.
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Although the Defamation Resolution aims to apply to all religions, it  continuously highlights 
“the negative projection of Islam in the media and the introduction and enforcement of laws that 
specifically discriminate against and target Muslims.”58 This notion of understanding Defamation 
of Religions as equivalent to the “Negative Stereotyping of Islam” has been reaffirmed to me in 
several personal conversations with diplomats, who had represented the OIC in negotiations over 
the resolution in recent years.59 In order to counter possible claims that stereotyping is not always 
negative in nature, proponents of an Islam-centred reading further clarified negative stereotyping 
as one that projects a negative image of Islam. The implication here is that primarily the western 
media be regulated to combat the phenomenon of said Defamation of Religions. This is as the 
proponents  see  predominantly  the  rights  of  Muslim  minorities  as  migrant  communities  in 
western countries at risk of falling victim to the phenomenon. In this regard the resolution states 
the countries' deep concern about “negative projection of certain religions in […] against and 
target persons with certain ethnic and religious backgrounds, particularly Muslim minorities”60 
and further strongly condemns “all manifestations and acts of racism […] against […] religious 
[…] minorities and migrants and the stereotypes often applied to them”61 
While  not  necessarily  representing  the  official  position  of  all  OIC  Member  States,  or  the 
understood definition of the concept; such conversations , as well a similar statements held in  
national  capacity  at  various  UN  bodies,  make  it  evident  that  the  core  issue  surrounding 
Defamation  of  Religions  is  that  of  communication.  This  notion  is  further  supported  by  the 
analysis conducted by various Special Rapporteurs, whose reports have been welcomed and even 
quoted by OIC representatives at several occasions. Special attention must be given to the reports  
of  those Special  Rapporteurs  who were  specifically  appointed and mandated  by the Human 
Rights Council to research and report on the phenomenon of Defamation of Religions and to 
subsequently provide recommendations regarding it.  For example,  the Special  Rapporteur on 
Contemporary  forms  of  racism,  racial  discrimination,  xenophobia  and  related  intolerance, 
Doudou Diène, defined Defamation of Religions as a concept that „[…] provides the intellectual 
justification and legitimizing discourse that supports all forms of discrimination.“62 The Special 
58 Ibid., 1.
59 Conversation took place in February 2010, at the Headquarters of UN, in New York. Name and nationality 
ought to remain unmentioned within this thesis. Exact quotation known to the author.
60 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HCR/Res/13/16), 2010 PP.
61 Ibid. OP 13.
62 Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,  
Doudou Diène, Report on the manifestations of defamation of religions and in particular on the serious
implications of Islamophobia on the enjoyment of all rights, 2007, para. 13.
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Rapporteur further suggested that the “equation of Islam with violence, terrorism and cultural 
and  social  backwardness  by  intellectual,  political  and  media  figures”63 is  a  symptomatic 
expression of the phenomenon.
In short,  Diène's perspective tells us that “defamation of religions is a form of speech about 
religion  that  justifies  or  supports  human  rights  violations”64 as  Rivers  bluntly  puts  it. 
Unfortunately of course, any kind of speech  can be used to justify human rights violations  in  
principle. In other words: any kind of speech about any religion that leads to any human rights  
violation or is used in any way to justify any human rights violation would need to be considered 
a form of Defamation of Religions. Essentially, it is not possible to assess in advance whether a 
peaceful speech on religion or the criticism of certain religious practices or practises justified 
with  religious  arguments,  will  subsequently  be  used  as  justification  for  acts  of  violence  or 
Human Rights violations. 
Such considerations make this trend of widening the boundaries of Defamation of Religions to 
such extremes, problematic to say the least. While Diène fails here in giving a useful definition 
of the  term that  would provide feasible boundaries;  he does well  in framing the  concept  as 
essentially  being an issue of communication.  His remarks clearly show the thematic  linkage 
between 'Freedom of Expression' as a human right and Defamation of Religions as its presumed 
misuse. 
Proponents of the resolution tend to frame the concept of Defamation of Religions mostly as a 
matter  of  negative  stereotyping  that  is  disseminated  by  media  broadcasting.  But  legally, 
defamatory statements  that  are  broadcast  or  are  in  print  are  referred  to  as  'libel'  rather  than 
'defamation'.65 Under this perspective, it would be pertinent rather to understand Defamation of 
Religions as religious libel – nevertheless, this would remain a concept without a sound legal 
standing. 
In short, the most significant difference between the meaning of the legal term 'defamation' and 
the meaning of the term in the Defamation of Religions resolution lies in their respective areas of 
application. In the first case, it is an individual or a legal entity that falls victim to defamation. 
Defamation of Religions, however, not only refers to a a group of individuals but rather to an 
63 Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,  
Doudou Diène, Situation of Muslim and Arab peoples in various parts of the world in the aftermath of the 
events of 11 September 2001 (UN Commission on Human Rights, 2003), para. 2.
64 Julian Rivers, “The Question of Freedom of Religion or Belief and Defamation,” Religion and Human Rights 2, 
no. 3 (November 1, 2007): 115.
65 law.com -  Law Dictionary, “Defamation.”
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idea that those people might collectively share. This is strongly reminiscent of the long standing 
legal tradition of Anti-blasphemy laws. Critics point to the problem that while Defamation of 
Religions might seem like a legal issue located somewhere between traditional defamation law 
and Anti-blasphemy laws, or as a combined new approach – the terminology 'Defamation of 
Religions' is – from a legal perspective – is nevertheless quite difficult.66 Consequently, some 
observers  of  the  debate  carefully  advise  both  proponents  and  critics  to  shift  away  from  a 
language of 'Defamation of Religions' to the more legally valuable one of 'incitement to religious 
hatred', a move by and large welcomed by many Human Rights Special Rapporteurs.67 Others 
point out in their statements that indeed terms with less legal meaning such as ‘disparagement of 
religions’ or ‘abuse of religions’ would be preferable.68 The dispute surrounding the terminology 
of Defamation of Religions contributes greatly to an explanation of the political dynamics of the 
resolution; although it does not clarify its implications for the Human Rights standards. These 
will be considered in a separate section.
66Rivers, “The Question of Freedom of Religion or Belief and Defamation,” 114, 115.
67Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,  
Githu Muigai, Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, and Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, “Joint Statement 
to freedom of expression and incitement to racial or religious hatred,” April 22, 2009.
68Rivers, “The Question of Freedom of Religion or Belief and Defamation,” 115.
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 2.3  The Relationship between Defamation of Religions and 
Blasphemy
Essentially, Defamation of Religions pertains the case of the defamation of a religious idea. In 
reality this might trigger legal consequences similar to those of Anti-blasphemy laws, rather than 
those  of  usual  defamation  laws.  This  has  severe  repercussions  for  the  States'  obligations  in 
practical jurisdictional terms: when it comes to Defamation of Religions, the state authority is 
forced  to  make  a  decision  about  which  religious  ideas  are  acceptable,  while  in  the  case  of 
defamation of an individuals' reputation, the state needs to determine what facts are accurate.69 
Subsequently  in  the  case  of  Defamation  of  Religions,  the  government  has  to  decide  which 
religious ideas are to be accepted or not by public opinion in a manner akin to facts, and which 
deserve protection  from criticism,  neglect  or  libel.  In  other words,  the  state  must  determine 
which  of  the  statements  opposing religious  ideas  can be  acceptably  expressed  in  the  public 
square. 
Hence in practice, such laws differ little from Anti-blasphemy laws. In fact, Anti-blasphemy laws 
and legal measures against Defamation of Religions are the same for all practical purposes, as 
both  target  individuals  in  their  eventual  execution.  This  notion  is  affirmed  by  Special 
Rapporteurs mandated to research on the issue and report to the HRC. In a joint statement held in  
2009,  Mr.  Githu  Muigai,  Special  Rapporteur  on  contemporary  forms  of  racism,  racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Ms. Asma Jahangir, Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of religion or belief and Mr. Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, referred to anti-blasphemy laws as 
the practical, legal implementation of the concept of combating Defamation of Religions. 70 
Anti-Blasphemy laws have a long tradition in various societies and national legislation around 
the world. Such legislation is not outdated as may be presumed; in fact, the Irish Defamation Act 
just  reaffirmed in  2009  an  understanding  of  blasphemy as  a  punishable  offence,  and  Great 
Britain only abolished their  anti-blasphemy provisions in 2008. Most  Muslim countries have 
69 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Religious Defamation - Issues Brief,” October 29, 2009.
70 Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,  
Githu Muigai, Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, and Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, “Joint Statement 
to freedom of expression and incitement to racial or religious hatred.”
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laws  protecting  religious  symbols  and  other  sacred  elements  of  Islam.  In  some  cases,  like 
Pakistan or Saudi-Arabia, these laws even include the death penalty as possible punishment for 
certain  blasphemous  acts.71 Pakistan,  the  main  sponsor  and  strongest  proponent  of  the 
Defamation of Religions resolution,  has exceptionally harsh anti-blasphemy laws. Paragraphs 
§295 to §298 of Pakistan's Penal Code are dedicated to protecting state religion, which is Islam 
according to the constitutional provision.72 While article 298 targets the religious minority of the 
Ahmadis and stifles their right to manifest their religion73, the provisions in article 295 set out 
general rules prosecuting blasphemy. The law forbids 'outraging religious feelings', 'defiling the 
Quran'  or  'defaming  the  prophet  Muhammad'.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  latter  office  is 
punishable by death and the defiling of the Quran is punishable by a life sentence.74
In  their  practical  application,  there  is  really  little  difference  between  the  two  concepts  of 
Combating Defamation of Religions and Anti-blasphemy law, other than in their titles. In the 
end, the concept of Defamation of Religions is an attempted globalization of blasphemy laws, by 
exporting them from a domestic level to one of international politics and law.75 The Defamation 
Resolution brings the idea of an allegedly need to protect religion against blasphemous remarks 
to  the international  community of  States  for  their  consideration as  a  legitimate international 
interest; and provides thereby cover for domestic legislations. 
The question of the resulting implications for the enjoyment  of Human Rights is  not only a 
theoretical one, but is deeply connected with the implementation of the concept on the ground. 
Both the Human Rights compatibility and the specifics of legal implementation will be dealt 
with in separate chapters. 
71 Matt Cherry, “Speaking freely about religion: religious freedom, defamation and blasphemy.”
72 Government of Pakistan, “The Constitution of Pakistan,” n.d., 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part1.html, Part 1, Article 2.
73 Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), n.d., 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html, §298 A, B, C.
74 Ibid., § 295.
75 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, May 2009, 65, 228, 
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/AR2009/final%20ar2009%20with%20cover.pdf.
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 3  The Human Rights Concept
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
Article 1, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
 3.1  Introduction: A short History of Human Rights
The history of Human Rights is long and complex, but it was in the aftermath of the catastrophe 
of World War II that a unique opportunity arose to reach a historical agreement and articulate 
what is known today as the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (UDHR). This foremost 
document  of  modern  Human  Rights  understanding  was  proclaimed  by  the  United  Nations 
General  Assembly  in  Paris  on  10  December  1948.  It  is  the  very  basis  of  Human  Rights 
instruments and law both on a domestic and international level. Building upon it, a great number 
of specific  and legally  binding instruments have been developed that together  constitute  the 
international framework for Human Rights today.
In the short window of of relative political consensus between the end of World War II and the 
beginning of the Cold War, the creation of Human Rights took place. The drafting of the UDHR 
had been merely a peripheral project for the powers of its time. Considering the geopolitical 
context of the era – the shock of the Holocaust, the beginning Cold War and its proxy wars as in 
Korea – it can be safely claimed that the Human Rights project received far less attention than 
one might have reasonably expected considering it's  real impact. But overshadowed by other 
matters that seemed more pressing at the time, the project to establish an 'International Bill of 
Rights'  was  not  then  perceived  as  the  challenge  for  the  long  standing  principle  of  non-
interference in national internal affairs that it was.76 Hence – perhaps unknowingly – some of the 
mightiest  nations  bowed  down before  the  claims  of  smaller  countries  for  equal  rights,  and 
accepted a document that soon began to question the national  sovereignty of even the most 
powerful among them. Considering its severe consequences, the invention of Human Rights is an 
event that can hardly be overestimated.
76 Mary Glendon, A world made new: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New 
York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2002), 236.
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Defining Human Rights 
As Lynn Hunt in her book “Inventing Human Rights” eloquently puts it,  “Human rights are 
difficult to pin down because their definition, indeed their very existence, depends on emotions 
as much as on reason”77 It is in fact, the emotional disturbance felt when ones dignity is hurt that 
gives the concept of rights its powerful nature of being perceived as self-evident. This notion of 
self-evidence  is  an  essential  characteristic  of  the  modern  understanding  of  Human  Rights. 
Already in the US Declaration of Independence, drafted by President Jefferson in 1776, it was 
stated that the rights of all men were self-evident, and would not require any justification. And 
while the French 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen' of 179878 expressed the 
'truth' of rights in a less straightforward manner than the US Declaration due to the legalistic tone 
of its time, both US and French declaration clearly refer to Human Rights as something 'given', 
in other words: self-evident79
This  self-evidence  is  closely  linked  to  another  determining  quality  of  Human  Rights,  the 
essential assertion of being natural. This means that all human beings have these rights at birth 
and they are not privileges that must be earned, as had been the case with specific civil rights in  
previous times. In short, Human Rights are understood as characterised by 3 central and highly 
interdependent qualities:
1. As a natural right – given by birth, simply be “being” human, rather than constituting a 
privilege to be earned or granted for some merits. 
2. As  equal for  all  humans  –  which  provides  the  grounds  for  the  rejection  of  any 
discrimination based on any distinction made between people.
3. As essentially universal – understood to be applicable under all jurisdictions 80
The essential characteristic of being universal has appeared to cause the most disputes in the long 
run. It was soon obvious that the notion of universality posed a challenge to national sovereignty 
and became a tool to justify interference in what is often labelled 'internal affairs'.
77 Lynn Hunt, Inventing human rights : a history (New York [u.a.]: Norton, 2008), 21.
78 National Assembly of France, Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789, 
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/frenchdec.html.
79 Lynn Hunt, Inventing human rights, 19.
80 Ibid., 20.
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The declaration itself does not hold any real power when it comes to legal consequences for non-
compliance. It does not contain any provisions or mechanisms to ensure accountability. In fact, 
legally speaking, the UDHR is irrelevant. The success of the declaration, however,  might be 
explained precisely due to its non-binding character. Not being a legal agreement but a moral one  
made it something of a general moral beacon for the universal grounds for rights,. The UDHR 
was not drafted to establish a set of laws but rather, reaffirm a collection of inherent and self  
evident rights that require no further explanation or justification nor any prescribed authority of 
accountability or legal reference. It is also remarkable that the UDHR focuses on the prevention 
of Human Rights violations rather than the punishment of its violators.81 This adds to its use as a 
tool for activists who call upon the moral rather than legal obligation of State Parties to fulfil 
their duties in granting their citizens the rights they inherently possess. 
For these reasons, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ultimately becomes a powerful 
weapon for all those without jurisdictional powers namely, the civil society, in demanding their 
rights and freedoms.
81 Glendon, A world made new Preface - xvi.
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 3.2  The international Human Rights framework
The  international  Human  Rights  framework  encompasses  today  a  whole  set  of  various 
conventions,  declarations,  resolutions  and  instruments  formally  adopted  by  the  international 
community. 
For this paper, the international Human Rights framework will provide an analytical framework 
to answer the main research question and to test the hypotheses behind it. Most relevant to this  
research are the principles set out in the UDHR – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
They provide the necessary moral underpinnings for the idea of Human Rights as such, as well  
as the legal Human Rights instruments built upon them: namely the ICCPR – the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights82 together with parts of the ICESCR – the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights83. All three together are often referred to as 
the International Bill of Human Rights, a term already used in proclaiming the UDHR itself back 
in 194884
Collectively, the the International Bill of Human Rights85 encompasses today:
•Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
•International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 
•International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
•Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
•Second  Optional  Protocol  to  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights, 
aiming at the abolition of the death penalty 
82United Nations, ICCPR.
83United Nations, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1976, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm.
84see: United Nations, General Assembly resolution 217 A(III), 1948, http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?
Open&DS=A/RES/217(III)&Lang=E.
85Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Ed.), “Fact Sheet No2. - The International Bill of Human 
Rights,” June 1996, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf.
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While the UDHR is the foundation for the HR framework, the ICCPR and ICESCR are relevant 
legal documents that will be used in conjunction with the former as a basis for further discussion 
of Human Rights in the international context. 
International Human Right law as such can be categorised into two main types of instruments. 
Firstly,  declarations,  usually  adopted by bodies such as  the  UN General  Assembly,  with  no 
concrete legislative power behind their decision. Those declarations do not constitute hard law, 
hence are not to be understood as truly legally binding. Nevertheless history has shown that these  
respective documents indeed have considerable moral impact, as they have found agreement in 
consensus and have been reiterated, referred to and reaffirmed in uncountable resolutions. They 
may be seen to have achieved the status of soft law over time. 
Hence, they provide the best outline of mutual understanding on Human Rights as it exists of 
today. The UDHR itself is perhaps the most prominent agreements of all – although not legally 
binding  under  international  law,  it  provides  the  guidelines  and  principles  for  other  relevant 
Human  Rights  law  and  instruments  and  therefore  can  be  interpreted  as  the  first  and  main 
standard statement on Human Rights.
The second type of instrument,  Conventions, are hard law. They are binding for all Member 
States of the United Nations. The two main pillars of legally binding Human Rights instruments 
are the above mentioned covenants, ICCPR and the ICESCR.
Besides those Human Rights instruments referred to as the international bill of Human Rights86, 
special attention must be given to the ICERD, the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The ICERD is relevant as it serves as the main thematic and 
legal vehicle for attempts to introduce the concept of Defamation of Religions into international 
Human Rights law. In this regard, continuous efforts are made at the Human Rights Council to 
amend the ICERD with complementary standards, in order to recognize Defamation of Religions 
as a form of racism prohibited by international law. When in 2009, the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Complementary Standards met to consider new normative standards to combat contemporary 
racism, Pakistan on behalf of the OIC, proposed to outlaw Defamation of Religions in a new 
optional protocol to the ICERD.87 Ever since then, proponents of the concept are working to 
establish and implement complementary standard to do just that. 
86 see: United Nations, “Drafting Committee on an International Bill of Human Rights,” n.d., 
http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/udhr/meetings_1947_1st_draftcom.shtml.
87 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the elaboration of complementary standards on  
its second session (Geneva, October 2009).
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Also important for the understanding of the international Human Rights framework is the Vienna 
Declaration and Program of Action (VDPA)88. Adopted in 1993, this document not only reaffirms 
and outlines the principles of Human Rights but also aims to bridge the legacy of the cold war 
period – the artificial division between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural 
rights. This rather unnatural division into two main sets of rights is a product of the opposing 
ideologies  during  the  cold  war  era.  While  countries  under  Soviet  influence  seized  on  the 
importance of cultural and social rights as a pretext to undermine unwanted political and civil 
rights; the western powers in turn sought to downplay the meaning of cultural and social rights, 
in  an  attempt  to  direct  attention  away  from their  long  standing history  of  imperialism and 
colonialism. Till today these demarcations continue to have effects and indeed determine to a 
significant  extent,  the  scope  for  political  manoeuvres  and  behaviour  of  the  Member  States. 
Nevertheless, in the short decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the opportunity was 
taken  to  put  aside  contradicting  perspectives  and  historical  rivalries  and  reach  a  crucial 
agreement over the nature of Human Rights as a whole. 
The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action of 1993 not only bridged the political gap but 
more  importantly,  reaffirms  the  universal  acceptance for  the  Human  Rights  principles  and 
underlines the equality and interconnectedness of all Human Rights. The UDHR itself had only 
been adopted by 57 Member States in 1948, which remained a source of constant criticism; the  
VDPA,  however,  has  found  agreement  of  the  full  membership  of  the  United  Nations  after 
decolonisation and the cold war. Additionally in the VDPA, countries have consensually agreed 
to view the protection and promotion of all Human Rights and fundamental freedoms as a duty 
of  States,  regardless  of  their  cultural  systems.89 In  other  words,  the  Member  States  have 
acknowledged the compatibility of all Human Rights with the system of their cultural values. 
The fact of this consensus in agreement rejects  all accusations of ethnocentrism and cultural 
imperialism as groundless. Most importantly, the VDPA gives a clear statement regarding the 
nature of Human Rights as a whole, affirming that “All human rights are universal, indivisible 
and interdependent and interrelated.”90 By adopting the exact wording of the VDPA in its pre-
ambulatory part, the Defamation of Religions resolution itself acknowledges this crucial aspect 
of nature of Human Rights.
88 United Nations, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument.
89 Population Council (Ed.), “Vienna Declaration on Human Rights,” Population and Development Review 19, no. 
4 (December 1993): 877.
90 United Nations, VDPA Part 1, Para. 5.
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Since the concept of Defamation of Religions is clearly framed by both proponents as well as 
critics  as  a  matter  of  communication,  or  more  accurately,  a  question  of  the  freedom  of 
expression;  the  Covenants  provisions  regarding  this  issue  are  most  relevant  for  the  analytic 
framework of this paper. Most predominant in this regard are Article 19 and 20 of the ICCPR91:
Article 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and  
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the  
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article  carries with it  special  duties and  
responsibilities.  It  may therefore be subject  to certain restrictions,  but  these  shall  only be such as  are 
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
Article 20
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility 
or violence shall be prohibited by law. 
Because these provisions are subject to a substantial level of interpretation, the Human Rights 
Committee adds clarifications  to  the  nature and scope of  the Covenants  provisions.  General 
Comment No. 22 specifically addresses the matter of freedom of expression as stated in Article 
19; while General Comment No. 11 elaborates the prohibition of propaganda during war and for 
inciting  national,  racial  or  religious  hatred  in  reference  to  Article  20  of  the  ICCPR92.  Both 
comments will serve well for the analysis of the compatibility of the concept of Defamation of 
Religions with international Human Rights law.
Logically  the  concept  of  Defamation  of  Religions  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  freedom  of 
expression,  but  – as it  ultimately claims to  aim at the protection of religion – very much a 
question of freedom of religion and belief. Hence, provisions such as Article 18 of the ICCPR93 
that clarify on the meaning and consequences on freedom of religion and belief, are of specific 
importance.
91 United Nations, ICCPR.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
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Article 18
1. Everyone shall  have the right to freedom of thought,  conscience and religion. This right shall  include 
freedom to have or  to  adopt a  religion or  belief  of  his  choice,  and freedom, either  individually or in  
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief 
of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary to  protect  public  safety,  order,  health,  or  morals  or  the  fundamental  rights  and 
freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when  
applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with 
their own convictions. 
Moreover,  general  Comment  No. 22 elaborates in  detail  the extent  of the scope covered by 
Article  18,  ICCPR  on  the  right  of  freedom  of  religion  and  belief,  including  thought  and 
conscience. In addition, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief94 will receive necessary attention to cover all aspects 
of the threats posed to freedom of religion and belief.
In practical terms, Defamation of Religions affects the rights of minorities and it would therefore 
be  crucial  to  consider  the  respective  Human  Rights  standards,  eminently  Article  27  of  the 
ICCPR, and to include the explanation on the subject provided by General Comment No. 23, 
which reads simply:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture,  
to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.95
A more  detailed  instrument  addressing  the  challenges  minorities  face  in  the  course  of  their 
enjoyment  of  all  Human  Rights  is  provided  by  the  Declaration  on  the  Rights  of  Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (A/Res/47/135), aiming at 
addressing issues related to minorities that haven't been given adequate attention and detail in the 
provisions of other instruments.96
94 United Nations, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on  
Religion or Belief, n.d., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/religion.htm.
95 United Nations, ICCPR, para. 27.
96 United Nations, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic  
Minorities, n.d., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/minorities.htm.
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The concept of Defamation of Religions is not only a matter of minorities, but – as it will be 
shown in due to the analysis – a matter of vulnerable groups in general. Prominently, the groups 
most vulnerable to Human Rights abuse include the category of 'women' as the largest group 
among  them.  The  The  Declaration  on  the  Elimination  of  Violence  Against  Women 
(A/Res/48/104) will serve as a base to accompany the understanding and interpretation of the 
legal Human Rights instruments in regard to the rights of women, in complementation to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)97
All together those central declarations, covenants, and comments provide the main frame to 
conduct a plausible and meaningful analysis of the compatibility of the concept of (Combating) 
Defamation of Religions with the Human Rights standards and relevant international law. For 
that, the legal analysis conducted in this paper will specifically take into consideration: the 
UDHR, the VDPA, the ICCPR, the ICERD, CEDAW, the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women (A/Res/48/104), the Declaration on Rights of Minorities 
(A/Res/47/135), and the Human Rights Committee's General Comments elaborating on the 
instruments' specifics. 
97 United Nations, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm. Note: The abbreviation 'CEDAW' may also refer to the 
'Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women'
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 3.3  Human Rights and Religion
 Already in the early stages of the realisation of a universal declaration, some voices suggested a 
certain incompatibility between the concepts of religion and the idea of Human Rights. It was 
pointed out that the “apparent divergence between religious belief's and human rights is the idea 
that human rights are reflecting individualistic traditions and religion is based on community” 98
The modern Human Rights declaration which was the first agreement to have codified Human 
Rights as  'natural', 'equal'  and 'universal',  was  born out  of  the era  of Enlightenment.  In  this 
context, the moral underpinnings behind such human rights were explained by human reason as 
naturally given to, equally shared by and universally applicable for all . This stood in opposition 
to the tradition of that time to create specific rights without reasonable explanation, often argued 
as  God-given. Human Rights  as  a  concept  is  hence  closely affiliated with  the  principles  of 
scientific argument, rather than religious or divine justifications. But one should not overlook a 
crucial similarity: While religious rule is very often argued as being an unquestionable, natural 
law handed down by God to mankind; a similar notion is advanced by some Human Rights 
advocates. They argue that Human Rights are in fact  not pillared by reason, but underline the 
merit in viewing Human Rights as indeed a natural law; unshakeable and indisputable by any 
government, for any reason. While religious rules may be argued as God-given, Human Rights 
are often characterised as inherited by every human naturally. The absolutism in both claims is 
evident.
Nevertheless, the UDHR as well as its early 'predecessors' was essentially a secular concept – a 
fact that remains a source of constant criticism and basis for objection by religious scholars, who 
claim  that  the  concept  of  Human  Rights  is  a  merely  western,  liberal  concept  serving  the 
objectives of a certain cultural imperialism.99 
It is often forgotten that it had been in fact religious associations alongside smaller States from 
the South and civil society organisations, that pushed hard for the creation of a human rights 
framework after the second world war.100 And while the UDHR as such is an essentially secular 
conception, it does contain strong language for the sound protection of freedom of religion. The 
UDHR clearly stipulates in Article 2 that distinctions of religious belief may not be any grounds 
98Susan C. Breau, “Human Rights and Cultural Relativism: The False Dichotomy,” in Religion, Human Rights and 
International Law (Leiden ;;Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 141.
99David Littman, “Universal Human Rights and "Human Rights in Islam",” 1999, 
http://www.dhimmitude.org/archive/universal_islam.html.
100Glendon, A world made new Preface - xv.
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for discrimination. It further lists 'religion' in all its provisions that refer to the equality of all  
humans, and thereby reaffirms the statement made in Article 2.101 Further, Article 18 is dedicated 
solely to outlining the nature of freedom of religion, reading that: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change 
his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to  
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.102
Article 18 is crucial for the further understanding of the right to freedom of religion or belief as it  
also indicates three essential dimensions of religious freedom: Possession of religion or belief; its  
manifestations; and a qualifier dimension for its extension and scope. Important in this regard are 
the different extents of private to public practice of the different notions of freedom of religion:
possession manifestation qualifier dimension
to have a religious belief
to adopt a religious belief
to change one's religious belief
to practice 
to teach
to worship
to observe
to enjoy all these rights alone 
or in a community with others
the right to exercise ones rights 
in private and public 
private private and public public
These threefold qualities of the right of freedom of religion, conscience and belief do not come 
without consequences for legal implications and questions of exercising the right in public 
sphere. Details regarding the regulation of specific manifestations and the intersection with the 
public sphere are set forth in Article 18 of the ICCPR103. Further efforts within the Human Rights 
discussion to provide adequate protection for freedom of religion, amounted in 1981 to the 
creation of the first instrument solely dedicated for this purpose, the 'Declaration on the 
101 UDHR, Article 2. “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, 
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.”
102 United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml, Article 18.
103 United Nations, ICCPR.
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Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief'. 104 
This relatively young Human Rights instrument, usually simply referred to as the 1981 
Declaration, sets out in detail the principles of non-discrimination and equality in their legal 
implications, which derive from the provisions of the UDHR and the ICCPR.105
Even more important for the understanding of the consequences resulting from the right and 
fundamental freedom of religion and belief is General Comment Number 22.106 Conducted by the 
Human Rights Committee, it clarifies the scope of Article 18 of the Covenant.
Most crucially, the General Comment reminds States that freedom of religion and belief is a  
whole series of interlinked rights that extends not only to religions but other beliefs, including 
non-theistic ones. It also elaborates the question of the manifestation of religion and beliefs in 
the public square and sets far reaching protections for their exercise. This manifestation extends 
“to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief, as well as various practices 
integral to such acts, including the building of places of worship, the use of ritual formulae and 
objects, the display of symbols, and the observance of holidays and days of rest.”107 The right to 
manifest ones religion also includes faith groups' “basic affairs, such as the freedom to choose 
their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or religious 
schools and the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications”108. 
Currently another aspect has become prominent in the debate in western societies, “the wearing 
of distinctive clothing or head-coverings”.109 Similarly, in Islamic States, the recognition that the 
right to freedom of religion and belief essentially includes “the right to replace one's current 
religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views”110 causes dispute and objection. 
Apostasy is considered a serious offence in Islamic law and hence this aspect of the provision is 
looked upon as highly disputable. The contemporary question of Human Rights in its connection 
with Islam is a pertinent one, that should be elaborated on in the next chapter.
104 Paul Taylor, Freedom of religion : UN and European human rights law and practice (Cambridge  UK ;;New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.
105 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Ed.), “Fact Sheet No2. - The International Bill of Human 
Rights.”
106 United Nation Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Art. 18),” July 30, 1993, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
(Symbol)/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15?Opendocument.
107 Ibid., 4.
108 Ibid., 4.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid., 5.
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 3.3.1  An Islamic Understanding of Human Rights 
As the concept of combating Defamation of Religions is an initiative aiming to protect organized 
religions,  primarily  Islam, an analysis  of  its  potential  implications on Human Rights  in  this 
context demands that special attention be given to the religious underpinnings of this discussion. 
Additionally, specific consideration must be given to the intersection of Islam with international 
Human Rights law. This is because Islam constructs “an entire legal, social, economic, political 
and spiritual system in itself that codifies the various aspects of the life of its followers”111. As 
such, Islam influences the understanding and interpretation of Human Rights at the level of their 
underlying  moral  value  systems,  and  can  determine  the  individual  level  of  acceptance  for 
different Human Rights.
While prominent scholars reject an incompatibility between Human Rights and Islam and even 
underline the added value that Islam can deliver to  the protection and promotion of Human 
Rights, it is the conclusions drawn by State Parties on an international political level that are 
more relevant for the debate at hand. Their understanding does not necessarily reflect the same 
approach that religious scholars and researchers pursue, and has been criticised by Human Rights  
advocates as stifling the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Human Rights framework. Their 
viewpoints  on  the  principles  and nature  of  Human  Rights  are  most  overtly  reflected  in  the 
creation of regional Human Rights instruments that take into consideration their specific context 
of Islam. 
Attempts to create Human Rights instruments or declarations from an Islamic perspective are not 
new. As early as 1981, representatives from Muslim countries including Pakistan,  Egypt and 
Saudi-Arabia,  proposed a  document known as 'The Universal  Islamic Declaration of Human 
Rights' (UIDHR). The text has received much criticism, notably for the substantial difference 
between the English version of the text which is closer to the language of the UDHR, and its 
Arabic version that  is  more oriented towards the language of Shari'ah.112 As a  result  of this 
criticism, a new approach was undertaken with the 'Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam', 
(CDHRI). 
111 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Combating defamation of religions as a means to  
promote human rights, social harmony and religious and cultural diversity: Report of the High Commissioner  
for Human Rights (UN. Commission on Human Rights, January 27, 2003), para. 22.
112 Delling, Malin, “Islam and Human Rights” (Master Thesis, Göteborg University, 2004), 41, 
https://gupea.ub.gu.se/dspace/handle/2077/1978.
43
 3 The Human Rights Concept
In 1990, the Organisation of Islamic Conference adopted the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights 
in  Islam  at  their  Nineteenth  Islamic  Conference  of  Foreign  Ministers.113 Its  proponents 
emphasized the complimentary nature of the text in providing additional guidance for Muslim 
States to read the UDHR with an Islamic perspective. But critics of this particular instrument, 
including  liberal  Muslim  groups114,  interpreted  the  CDHRI  not  as  a  legitimate  Islamic 
interpretation of Human Rights, but as a politically motivated attempt to undermine the rights, 
freedoms and principles of equality enshrined in the Human Rights framework115. Critics further 
argued that the declaration does not contain a single reference to the UDHR, and does not take 
note of the obligations State Parties are subject to under its provisions. Indeed, according to the 
CDHRI, Islamic Shari'ah is “the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of 
any of the articles”116, and the given rights and freedoms are subject to it's jurisdiction.117 The 
provisions  of  the  Covenants  and  the  Human  Rights  obligations  for  States  Parties  contained 
therein are meaningless according to the CDHRI. Thus, to use the CDHRI as the determining 
reference for Human Rights in their application would in practice, put the State firmly in the 
position of deciding which Human Rights ought to be enjoyed by its citizens and which not, 
without the need to comply with other Human Rights standards. 
Concrete criticisms arose when the provisions of the CDHRI were compared in their substance 
and  compatibility  to  international  Human  Rights  laws  and  standards  and  found  to  be 
substantially different in their approach towards the principles of equality and universality:
The  core  principle  of  the  Human  Rights  standard  is  the  concept  of  non-discrimination. 
Prominently, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that every human 
should be equal in dignity and rights, while Article 2 specifies in greater detail that: 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any  
kind,  such  as  race,  colour,  sex,  language,  religion,  political  or  other  opinion,  national  or  social  origin, 
property, birth or other status.[…]118
113 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI), 1990, 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html.
114 Washington College of Law: Human Rights Brief, “Column: United Nations Update” 16, no. 1 (2008), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/16/1unupdate.pdf?rd=1.
115 Fatema Mernissi, Islam and Democracy (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 2002), 67.
116 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) Article 
25.
117 Ibid. Article 24.
118 United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 2.
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This  same  idea  has  been  reiterated  and  reaffirmed  not  only  in  all  relevant  Human  Rights 
instruments  of  legally  binding  character,  but  in  uncountable  resolutions  that  have  been 
universally adopted by the international community at the United Nations. This exemplifies the 
undeniable  character  of  non-discrimination  as  the  basic  idea  behind  the  concept  of  Human 
Rights.  It  is  highly  problematic,  therefore,  if  States  refrain  from incorporating  such  central 
elements and the core Human Rights documents that contain them, in  their  regional  Human 
Rights instruments. 
In the  essential  aim of  granting  equal  rights based on a  principle  of non-discrimination,  the 
CDHRI  falls  short  of  fulfilling  minimum  requirements  of  the  international  Human  Rights 
standards.  Most  prominently,  the 
CDHRI does not grant equal rights to 
men  and  women.  While  the 
declaration  recognises  equal  labor 
rights for men and women, it makes 
distinctions  in  nearly  every  other 
aspect of life related to the traditional 
societal  roles  that  men  and  women 
have. While arguments pointing to the 
often  discriminatory  nature  of  these 
differences  have  been  advanced,  a 
crucial notion is also that a distinction 
between  male  and  female  roles  and 
obligations is made at all, as it is in itself highly contradictory to the principle of equality.
According to article 6, women are only granted “own rights”, with no further explanation as to 
how those rights differ from the rights men enjoy. Moreover,  equality for women to men is 
limited  to  their  right  to  enjoy the  same “human dignity” as  men.  It  is  problematic  that  the 
Declaration does not set out exactly what is to be understood by this, and what consequences can 
be drawn from it in practice. The same article also stipulates a difference in the duties applicable  
to  women,  again  giving  no  further  details  that  are  required  for  understanding  the  practical 
implications of this article. The provision continues with the declaration that the husband has 
sole responsibility for “the maintenance and welfare of the family”119, thereby effectively making 
119 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) Article 6.
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him head of the household.
This highly disputed article 6 reads in full length:
(a) Woman is equal to man in human dignity, and has her own rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform, and 
has her own civil entity and financial independence, and the right to retain her name and lineage.
(b) The husband is responsible for the maintenance and welfare of the family.120
120Ibid., Article 6.
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The other problematic divergence from human rights relates to the right of freedom of religion.  
Article 18 of the UDHR specifically states that everyone has the right to freely change one's  
religion  and the  right  to  remain  free  from pressure  to  change  one's  religion.121 The  CDHRI 
however, makes a negative statement in this regard: not emphasising the freedom of religion but 
rather criminalizing attempts to weaken one's faith or Islamic belief and stipulating that speeches 
which aim to do so or are suspected of aiming to do so, should be prohibited. 
This problematic approach to the matter  of changing one's religion comes as no surprise, as 
Muslim States  traditionally  have expressed strong feelings  regarding this  matter;  in  general, 
rejecting apostasy and often even labelling it a capital crime in their domestic legislation. It also 
remains unclear exactly how and when public faith would be weakened, and what limitations 
should  be  set  in  this  regard.  Such  vague  provisions  stifle  freedom  of  speech  beyond  the 
legitimate grounds set forth in precisely those Covenants whose references are missing in the 
Declaration. This becomes even more evident in the provisions of the CDHRI directly advancing 
the  controversial  view  that  freedom  of  expression  could  be  subject  to  interpretation  as 
blasphemous. The declaration merges this universal right with a stipulation against blasphemy:
Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary to the 
principles of the Shari'ah.122 
Hence,  speeches  interpreted  as  contradictory to  the  Shari'ah may be prohibited  according to 
article  22(b)  of  the  CDHRI.  In  this  provision,  the  declaration  clearly  violates  international 
Human Rights  law by extending the  scope  of  the  grounds for  restriction  of  the  exercise  of 
freedom of expression beyond the legitimate grounds outlined under articles 19 and 20 in the 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
The CDHRI further extends the legal ambit under which freedom of expression may be limited: 
Information […] may not be exploited or misused in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of  
Prophets, undermine moral and ethical Values or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith. 123
In other words, information must not be used in any way that would weaken a society's Islamic 
faith. This would essentially include the missionary activities of other religious organizations of 
any kind. Also, any kind of criticism regarding Islam and its values and traditions or advocacy of 
121 United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 18.
122 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) Article 
22(b).
123 Ibid. Article 22(c).
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any  other  form  of  lived  Islam  contrary  to  mainstream  interpretations,  could  be  subject  to 
censorship. 
Also, the CDHRI falls short of upholding the level of overarching freedoms and sound protection 
of rights found in the international Human Rights framework:
The Declaration only selectively reiterates some undisputed rights contained in the UDHR but 
consistently sets aside those that could conceivably contradict religious teachings under a stricter 
interpretation of Islamic law. The reluctance to adequately incorporate such rights can partly be 
ascribed to the differing perspectives of Shari'ah law of the States drafting the declaration: As 
Islamic law is a highly complex set  of codes affecting nearly every aspect of the life of its 
adherents, there are controversies in its exact interpretation, which can not be solved easily.124 
Due to the lack of common grounds in this regard, some essential aspects of specific rights and 
fundamental  freedoms  such  as  aspects  of  divorce,  changing  of  ones  religion,  protection  of 
religious minorities et al, are simply not mentioned at all in the CDHRI. In her research on Islam 
and Human Rights, Malin Delling notes that: 
“Not  dealing  with  the  rights  of  women and religious  minorities  in  an  Islamic  document  on 
human  rights  is  consequently  only  a  hypocritical  way  of  allowing  these  discriminations  to 
continue.”125 Provisions in the CDHRI that did refer to important aspects of the Human Rights 
composition  have  been  subject  to  harsh  criticism;  such  provisions  include  the  declarations' 
advice  to  States  to  reject  asylum  seekers  if  their  application  is  based  on  grounds  that  are 
“regarded by the Shari'ah as a crime”126, and the notion that education is obligated to “strengthen 
man's  faith  in  Allah”127.  Such  provisions  either  demand  the  promotion  of  Islam  or  seek 
punishment for any non-compliance with Islamic law. This is also connected to the more general 
apprehension regarding the rights of non-Muslims and the application of Shari'ah law on them. 
In short, these provisions are either inconsistent with the principles of equality, or at least work 
to weaken them significantly.
Proponents of the CDHRI argue that the declaration must be read as a text complementary to 
existing Human Rights documents, but this argument does not hold water as any reference to the 
UDHR which would support such a claim is missing from the CDHRI. In fact, on the basis of the 
124 Breau, “Human Rights and Cultural Relativism: The False Dichotomy,” 142.
125 Delling, Malin, “Islam and Human Rights,” 37.
126 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) Article 
12.
127 Ibid. Article 9.
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arguments  outlined  above,  the  CDHRI  cannot  be  seen  as  a  complementary  text  offering 
interpretations  of  Human  Rights  in  the  context  of  Islam  but  rather,  as  an  alternative  that 
challenges the principles and provisions set out in the UDHR and the Human Rights Covenants. 
Moreover,  some  provisions  made  in  the  CDHRI  particularly  with  reference  to  the  right  of 
freedom of expression, clearly violate existing and internationally binding Human Rights law. 
Rather than a text guiding the interpretation of Human Rights in the specific context of Islam, the  
CDHRI should be seen as an attempt to protect mainstream Islam and State practices at  the 
expense of sacrificing essential rights and freedoms, inter alia by encouraging anti-blasphemy 
laws which limit the right of freedom of expression beyond the scope granted by Human Rights 
instruments.
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 3.4  Contradicting Ideological Viewpoints
When the UDHR was presented to the United Nations General Assembly in Paris in 1948, it 
found adoption without a single dissenting vote. But the handful of States that did abstain and 
raised concerns regarding the instrument, gave an early indication of the underlying ideological 
differences that would only grow in years to come.
Under it's apartheid regime, South-Africa could not support the UDHR because it upheld equal 
rights for coloured people. In lieu of the fact that it was the beginning of the cold war period, the 
Soviet Union abstained for political reasons; and Saudi Arabia refused because equal rights for 
women were proclaimed in the text. It should be noted here that the differences are located not in 
individual  disagreements  over  particular  aspects  of  the  declaration,  but  rather  in  their  very 
principles.  In  considering  this  contextual  facet  of  the  Human  Rights  discourse,  a  historical 
examination of the roots and developments of ideological positions becomes pertinent. Attempts 
to challenge the principles of Human Rights arose in the 1950s with the entry into the arena of 
international relations, of new nations bound together by the experience of colonialism. Many of 
these small  and relatively weak States  rallied collectively under  the  patronage of  the Soviet 
Union.128
Nevertheless for decades, during the period of the Cold War, the opportunity to bring change in 
the underlying principles of Human Rights did not exist.129 Rather, the existing framework was 
split in two. Countries under Soviet influence seized on the importance of economic and social 
justice and worked to distract from claims for political and civil rights within their countries; the 
Western powers in turn sought to downplay the importance of cultural and social rights, in an 
attempt to direct attention away from their long standing history of imperialism and colonialism. 
They rather pointed to the relevance of political  and civil  freedoms, which mostly remained 
neglected in the communist  countries.  Following these ideological  demarcations between the 
'East' and the 'West', two Covenants codified the Human Rights into legally binding documents: 
one  specifically  addressing  political  and  civil  rights,  the  ICCPR,  and  the  other  addressing 
economic, social and cultural rights, the ICESCR. 
128 Glendon, A world made new, 223.
129 Glendon, A world made new Preface - xix.
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Although it  made political  sense for conflicting positions to derive from respective cold war 
stances, another major source of dispute over Human Rights was the increasing globalization of 
jurisdiction. At the time that the UDHR was drafted, the prevailing approach was one of non-
intervention and instruments such as the UDHR were conceived of simply as moral beacons with 
no concrete obligations that governments could be held accountable for. International law had 
been  a  set  of  rules  based on mutually  agreed upon norms organizing  the  relations  between 
nations.130 In the course of the second half of the 20th century however, this paramount paradigm 
of  a  sanctified  national  sovereignty became increasingly  impractical  and elusive.  The  moral 
failure of humanity in the second World War, the threat of a potential nuclear fuelled conflict and 
the  increasing  trends  of  globalization  became  grounds  for  an  emerging  interest  in  the 
international community – intervening in the internal affairs of other nations while at the same 
time, watching over their own sovereignty like hawks.
Newly created treaties between nations, instruments to safeguard international agreements, and 
reformed institutions to govern international relations are increasingly mandated to monitor and 
report  on  individual  countries  compliance  with  international  norms and standards.  They are 
concerned  with  establishing  mechanisms  of  accountability  and  thereby  have  effectively 
established definite limits on sovereign autonomy.131 General Comment No. 31 points out that 
with respect to the protection of Human Rights, “[…] every State Party has a legal interest in the 
performance by every other State Party of its obligations”132
Moreover, with the advent of new globally available communication technologies, the voice of 
the civil  society has increased substantially,  making it  a stronger force in  working for more 
intervention.  The emerging power that civil  society actors gained as  credible,  critical  voices 
enabled  them to  pressurize  States  for  greater  compliance  with  Human Rights  standards  and 
acceptance  of  accountability  mechanisms,  again  reducing the  extent  of  national  sovereignty. 
Non-state actors of the civil society in this context must not be understood to be limited only to 
typical NGOs such Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International, but encompass religious and 
social movements too; all of whom exercise political influence in the processes of national and 
international decision making.133
130 Paul Berman, “The Globalization of Jurisdiction,” University of Pennsylvania law review. 151, no. 2 (2002): 
356, 357.
131 Ibid., 357.
132 United Nation Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant,” 2004, para. 2.
133 Paul Berman, “The Globalization of Jurisdiction,” 357-358.
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Those developments of the Human Rights system from a simple moral beacon to an instrument 
of law interfering with national sovereignty and a powerful tool for civil society to pressure 
governments, explain the various attempts to weaken the Human Rights framework. This is not 
to say that criticism relating to Human Rights should not be taken seriously, but one cannot 
neglect the fact that some countries with the worst Human Rights records attempt to use such 
arguments to leverage the Human Rights system as a whole.  Despite Member States regularly 
adopting  text  with  language such  as  “universally  recognized  human rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms”, including Human Rights instruments of binding character and Human Rights related 
GA resolutions  on  an  annual  basis,  systematic  attempts  to  qualify  Human Rights  principles 
remain a  pressing issue.  In several informal  negotiations in  3rd committee on Human Rights 
resolutions  in  the  64th session  of  the  General  Assembly,  I  witnessed  first  hand,  attempts  to 
undermine the principles of Human Rights on the grounds of arguments such as that the term 
'universally recognized Human  Rights'  indicates  that  some  Human  Rights  might  not be 
universally recognized, and hence Human Rights as such should be seen as relative to local 
conditions and cultural specifics. Such arguments are greatly based on a perception of hypocrisy 
in the Human Rights stances of Western States, on ideas of cultural relativism and on a suspicion 
of Human Rights being a perfidious project of cultural imperialism. In the following subsections, 
these three underlying narratives will be elaborated further.
Perceptions of Western hypocrisy
Human Rights are often put to question by arguments building upon the perception that the 
strongest advocates of these rights are hypocrites themselves unwilling to comply with what they 
are calling for. In fact it is held that precisely “those who so confidently declared rights to be 
universal […] turned out to have something much less all-inclusive in mind”134 It is true that 
when the first tentative steps towards a Human Rights regime dating back till the 18 th century 
were taken, the provisions of these early Human Rights documents proclaiming equal rights for 
all human beings did not include those colonised, those held in slavery, the general poor man or  
women in general. These groups remained shut out as equality was articulated as applying to 
white European men exclusively. It were grassroot movements in the 20th century, eg the civil 
rights movement in the United States, the Indian struggle for self-determination or the resistance 
against the apartheid regime in South Africa, etc that brought an end to this injustice step by step.
134Lynn Hunt, Inventing human rights, 18.
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This long standing tradition of hypocritical double standards by Western countries continues to 
have an effect on the Human Rights debate and undermines the credibility of States who have 
historical  marks  on  their  otherwise  shiny  Human  Rights  record.  The  hypocrisy  of  nations 
preaching compliance with Human Rights standards for others while not complying themselves, 
has  hence  been often  used  as  an  argument  that  the  concept  of  Human  Rights  is  a  tool  of 
imperialism and the suppression of the weak by the mighty. Violations of Human Rights when 
committed by those States most prominently advocating for Human Rights in international fora, 
including inter alia by openly pinpointing the worst, most notorious Human Rights violators, are 
perceived as nothing less than a proof of the hypocrisy of the western world. 
The subsequent arguments against Human Rights based on perceptions of hypocrisy overlook 
two crucial points: 
Firstly, the UDHR itself does not constitute a guarantee for the enjoyment of Human Rights, but 
rather lays the groundwork for claiming them and for the possible enforcement of ones rights.135 
Essentially  it  must  be  understood  that  non-compliance  with  any  law cannot  be  seen  as  an 
argument  against  the  law  itself,  but  rather  simply  as  grounds  for  better  and  more  sound 
implementation and the establishment of accountability mechanisms to avoid future violations. 
To  illustrate  this  point,  one  can  see  the  example  of  Murder  which  is  universally  outlawed 
throughout the different jurisdictions of all UN Member States. Nonetheless, murder does take 
place every day. But the fact that it does happen does not serve as grounds for abolishing the 
prohibition of murder. This reasoning is contrary to the illogical argument against the Human 
Rights regime based on the fact that Human Rights are violated by proponents of the system.
Secondly, incidents of Human Rights violations committed by officials in a country continue to 
undermine the credibility of its government in their standing on Human Rights issues. This is 
despite the fact that the uncensored publication of those violations and an open handling of them 
speaks for the credibility of these countries commitment to comply with Human Rights. 
135 Glendon, A world made new, 236.
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Arguments of cultural relativism and imperialism 
The attack on the Human Rights understanding from the point of view of culture, is predicated 
on two levels:
– the accusation that Human Rights is a project of cultural imperialism, and
– cultural  relativism or  in  other  words,  the  claim  of  cultural  diversity  as  means  of  a 
qualifier
Both arguments are connected to the claim that rights require adaptation to the local specifics of 
cultural diversity, and this fact has not been taken into account by the Western understanding of 
Human Rights.136 
The  accusation  that  the  Human Rights  framework is  barely  more  than a  project  of  cultural 
imperialism can be easily dismissed. Countries like China or Russia, a veto power in the UN, 
that  regularly  use  this  line  of  argument  to  justify  their  Human  Rights  violations  against 
dissidents137, nevertheless still fully agreed with the UDHR as is exemplified by their signatory 
assent. Moreover, eastern and middle eastern countries like China as well as Egypt, played a 
significant role in drafting the UDHR. While it is true that the majority of the world's people,  
dominated by colonialism, were not represented adequately within the UN in the 1940s,  the 
UDHR document was however formulated by persons with highly diverse backgrounds. It was 
in  fact  precisely  those  contributions  of  cultural  diversity  to  the  document,  that  made  the 
acceptance throughout all nations and ideologies acceptable in the first place. Most notable the 
diplomats and philosophers, Charles Malik from Lebanon and Chang Peng-chun form China had 
a heavy hand in working out the principles of the UDHR.138
Furthermore, the misgiving that claiming universal applicability may cause dispute and conflict 
in a multicultural world has been recognized from the early beginnings of the Human Rights 
project.  As  early  as  1947,  UNESCO  had  been  given  the  task  of  examining  whether  the 
fundamental principles of Human Rights would be compatible with the sociocultural ideas held 
by people around the world.139 The questionnaire was sent out to politicians and scholars, such as 
Mohandas Gandhi or Aldous Huxley, to inquire and incorporate their opinion on the principle 
idea of creating a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The answer of UNESCO scholars 
136 vgl. Ibid., 221.
137 Ibid.
138 “Chang Peng-chun,” in Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 2010), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1056274/Chang-Peng-chun.
139 Glendon, A world made new, 222.
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could  not  have  been  clearer:  Regardless  of  their  origin  they  agreed  that  despite  cultural 
differences all people and nations shared two great principles and common ideals, 'the right to  
live a life free from the haunting fear of poverty and insecurity'.140 Essentially, although people 
might not agree in theory, they can agree in practice. 
Interestingly, the same political and civil rights that today are most often labelled 'Western rights' 
and held up as instances of cultural  imperialism, were the least  controversial  ones when the 
articles of the UDHR were taken up one by one during its adoption in 1948.141
As the Human Rights system had not yet been understood as the challenge to political power it  
would soon become, questions of the freedom of expression and similar rights were of little 
concern. In fact it was the cultural rights – the right to change ones religion142 and ones right to 
marry143 (Article 16, UDHR) – that had been singled out by countries like Saudi Arabia as being 
Westernised concepts incompatible with their values.144 One should not forget that the UDHR 
also came under siege in the West itself.  Immediately following its adoption,  it  was heavily 
criticized by the conservative circles in the United States for not being imperialistic enough. Not 
only  did  these  groups  complain  about  the  fact  that  only  3  members  from English-speaking 
countries had been part of the Human Rights Commission, but also openly referred to the UDHR 
as  a  'pink  paper'  which  would  encourage  state  socialism  and  lead  to  communism.145 Such 
perspectives, not simply footnotes in history but commonly shared ideas in conservative circles, 
have their share in engendering the suspicion which remains powerful among people with critical  
perspectives regarding the west; that the Human Rights project is merely a project of cultural 
imperialism.
Accusations of cultural imperialism are often backed by claims of inadequate representation as 
only  57  nations  originally  adopted  the  UDHR as  the  common  grounds  for  Human  Rights 
understanding. This argument implies that if the world had been decolonized back then, a project 
of cultural imperialism would not have been accepted that easily or would have been altogether 
dismissed. There is an important counterargument to this, disqualifying any of such arguments. 
In June 1993, 171 countries  unanimously adopted the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
140 UNESCO, “UNESCO and the Declaration,” n.d., http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-
sciences/themes/human-rights/advancement/60th-anniversary-of-udhr/unesco-and-the-declaration/.
141 Glendon, A world made new, 226.
142 United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 18.
143 Ibid. Article 16.
144 Glendon, A world made new, 226.
145 Ibid.
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Action (VDPA) at the World Conference on Human Rights, without any dissenting vote.146 Not 
only does this paper clarify some of the disputed issues which had so far remained unresolved, 
but it also is more precise in its language. It reaffirms the UDHR as the common ground for 
Human  Rights  with  the  consensual  agreement  of  all Member  States.  Together  the  nations 
reaffirmed “the solemn commitment of all States to fulfil their obligations to promote universal 
respect for, and observance and protection of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, other instruments relating to human rights,  
and international law. The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question.”147 
And more importantly stated that “Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of 
all human beings; their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Governments.“148 
The universal acceptance of Human Rights could barely be affirmed in any clearer way. 
Cultural relativism might be the greatest challenge to the concept of Human Rights and its claim 
of  universal  applicability.  Cultural  relativism  essentially  claims  that  one  should  not  judge 
behaviour  upon standards born out  of  a  different  culture.  Behaviour  based  on the  values  of 
different cultures should be respected and not be judged upon.149 This argument is put forward 
also within the UN context, noteworthy under the term of 'cultural diversity', and the eponymous 
resolution traditionally introduced by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The claim of cultural 
relativism implies that there is no such thing as a universal human culture that would connect 
mankind or would rightly leave room for a moral judgement beyond cultural differences. Human 
Rights  must  be  understood  and  interpreted  as  flexible  considering  local  specifics because, 
essentially,  there  are  no  universal  standards  by  which  different  cultures  could  be  morally 
'evaluated'. But this is precisely what the concept of Human Rights proposes: A universal culture 
viable as a standard inherent to all people – human dignity. The rights drawn from it serve simply 
as the protection mechanisms and political guarantees for everyones dignity. It must be pointed 
out that human dignity as a concept is rarely disputed, instead it is the rights drawn from the 
concept itself that serve as powerful tools for activists to argue for greater individual freedoms,  
that come under constant attack from relativist arguments. 
146 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Ed.), “Fact Sheet No2. - The International Bill of Human 
Rights.”
147 United Nations, VDPA I, 1.
148 United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 18.
149 Breau, “Human Rights and Cultural Relativism: The False Dichotomy,” 138.
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A notion often raised by OIC members is that dignity is more important than rights. While the 
importance  of  Human Dignity is  not  questionable,  this  may not  be an argument  against  the 
concept  of rights itself.  Indeed, as rights for humans are as much based on emotions  as  on 
reason, Human Rights essentially require dignity as a central element of the human condition to 
be effective. It is this emotional sense of dignity that is hurt by Human Rights violations. This 
feeling of disturbance gives the UDHR its moral power of a commonly shared idea of how 
humans deserve to be treated and what humanity means. Pointing towards dignity as an attempt 
to undermine the concept of Human Rights is based on an ill-suited argument. Dignity is an 
essential under-pinning of rights, and strengthening the importance of dignity could very well 
lead to an stronger Human Rights stance in the long run. Consequently, the UDHR “ […] came 
to be recognized as a historic document articulating a common definition of human dignity and 
values.  The  Declaration  is  a  yardstick  by  which  to  measure  the  degree  of  respect  for,  and 
compliance with, international human rights standards everywhere on earth.”150 
Another  typical  critique  voiced  along  the  lines  of  arguments  of  cultural  relativism  and 
imperialism  is  an  allegedly  overemphasis  of  the  individual,  amounting  to  liberal  western 
individualism and threatening the welfare and stability of the society. This argument overlooks 
the fact that the civil and political rights that are the main sources of growing individualism are 
only one part of the Human Rights system. The cultural, economic and social rights serve well 
for concerns in the higher interests of social stability, such as the right for food, the right for 
adequate housing, health or eduction. Much of those rights can not be seen what is negatively 
labeled 'individualistic'.151 Cultural relativism also overlooks the point that while Human Rights 
follow a general notion of universal application to the individual (a notion shared by western 
liberalism) this is not the only principle underlying the construction of Human Rights and does 
not mean that diverse cultural elements aren't included. Cultural relativism assumes that western 
ideas  are  exclusive to  the  Western  world and exclusively  responsible  for  the  formulation  of 
Human Rights principles.
Arguments against Human Rights made by proponents of cultural relativism are also ill-suited 
when claiming that Human Rights would have to be rejected as universal because they are only a 
set of western ideas born out of enlightenment thought. This is not logical, as Lynn Hunt points 
out in this regard referring to the UDHR: “The origins of documents do not necessarily tell us 
150 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Ed.), “Fact Sheet No2. - The International Bill of Human 
Rights” unpaged.
151 Breau, “Human Rights and Cultural Relativism: The False Dichotomy,” 147.
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something significant about their consequences”152 On a more general note, one might claim that 
origin of  ideas does not predetermine their  added value, and the codification of an idea in a 
specific  context,  time  and  origin  does  not  mean  that  those  very  same  ideas  were  not 
conceptualized  elsewhere  and before  also.  It  is  barely  arguable  that  human  dignity  and  the 
deriving urge for basic inherent rights, would have been created with the drafting of a single 
paper in 1948.
Interestingly, the argumentation and idea of cultural relativism itself has arisen from the very 
same world region that critics claim the UDHR was born out  of:  It  had been the American 
Anthropologist  Association  which  formulated  the  criticism  of  cultural  relativism  against  a 
universal Human Rights standard, not any group from the south. These arguments of cultural  
imperialism must be dismissed because it is essentially similarly imperialistic to argue for the 
neglect of Human Rights for persons simply on the grounds that they do not belong to the same 
world region or cultural sphere where the concept of Human Rights was formulated. In other 
words, should someone enjoy any less protection from torture, arbitrary killing, or enjoy any less 
freedom of thought, or right to food etc, based on the fact that they do not belong to the 'west', 
politically, ideologically or culturally? This would be more than hard to argue.
152Lynn Hunt, Inventing human rights, 18.
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Concluding remarks
Surprisingly, there have been few other texts, cited and referred to as often and “yet so little read 
or understood”153 than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Human Rights challenge the national sovereignty of a country, making them a natural target for 
all those who do not wish for interference in their internal affairs. The arguments of hypocrisy, 
cultural  imperialism and double standards do not hold water for the reasons outlined above. 
Instead of blaming individual governments for violations,  they attack the concept of Human 
Rights itself. The very same accusations made can also more than validly be raised against those 
attacking the  Human  Rights  system themselves.  When authoritarian  governments  with  poor 
human rights records attack the foundations of Human Rights law and the principles of Human 
Rights under the pretext of cultural imperialism, they often bear in mind, domestic interest and 
“troubles  at  home”.154 The  concept  of  Human  Rights  becomes  a  weapon  and  tool  for  the 
suppressed, and authoritarian governments need to fear the resistance of their own populations 
and the moral pressure of media attention. 
With the UDHR, the international community gave itself a sound moral beacon whose worth is 
exemplified by the fact that it can be found referenced in nearly any Human Rights document 
consensually adopted by the international community. The declaration constitutes the underlying 
framework for our understanding of Human Rights, on which other Human Rights instruments 
of a more legal character were built. As such, the ICCPR and ICESCR put the rights set out in 
the UDHR into precise legal norms and obligations for their practical implementations. With 
their legally binding character applicable for the whole UN membership, they constitute the core 
of international Human Rights law. Moreover, the VDPA elaborated the nature and principles of 
Human Rights resulting in an outline of possibly their most crucial characteristic, stating that 
“All  human rights  are  universal,  indivisible  and  interdependent  and interrelated”155 Together 
“[…] the International  Bill of Human Rights represents a milestone in the history of human 
rights,  a  veritable  Magna  Carta  marking  mankind's  arrival  at  a  vitally  important  phase:  the 
conscious acquisition of human dignity and worth.”156
153 Glendon, A world made new Preface - xvii.
154 Ibid., 224.
155 United Nations, VDPA Part 1, Para 5.
156 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Ed.), “Fact Sheet No2. - The International Bill of Human 
Rights” unpaged.
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Overall,  the concept  of Human Rights clearly improved “the odds of reason and conscience 
against power and interest”157 And the UDHR with its moral  beacon has done more for the 
advancement  of  human  rights  than  any  other  legally  binding  treaty  such  as  the  ICCPR or 
ICESCR.158 And  while  attempts  to  undermine  the  principles  of  Human  Rights  through 
accusations of cultural imperialism have to be dismissed, accusations of Human Rights serving 
as tools of cultural imperialism may not be and instead, must be taken very seriously159 – in 
particular by Human Rights defenders themselves. 
157 Glendon, A world made new Preface - xix.
158 Ibid., 236.
159 Ibid., 224.
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 4  The Defamation Resolution and its Political Context
 4.1  Status of the Defamation of Religions Resolution
The  political  dynamics  and debate  surrounding the  resolution  and  its  underling  concept  are 
interconnected and interdependent with the development of the resolutions language over the last 
decade. Before going into further detail of the complex political context and the development of 
the resolution in the various UN bodies, this chapter will briefly summarize the current status.
Although  the  concept  of  Defamation  of  Religions  has  been  framed  as  being  negative 
stereotyping in particular of Islam and by the media, it remains vaguely defined in terms of its 
boundaries.  While the resolution does not give a clear and overt  definition,  several  Member 
States have explained in their statements that they understand Defamation of Religions as the 
negative stereotyping of religions,160 or more specifically as “[…] expressions which negatively 
projected Islam […]”161. Nonetheless, the scope of Defamation of Religions is not limited to this 
understanding alone but  encompasses  further  issues  such as  those  of  incitement  to  religious 
hatred, violence and discrimination; topics that are indeed covered by the existing Human Rights 
framework. In the emerging dispute around the intersection of and the interrelation between 
Defamation  of  Religions  and  Freedom of  Expression,  the  resolution  framed  Defamation  of 
Religions as an abuse of freedom of expression. This claim is based on the presupposition that 
Human Rights can be abused at all.
Despite the vague demarcation lines of the term itself, the resolution uses the strongest language 
of  all  General  Assembly  resolutions;  giving  concrete  directives  for  public  officials  of  other 
Member States. It further calls for measures to combat the phenomenon by means of creating 
new laws, aiming to extend the grounds for restricting the exercise of freedom of expression 
beyond the legitimate limits of the ICCPR. 
Due to the lack of a precise definition of what it means to 'defame religions' within the resolution 
itself, proponents and opponents of the concept  differ substantially in their articulation of the 
meaning of the term. Above all, there is an underlying, but significant difference of Member 
States' understanding of the application and scope of the resolution itself:
160 UN. General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 64th Session, 42nd meeting, (A/C.3/64/SR.42) 
(New York: United Nations, March 2010) Para 67.
161 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 61st Session, 48th meeting,  
(A/C.3/61/SR.48) (New York: United Nations, January 2007), para. 22.
61
 4 The Defamation Resolution and its Political Context
Proponents read the resolution focusing on its scope on an international level, on the role of the  
media as  perpetrators  of  Defamation  of  Religions,  and  on  Muslim  and  Arab  migrant  
communities in western countries as the most vulnerable victims of Defamation of Religions. 
Critics, on the other hand, tend to focus on  concerns of domestic nature as a  matter of state  
policy for the Member States supporting the resolution itself, and find the concept flawed on an  
definitional level.  Opponents are mostly alarmed by the tendency of the resolution to extend 
grounds for the legitimate limitation of the right  of freedom of expression.  These critics are 
highlighting the potential misuse of the concept in the countries as a tool for mainstreaming the 
dominant religious ideology, for undermining Human Rights, for silencing the media and for 
suppressing the role of the opposition as a critical political voice. The European Union took note 
of these considerations, pointing out that “Members of religions or communities of belief should 
not be viewed as mere particles of homogeneous and monolithic entities.”162 
Since its introduction, the concept of Defamation of Religions underwent major changes and 
developed from a resolution that had been conceived as a text aimed at raising concerns about 
discrimination, into a highly disputed topic within the Human Rights discussion. The initiative is 
today perceived by critics as an attempt to undermine the very foundations of Human Rights,but 
for supporters it is a case exemplifying the hypocrisy of discriminatory double standards of the 
West.163 
While the resolution was adopted in consensus in 1999 and 2000, the initiative has since lost  
support with more than half of the UN membership. The opposition had been predominantly 
limited  to  'Western  European  and  other  Group'  (WEOG)  and  like  minded  States,  until the 
resolution  found  its  way  to  the  General  Assembly  in  2006. Today  several  African,  Asian 
countries and members of the 'Latin American and Caribbean Group' (GRULAC) have shifted 
their  stance  to  one  of  opposition  also,  either  by  abstaining  or  openly  voting  against  the 
resolution. In the most representative of the UN bodies, the General Assembly, the support for 
the resolution dropped below 44%. Nevertheless, the OIC have kept their votes for the resolution 
in both Human Rights bodies, in the old Commission of Human Rights as well as its successor  
the Human Rights Council, relatively stable.
162 Ibid., para. 25.
163 Note: Insights on this perspective are also based on personal conversations with 4 NAM representatives, 2 of  
them members of the OIC
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The gravity of the misgivings regarding the concept behind the initiative are best illustrated by 
the explanation given by the European Union before voting on the resolution. Therein it states 
that  overall  “the  concept  of  Defamation of  Religions  is  not  relevant  in  a  debate on Human 
Rights.”164 Unimpressed, the OIC continues to push the resolution forward, although fully aware 
of the fact “that the positions of partners who opposed the text would not change unless the core 
issues addressed in it were compromised”165 
The opposing positions are clear: The OIC frames Defamation of Religions as a form of Human 
Rights violation that needs to be prohibited by means of limiting the freedom of expression. 
Proponents  argue  that  existing  Human  Rights  instruments  are  falling  short  in  adequately 
protecting the freedom of religions and new, legally binding instruments that outlaw Defamation 
of  Religions  are  needed.  Opponents  of  the  resolution,  on  the  other  hand,  warn  of  the 
consequences which the legal implementation of the concept would have on the enjoyment of 
Human Rights, particularly in the case of minorities and with regard to freedom of expression. 
They see an inherent  threat  in  the resolution leading to  the increased suppression of people 
through State Authorities and go as far as to condemn the whole initiative as barely more than a 
hidden attack on the Human Rights system.
The following chapter will outline the development of the resolution, the debates and criticism 
attached, as well as the political dynamics resulting therein. 
164 Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/13/L.1  made by France on behalf of the  
european Union. Mr. Jean-Baptiste Mattei (UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, n.d.), 
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/thirteenth/hrc100325am1-eng.rm?
start=02:36:57&end=02:41:24.
165 UN. General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 64th Session, 42nd meeting, (A/C.3/64/SR.42) 
Para. 57.
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 4.2  Claims made by the Resolution
The claims outlined below form the underlying basis for the provisions of the resolution being 
examined. They exemplify how Defamation of Religions is conceptualized, and further reflect 
the understanding of the Human Rights system within the OIC. 
Insufficiency of Existing Initiatives
Proponents  of  the  resolution  argue  that  existing  initiatives  have  in  practice  proven  to  be 
insufficient in solving the problems at hand. Initiatives such as resolutions166, are looked upon as 
meaningless and legally binding instruments that directly aim at  the elimination of religious 
intolerance,  the  protection  of  freedom of  religion  and  the  rights  of  religious  minorities  are 
considered  as  incomplete.  Representatives  of  delegations  commonly  cited  events  of 
discrimination against Muslim communities or individuals in western countries, as instances that 
support the need of the resolution. The underlying accusation in these conversations was that the 
concerns raised by the OIC could not possibly be met by western initiatives, such as the religious 
intolerance resolution mentioned above. This is, according to their argument, due to a lack of 
true willingness to understand divergent cultural perspectives. Regardless of such perceptions, 
the question of the need for additional legal initiatives boils down to whether or not existing 
regulations  and Human  Rights  laws  (including the  necessary  remedies  provided for  Human 
Rights  violations)  have  been  effectively  implemented.  Elaborating  on  this  issue,  General 
Comment No. 31 suggests that violations of rights where appropriate remedies were formally 
prescribed,  should  be  presumed  to  be  a  result  of  the  failure  of  those  remedies  to  function 
effectively in practice.167
It can be concluded that this comment suggests that existing tools be seen as sufficient until  
proven incomplete only after their effective implementation. Hence, arguments for the need to 
introduce additional legal  instruments to address instances of religious  intolerance should be 
rejected if  existing instruments lack proper implementation.  Furthermore, calls  for additional 
legal initiatives must also be rejected if internal laws are serving as justification for recurring 
Human  Rights  violations,  whose  prevention  is  in  fact  already  covered  by  existing  legal 
166See for instance resolutions on the “Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance”
167United Nation Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant,” 20.
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instruments.  On  this  subject,  the  General  Comment  on  the  legal  obligations  of  the  ICCPR 
imposed  on  State  Parties,  reinforces  the  principles  contained  in  Article  27  of  the  Vienna 
Convention  on  the  Law of  Treaties;  according  to  which  a  State  Party  'may  not  invoke  the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty'.168
The provisions provided by existing Human Rights instruments already prohibit any advocacy of 
intolerance  that  would  amount  to  incitement  of  religious  hatred,  discrimination,  hostility  or 
violence; and consequently put States under the obligation to protect people from this. Moreover, 
they  put  State  Parties  under  obligation  to  prohibit  such  occurrences  by  law.169 Hence,  the 
argument that there is additional need for legal grounds to address issues of religious intolerance 
holds no water.
Defamation of Religions as a Human Rights Violation
Article  3  of  the  '1981  Declaration'  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  Intolerance  and 
Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief reaffirms that discrimination on the grounds of 
religion or belief constitutes an affront to human dignity, and that such discrimination rightly 
constitutes a Human Rights violation. The proponents of the Defamation Resolution however 
attempt to put this Human Rights violation on equal footing with Defamation of Religions: They 
adapt the language of the declaration for this purpose, replacing the term 'discrimination' with 
'defamation'. As such the resolution proclaims that Defamation of Religions is a “serious affront 
to  human dignity”170 and  further  suggests  that  it  “[…] could lead  to  social  disharmony and 
violations of human rights, […]”171. Even if supporters of the concept argue that a root cause 
relation exists between the two, it is still merely an indirect link to Human Rights Indeed, when 
read carefully the resolution only suggests that Defamation of Religions could lead to Human 
Rights violations, on the basis of such acts as “incitements to religious hatred and violence”172. 
Hence, Defamation of Religions itself does not amount to a Human Rights violation, and there is 
no provision in the resolution claiming otherwise. Nevertheless, implications in the language, as 
outlined in the chapter above, indicate that the resolution aims to frame the phenomenon of 
168 Ibid., 4.
169 United Nation Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 11: Prohibition of propaganda for war and 
inciting national, racial or religious hatred (Art. 20),” July 29, 1983, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
(Symbol)/60dcfa23f32d3feac12563ed00491355?Opendocument.
170 United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/64/156) ([New York]: UN, 2009), 
PP. 10.
171 Ibid., PP. 13.
172 Ibid., PP. 10.
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Defamation of Religions as a unique form of Human Rights violation. While proponents argue 
Defamation of Religions amounts to a violation of Human Rights; a closer look at the resolution 
itself shows that the underlying claim is rather that Defamation of Religions  could  lead to the 
aforesaid  violation.  The  resolution  further  identifies  media  broadcasting  as  the  predominant 
means  of  articulating  and  disseminating  Defamation  of  Religions,  promoting  “negative 
projection of certain religions”.173 
All together a core claim remaining implicit in the language of the resolution, is that Defamation 
of Religions should be viewed equal to a Human Rights violation. 
Protecting Freedom of Religion
The Human Rights violation that proponents of the resolution have in mind when addressing the 
issue of Defamation of Religions is the right of freedom of religion and belief. The resolution 
proclaims that Defamation of Religions will lead to the illegitimate restriction of the freedom of 
religion for adherents of the defamed religion.174 Hence, by combating defamation and protecting 
religions from this act, the Human Right of freedom of religion will be defended.
This  logic  is  exemplified  inter  alia  by  Operative  Clauses  welcoming  “[…]  steps  taken  by 
Member States to protect freedom of religion through […] legislation to prevent the defamation 
of religions […]”175. Here again the idea can be found that religious ideas can themselves be 
subject to defamation or insults, rather than individual adherents of the religion being victims of 
such.
In short, supporters of the initiative argue that combating Defamation of Religions is a necessary 
step to prevent religious intolerance and promote Human Rights and freedom of religion. This 
understanding is opposed by critics who hold that, at the level of principle, “prohibiting speech 
did not promote tolerance”176; and that the notion of religious ideas being subject to defamatory 
insults is conceptually flawed. Furthermore, critics voice their apprehensions over the rights of 
religious minorities that might be compromised for the sake of protecting religious majorities. 
173 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HCR/Res/13/16).
174 United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/64/156), PP. 10.
175 Ibid., OP. 19.
176 UN. General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 64th Session, 42nd meeting, (A/C.3/64/SR.42), 
para. 66.
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The resolution as a reaction to 9/11
In conversations on the subject with diplomats of Member States that promoted the resolution, a 
common  argument  voiced  was  that  the  resolution  and  its  underlying  concept  are  necessary 
because after  the  events  of  9/11,  Defamation  of  Religions  had become a major  issue  and a 
significant threat to the well-being of adherents of Islam. This notion is put forward within the 
resolution very clearly in its version from 2002:
Alarmed at the impact of the events of 11 September 2001 on Muslim minorities and communities in some 
non-Muslim countries and the negative projection of Islam, Muslim values and traditions by the media, as  
well  as  at  the  introduction  and  enforcement  of  laws  that  specifically  discriminate  against  and  target 
Muslims.177
And further in its operative clause 3:
Notes with  concern  the  intensification  of  the  campaign  of  defamation  of  religions,  and  the  ethnic  and 
religious profiling of Muslim minorities, in the aftermath of the tragic events of 11 September 2001;178
These concerns link with and fortify the paragraph about identification of Islam with terrorism 
which has been in the resolution since 1999, and are frequently emphasized by scholars in favor 
of the concept: „[…] in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States, Islam has 
been frequently and wrongly associated with terrorism,[…] “179
While not directly claiming so, these arguments suggest that the resolution should be understood 
as a direct reaction to the attacks of September 11, legitimately aiming at the prevention of the 
resulting discrimination against Muslims. Furthermore, diplomats occasionally argue that it  is 
due to the increasing suspicion towards Islam and its  equation with terrorism post 9/11 that 
official support of the resolution has also declined. But in fact, the resolution was introduced two 
years before the events of 9/11 in 1999 and while it found consensual adoption in the beginning, 
had lost significant support already in April 2001 , 4 months before the attacks of September 11. 
Only 28 members of the Commission on Human Rights voted in favour of the resolution, while 
already 15 countries voted against the initiative and 9 decided to abstain.180
177 UN. Commission on Human Rights, Combating defamation of religions (2002/9), 2002.
178 Ibid., OP. 3.
179 Liaquat Ali Khan, “Combating Defamation of Religions,” 1.
180 UN. Commission on Human Rights, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL - OFFICIAL RECORDS 
(E/2001/23 - E/CN.4/2001/167), 2001, http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf, Chapter IV, Paras: 88, 90.
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Defamation of Religions as a form of racism
As seen in the chapter on the development of the resolution, the language of the CDHRI puts 
great effort into linking the nature and characteristics of Defamation of Religions to those of 
racism. Equating cases of Defamation of Religions with cases of racism and even more critically, 
arguing that Defamation of Religions is just another form of that phenomenon would in effect, 
make existing international laws combating racism applicable to Defamation of Religions also. 
Indeed, proponents of the concept have begun to argue using this perspective, that Defamation of 
Religions should be seen as already outlawed by the ICCPR. They mainly cite Article 20 in this 
regard,  pointing  toward  the  obligation  of  States  to  prohibit  advocacy  of  national,  racial  or 
religious hatred. In addition they use the provisions of the ICERD, as Article 4 stipulates the 
prohibition of the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred and incitement to 
racial discrimination.181 As outlined previously, many States, while open to the idea and concept 
of Defamation of Religions in principle, reject the idea that it is in itself, a matter of racism.
Concluding remarks
In short, proponents of the concept of Defamation of Religions claim that religious ideas and 
doctrines deserve protection by the State in order to ensure that the sensibilities of believers are 
not offended. Such offences that do not target individuals but religious thought itself,  would 
constitute an “affront to human dignity, a restriction of the freedom of religion, and an incitement  
to religious hatred and violence”182. Defamation of Religions should be considered a form of 
human rights violation and an abuse of the right of freedom of expression, manifested in the 
negative stereotyping of religion, predominantly through media broadcasting. It is argued that 
any existing mechanisms to address the issues raised have proven insufficient and incomplete, 
hence additional legal instruments are required. 
181 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, 229.
182 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 63rd Session, 46th meeting,  
(A/C.3/63/SR.46) (New York: United Nations, January 2009), para. 31.
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 4.3  Critique of the Resolution and Concept of Defamation of 
Religions
Many concerns have been voiced from various quarters since the introduction of the Defamation 
of Religions concept to the UN. Some of them circulate exclusively around the theoretical level, 
while others address practical implications, but most of them are interrelated with each other. 
And while not all of them have direct implications for the Human Rights framework, they must 
be viewed upon in a holistic manner and should be discussed comprehensively. This chapter will 
give an overview of the misgivings attached with the resolution and the concept, while those 
components that it is claimed directly conflict with the international Human Rights standards, 
will be elaborated in further detail in a separate chapter.
Vague language used in the resolution
A major  source  of  dispute  around  the  resolution,  is  an  overly  broad  and  vague  language, 
suggesting that the concept may easily be abused by States in order to shield themselves from 
critics, to mainstream public opinion and to suppress opinions opposing governmental policies. 
Such  suspicions  are  accompanied  and  reinforced  by  accusations  that  some  of  the  major 
supporters of the concept are among those with the poorest Human Rights records, who face 
difficulties with a sound implementation of democratic standards. 
Remarks of the representative of the United States in their delegation's explanation of vote in 
regard of the latest General Assembly versions of the resolution, provide a summary of these 
concerns: 
His  delegation  would  vote  against  the  resolution  because  […]  the  concept  of  defamation  of  religions 
continued to be used to justify censorship, criminalization and even violent assaults and deaths of political, 
racial and religious minorities around the world. Contrary to the intentions of most Member States, some 
Governments were likely to abuse the rights of individuals in the name of that draft resolution and in the 
name of the United Nations.183
The criticism that irresponsible vagueness is maintained in the language is rooted in the fact that 
even  the  term 'Defamation  of  Religions'  itself  has  remained undefined  in  every  one  of  the 
versions of the Defamation Resolution so far.  In this connection,  several  of the UN Special 
Rapporteurs warned in a joint statement held in April 2009 that: 
183 UN. General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 64th Session, 42nd meeting, (A/C.3/64/SR.42), 
66.
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Indeed,  the  difficulties  in  providing  an  objective  definition  of  the  term 'defamation  of  religions'  at  the  
international level make the whole concept open to abuse.184
Unsurprisingly,  a  vague  term  such  as  'Defamation  of  Religions'  leads  to  even  more  vague 
language when it comes to setting the boundaries for recommendations and suggestions. The 
precise circumstances in which recommendations and demands that are made in the resolutions 
would be applicable, remain ambiguous. The blatantly obvious vagueness of the term has been 
compensated with strong language overall in the recommendations set out by the resolution on 
methods  to  counter  instances  of  Defamation  of  Religions.  This  use  of  exceptionally  strong 
language,  which is  more demanding than in any other comparable type of GA resolution in 
practice, in combination with the poor definition of the subject itself, causes discomfort among 
many Member States. It is unusual for this type of resolution to actually demand such concrete 
action and to advise specific national policies to Member States, which is precisely what the 
Defamation Resolution does. The resolution even goes as far as to advise other Member States'  
officials in detail on how to behave in the exercise of their duties.185 
In short, the religious Defamation Resolution uses vague language in outlining the meaning and 
scope of the phenomenon, but is rather strong and demanding in its suggested means to address 
Defamation  of  Religions.  This  is  perceived  as,  if  not  a  deliberate  act,  at  least  an  unlucky 
combination  as  it  further  enhances  the  possibility  of  misuse  of  the  resolution  as  a  tool  for 
governments to shield themselves against critics and to cover suppression and Human Rights 
violations.  As  the  High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  outlined  in  an  expert  seminar 
addressing  this  matter,  the  right  to  freedom of  expression  is  mostly  “denied  to  those  most 
vulnerable to arbitrary excesses of power, such as members of religious minorities”186 Therefore, 
the matter of Defamation of Religions is not only a question of the freedom of expression but  
even more critically, a matter of minority rights, although the estimated impact differs according 
to  different  perspectives.  While critics claim that the practical  implementation would further 
impede the enjoyment of Human Rights by minorities, supporters of the concept are convinced 
184Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,  
Githu Muigai, Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, and Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, “Joint Statement 
to freedom of expression and incitement to racial or religious hatred.”
185United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/64/156) OP 20.
186United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS - Addendum - 
Expert seminar on the links between articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political  
Rights: “Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,  
hostility or violence”, January 16, 2009 Para 3.
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that it is in fact, necessary to protect minorities. As outlined in the resolution, this protection is 
directed towards  those  facing  any form of  discrimination by state  regulations and laws that 
particularly target Muslim and Arab minorities, often with migration backgrounds.187 
Freedom of Expression
One of the most significant criticisms relates to what is perceived as a call for the limitation or 
restriction  of  the  right  of  freedom  of  expression,  and  the  welcoming  of  such  practices,  in 
particular at the level of legal measures.188 The language of the resolution suggests an extension 
of the legitimate grounds for the limitation of the right to exercise freedom of expression and 
welcomes domestic initiatives that already do so. Furthermore, the resolution has a tradition of 
calling  upon the Secretary-General  to  report  on the implementation  of the provisions  of the 
resolution  “and the  steps  taken by States  to  combat”189 Defamation of  Religions,  essentially 
implying the introduction of defamation laws that limit freedom of expression. These repeated 
calls in the resolution for legal steps are seen by its critics as attempts to restrict rights beyond 
the legal limitations set out in the ICCPR. On the other hand, these same calls for the restriction 
of the freedom of expression to protect religion190, are justified by supporters of the resolution as 
necessary means to protect the full enjoyment of the freedom of religion. 
The European Union and like minded States argue against this conceptualization, holding that all 
human  rights  are  indivisible  by  their  nature  and  mutually  reinforcing.  In  this  perspective, 
“freedom of expression was the very manifestation of freedom of thought, conscience, religion 
or belief.”191 
Critics  point  out  that  the  resolution,  in  remaining vague in  determining relevant  boundaries 
around the term Defamation of Religions, falls short of making the necessary distinction between  
legitimate criticism of religions and incitement to religious hatred.192 The United Nations held a 
related  expert  seminar  on  this  subject,  reaffirming  the  need  to  define the  general  criteria 
187 see for instance: UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HCR/Res/13/16) OP 5. 
“Notes with deep concern the intensification of the overall campaign of defamation of religions and incitement 
to religious hatred in general, including the ethnic and religious profiling of Muslim minorities in the aftermath 
of the tragic events of 11 September 2001;”
188 United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/64/156) OP 11, OP 19.
189 United Nations General Assembly, Combating Defamation of Religions, A/Res/64/156, n.d. OP 27.
190 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HRC/Res/4/9), 2007 OP 10.
191 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 63rd Session, 46th meeting,  
(A/C.3/63/SR.46), para. 43.
192 Ibid.
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distinguishing between speeches constituting incitement to religious hatred that should be subject  
to legitimate limitations of their expression, and those speeches that do not.193
One particular  operative  clause  in  the  resolution  claims  the  need to  combat  Defamation  of 
Religions especially in Human Rights fora194 including the HRC itself, where criticisms raised 
are regularly condemned as a form of Defamation of Religions. Critics highlight this clause as an 
attempt to silence critical voices in such Human Rights forums. They invoke examples where 
representatives  from the  civil  society  speaking  against  the  resolution  were  silenced  through 
strident  denunciation  of  their  criticism  as  an  attack  on  Islam  itself;  or  point  towards 
Islamophobia being misused as a tool to silence opponents who are then accused of promoting 
hate speech.195 Such incidents can only reaffirm the perception (inter alia of already suspicious 
Member States) of the resolution containing language aiming to undermine Human Rights, first 
and foremost the right for freedom of expression. Critics see therein a direct affirmation of the 
concept of combating Defamation of Religions serving as a practical tool to silence political 
opponents and critical voices, not the additional tool to promote Human Rights as proponents of 
the resolution claim it to be. 
There is a difference in restricting the exercise of a right under certain circumstances and the  
limitation of a human right as such. This difference is blurred by the language of the resolution. 
In referring to this sensitive issue, the language used indicates the restriction of the right itself,  
rather than restricting the right to exercise a human right, as is the common language of relevant  
and internationally binding Human Rights instruments such as the ICCPR. Article 19 of that 
declaration clearly outlines that the rights as such may not be subject to limitation but “The 
exercise of the rights […] may […] be subject to certain restrictions”.
Furthermore,  the  circumstances  under  which  such  restrictions  are  considered  legitimate 
according to international binding law, are bluntly expanded in scope by the language given in 
the resolution – by adding the purpose of protection of religion and belief to the list of legitimate 
193 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS - Addendum - 
Expert seminar on the links between articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political  
Rights: “Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,  
hostility or violence”, para. 42.
194 United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/61/164) ([New York]: UN, 2006) 
OP 8. “Stresses the need to effectively combat defamation of all religions, Islam and Muslims in particular, 
especially in human rights forums;”
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purposes outlined in article 19, ICCPR196 for restrictions on the freedom of expression. As will be 
elaborated in the chapter researching the concepts' accord with Human Rights law, this attempt is 
incompatible with the Human Rights framework.
Rights of Minorities
In relation to the dispute surrounding the focus of the resolutions and to concerns attached to the 
potential  misuse of the difficult  language of the resolution,  questions regarding the effective 
protection of religious minorities have been raised. The arguments and perspectives outlining the 
linkage between Defamation of Religions and religious minorities are twofold in principle as 
discussed below. 
Those  arguing  for  the  concept  of  Combating  Defamation  of  Religions  as  an  instrument 
protecting respect for religion, see in the act of religious defamation the violation of Human 
Rights  for  their  adherents.  Hence  it  is  argued  that  initiatives  aiming  at  the  prevention  and 
elimination  of  Defamation  of  Religions  would  contribute  to  the  protection  of  religious 
minorities.  The  resolutions  repeatedly  underlines  this  understanding,  inter  alia  by  pointing 
towards  the  issue  of  religious  profiling  of  Muslim minorities197 and  the  state's  obligation  to 
protect  religious  minorities  by  means  of  legislation,  suggesting  therefore  the  inclusion  of 
Defamation  of  Religions.198 The  resolution  focuses  on  the  enjoyment  of  rights  by  religious 
minorities being impaired through discriminatory national policies199 rooted in opinions based on 
the dissemination of defamatory stereotyping of religion.  The European Union stated in  this 
regard  to  be “particularly  concerned  at  the  insistence  on  asking  special  protection  for  one 
specific religion.”200
Critics  oppose  the  above  perspective  because  their  focus  on  minorities  is  a  different  one. 
Religious minorities do not face the same situations and challenges solely due to the fact that  
they share the commonality of being a minority within their respective environment. While the 
resolution  predominantly  addresses  issues  most  relevant  to  minorities  with  migration 
195 Arte Thema: Menschenrechte und Vereinte Nationen., 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=zmaJ_65xnMc&feature=youtube_gdata_player.
196 United Nations, ICCPR Article 19 (3).
197 United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/64/156) OP 5.
198 Ibid. OP 14.
199 Ibid. PP 8.
200 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 39th MEETING, 58th Session, 2002, para. 
32.
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backgrounds, with home governments speaking out in their interest on an international level, 
critics of the concept point to the Human Rights problems that domestic religious minorities face 
in relation to their own governments. 
The concerns here converge again on two aspects: 
Firstly, the concrete recommendations on combating the issue of defamation together with an 
overly broad language on setting its boundaries, add to the suspicion of being a tool or even 
initiative to undermine Human Rights rather than protect them.
Secondly, observers point to the issue of religious ideas contradicting each other and potentially 
constituting what is seen as defamation of one religion over the other: 
While all religions claim universal truth to some level, opinions expressed might be looked upon 
as blasphemous by adherents of a different religion. While for instance, adherents of Islam view 
Muhammed as the prophet of God, adherents of Christianity reject this fact in accordance to their  
scholars as a false claim.201 Similarly, “when a Muslim states his belief that Jesus was a prophet, 
but  not  God  incarnate,  such  statements  could  also  be  considered  'defamation'  against  the 
Christian faith of many believers. But no OIC member state supporting 'defamation of religions' 
laws would want to strip Muslims of their right to state this Qur’anic teaching.”202
Pakistan is traditionally advancing the resolution on behalf of the OIC, and its strong support for 
the concept, is well reflected in its own rule of law. Penal code §295 states that defiling Islam or 
its prophets deserves life imprisonment or the death penalty. Speeches considered blasphemous 
before the law, for example by rejecting the idea of Muhammed's prophet-hood, can hence be 
punished  by  death.  This  ultimately  puts  the  state  authority  in  the  position  to  decide  which 
religious claim would stand over the other, be more 'true' than the other, and which ones would 
have to be considered blasphemous or defaming to religion. This is problematic insofar as no 
religiously argued truth can be rejected or proven on the grounds of reason. Additionally, experts 
outline  in  regard  to  articles  19  and  20  of  the  ICCPR  that  “no  one  must  be  penalized  for 
statements that were true”.203 In practice this means that a speech assessed in court as being a 
201 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Religious Defamation - Issues Brief,” 11.
202 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Religious Defamation - Issues Brief.”
203 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS - Addendum - 
Expert seminar on the links between articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political  
Rights: “Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,  
hostility or violence”, para. 28.
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case  of  Defamation  of  Religions  and  therefore  a  punishable  offence,  is  hence  highly 
contextualized  and  dependent  on  the  local  majority  religion.  Critics  conclude  that  the 
combination of the resolutions unclear language and the subsequent potential misuse as a tool of 
silencing critics and mainstreaming domestic religious concepts, is contra-productive towards the  
protection of religious minorities and their enjoyment of rights.204 
The concept may further be used as tool to silence divergent ideas within a certain religious 
group and mainstream mass opinions. This could hinder attempts to reform certain traditions or 
generate  internal  discussions  over  religious  disputes.  The European Union took note  in  this 
regard, pointing out that “Members of religions or communities of belief should not be viewed as  
mere  particles  of  homogeneous  and  monolithic  entities.”205 Moreover,  an  expert  seminar 
conducted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2008 
warned on the linkage between Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR that the “honest debate and 
research on religious issues” is at risk of being outlawed and freedom of expression and freedom 
of religion or belief would be at stake if Article 20 of the ICCPR is applied in a broad way. 206 
The experts concluded that “article 20 could be used as a pretext for persecuting and oppressing 
religious minorities”207. The 'Becket Fund for Religious Liberty' argues that, in practice “[…] 
much of the persecution and discrimination has resulted not from 'defamation of religions' but 
from state action against religious minorities and dissenters, who promote viewpoints that are 
often considered offensive to the majority religious populations in each of these countries.”208
Regardless of the effectiveness of the concept  in actually protecting respect for religion,  the 
concept serves the interest of the majority over the rights of the minority. Critics from the civil 
society go as far as to declare religious defamation laws as conceptualized in the resolution, “as a 
form of thought control and work solely to the advantage of religious majorities that have the 
power to sanction which ideas should be permitted in the public square.”209 The implications for 
vulnerable  groups  such  as  religious  minorities,  deriving  from  the  broader  application  of 
204 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Religious Defamation - Issues Brief.”
205 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 61st Session, 48th meeting,  
(A/C.3/61/SR.48), para. 25.
206 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS - Addendum - 
Expert seminar on the links between articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political  
Rights: “Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,  
hostility or violence”, para. 42.
207 Ibid., para. 43.
208 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Religious Defamation - Issues Brief,” 12.
209 Ibid., 8.Ibid., 8.Ibid., 8.Ibid., 8.
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Defamation of Religions in its practical implementation in reference to Articles 19 and 20 of the 
ICCPR will  therefore  be  examined in  detail  in  a  separate  chapter.  The compatibility  of  the 
concept as it is proclaimed in the resolution with the enjoyment of Human Rights of persons 
belonging to minorities will also be assessed therein. 
Defamation of Religions as a Flawed Concept
At first sight, Defamation of Religions seems to be an extension of the scope of the traditional 
application of defamation laws protecting the reputation of a person, to the level of groups of 
individuals.  Critics  point  to  the  issue  in  group  defamation  of  providing  a  justification  to 
introduce censorship and stifle freedom of expression on grounds of social harmony. While the 
concept of Defamation of Religions might be closely related to the idea of group defamation law 
in  its  practical  execution,  it  goes  further  beyond  it  on  a  conceptional  level.  Defamation  of 
Religions  extends  its  protectionist  aim towards  religious  ideas  and their  related  doctrines,210 
implying the idea that religion can be a possible subject to injury of reputation by falling prey to 
defaming statements. The idea of religion having a personal reputation is problematic enough to 
judge Defamation of Religions as being an inherently flawed concept: Defamatory statements do 
not only require to be intended but – more importantly – have to actually be false statements. In 
questions of faith, the level of truth to statements is highly difficult to assess from a jurisdictional 
point of view. Differing claims of religious truths, even denouncing other religious teaching, 
have often proven to be the epicentre of particular religious teachings. 
From a legal perspective, Defamation of Religions is flawed in its conceptualization and as such, 
incompatible with current interpretations of international law although not necessarily though 
with the Human Rights standard itself. 
Some of the concerns mentioned above already contain criticism regarding the concept itself. As 
will be outlined in the chapter researching the concepts compatibility with the Human Rights 
framework, the term defamation is highly problematic when being applied to 'religion'. The legal 
term 'defamation' is the matter of an insult against an individual, causing emotional injury on the 
part of the victim. Applying this idea on a term such as religion would mean that (depending on 
the definition) either an idea about the world, an institution or a group or all of them together,  
could be subject to defamatory injury. While the legal concept of group defamation may apply in 
210Liaquat Ali Khan, “Combating Defamation of Religions,” 4.
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some cases, essentially religious ideas themselves cannot be subject to such defamatory insults. 
In this logic, the concept of Defamation of Religions is inherently flawed. As Human Rights 
apply to individuals and not to groups as such and certainly not to ideas, the concept is often also 
seen flawed in its proposal  to be a framed as a Human Rights issue.  Most  prominently,  the 
European Union has voiced  strong reservations about  discussing the  issue  of  Defamation of 
Religions in the context of Human Rights. They argue the topic to be misplaced in the discourse 
of Human Rights.211 The UN Special  Rapporteur  on the Freedom of Religion or Belief  also 
concluded that the international Human Rights law regime protects individuals against Human 
Rights  violations,  but  does  not  extend to  belief  systems.  Essentially,  the  right  of  anyone to 
freedom of  religion  or  belief  does  not  encompass  the  right  to  have  one‘s  religion  or  belief 
protected against criticism; even if this fact is considered inadequate by adherents, as the concept 
of the Defamation Resolution proposes.212
Race and Religion 
Another point of discomfort among Member States is the growing tendency of the language used 
in the resolution to conflate identities based on race and religion, with references to “increasing 
acts of racism and xenophobia”213 as well as to the World Conference against Racism ('Durban 
Conference')”214 These references, such as highlighting the “intersection of religion an race”215 
and their consequences, give the indication that both aspects should be seen as equal in nature. 
This is to place Defamation of Religions and racism on an equal footing; an attempt that became 
a source of dispute even among proponents of the concept. The members of the OIC draw an 
analogy  between acts  of  racial  hatred  and  defamation  of  religion,  as  they  see  any form of 
discrimination  equivalent  if  directed  “against  a  group  of  individuals  if  these  were  clearly 
identifiable as a group and were discriminated against as such.”216 
211 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 61st Session, 48th meeting,  
(A/C.3/61/SR.48), para. 25.
212 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, 229.
213 United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/61/164) PP; United Nations 
General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/62/154) ([New York]: UN, 2007) PP; United 
Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/63/171) ([New York]: UN, 2008) PP.
214 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Religious Defamation - Issues Brief,” 3.
215 United Nations General Assembly, Combating Defamation of Religions PP 23.
216 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS - Addendum - 
Expert seminar on the links between articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political  
Rights: “Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,  
hostility or violence”, para. 30.
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Indications  of  internal  disputes  regarding  the  resolution  such  as  inter  alia,  last  minute  oral 
revisions right before the vote, include disputes over such references to the intersection of race 
and religion. This connotes that an agreement over this question can be found on a case by case  
basis and only at a very late stage in the negotiations.217 Not all countries which in principle 
agree to the idea of Defamation of Religions want to see the the issues of racism and Defamation 
of Religions intermingled. Some abstained from voting on the resolution specifically due to their  
reservation about linking the issue of Defamation of Religions with racism.218 Even Albania, an 
OIC member itself, voiced its irritation over “attempts to associate defamation of religions with 
racial discrimination” in an explanation of its vote in 2009.219
Such criticism against the conflation of the terms 'race' and 'religion' is based on the following 
reasoning. Member States irritated by this tendency, point out that unlike religion which might 
be adopted or changed at free will, aspects used to racially categorise are mostly determined at 
birth and are assumed to remain unchangeable. Hence both subjects are of different nature, and 
should not be mistakenly assumed as being essentially the same nor should they be treated as  
such. This view is supported by experts mandated by the UN to elaborate on the subject, who 
noted  that  a  clear  distinction  between  religious  and  racial  hatred  should  be  made.  More 
importantly,  the  Special  Rapporteur  on  contemporary  forms  of  racism,  racial  discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief as 
well  as  the  Special  Rapporteur  on the  promotion and protection  of  the  right  to  freedom of 
opinion and expression have spoken out against the notion of the resolution conflating race and 
religion: They argued that while “any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is 
scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous”220 religious statements 
claiming  truth  and  superiority  over  each  other  (statements  that  are  hence  defamatory  over 
another  religion),  “have  been traditionally  accepted  as  part  of  their  theological  grounds”221. 
Consequently, racism and defamation of religions are not issues of equal nature and should not 
be conflated.
217 UN. General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 64th Session, 42nd meeting, (A/C.3/64/SR.42) 
Para 59. (The phrase “the intersection between religion and race” in paragraph OP 25, of Resolution 64/154 had 
been added only orally by Malaysia speaking on behalf of the OIC in an explanation of vote before the vote.)
218 Ibid. Para 67.
219 Ibid., para. 76.
220 Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,  
Githu Muigai, Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, and Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, “Joint Statement 
to freedom of expression and incitement to racial or religious hatred.”
221 Ibid.
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While proponents of the concept and the resolution argue that legal measures fighting against 
racism should incorporate cases of Defamation of Religions, the Special Rapporteurs conclude 
from their argumentation that legislation directed against acts of racism would not necessarily be 
applicable in case of religious intolerance.
Narrow focus on the protection of Islam
Another point of criticism is the narrow focus on the protection of Islam. Even countries which 
in principle support the initiative and the ideas behind it, feel strongly enough about this issue to 
not vote in favour on the resolution.222 Throughout the history of the resolution, critics have 
pointed  out  that  the  language  has  maintained  a  narrow  focus  on  Islam,  despite  efforts  to 
accommodate  these  concerns  by  including  more  general  references  to  religion  in  various 
sections.  Nevertheless,  a  closer  view  of  the  text  reveals  that  the  substantive  clauses 
predominantly focus on Islam. 
The  European  Union  reminded  the  UN  membership  in  this  regard  repeatedly  that  “[…] 
discrimination based on religion or belief, which constituted a serious violation of human rights, 
must be addressed comprehensively; it was vital to recognize that such discrimination was not 
confined to any one religion or belief, or to any one part of the world.”223 The argument goes 
further, that “Singling out one group only distracted from the ultimate objective of promoting 
respect for all religions or beliefs.”224
Alleged Campaigns against Islam 
Criticisms arise as well over the barely hidden claim in the resolution of the existence of a joint 
and deliberate campaign against Islam, which is even actively “condoned by Governments”225. 
Together with additional language pointing towards “the intensification of the overall campaign 
of defamation of religion”226, this creates the subtext of an allegedly existing conspiracy against 
Islam.  It  further  constructs  Defamation  of  Religions  as  generally  an  act  of  conscious 
222 Statements made by India: UN. General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 64th Session, 42nd  
meeting, (A/C.3/64/SR.42), para. 67.
223 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 61st Session, 48th meeting,  
(A/C.3/61/SR.48), para. 25.
224 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 39th MEETING, 58th Session, para. 31.
225 United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/63/171) OP 4.
226 Ibid. OP 5.
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discrimination, rather than possibly an occurrence based on a lack of inter-cultural competence 
or cultural sensitivity. Unsurprisingly, such accusations do no good to the atmosphere in which 
the negotiations for the resolution take place.  It  is  not constructive to accuse other Member 
States with differing perspectives regarding the concept, of acting unfaithfully and with ill-intent. 
Such remarks only add to the atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust in which the negotiations 
about the resolution take place.
 4.3.1  Elements missing in the Critical Debate 
In light of the discussion surrounding the concept of Defamation of Religions and its probably 
negative  consequences,  two  major  critical  aspects  have  not  found  mention  in  the  political 
arguments yet. One aspect is the potential use of the concept as grounds for arguments to justify 
non-compliance with State regulations; it might well be that this aspect was allowed to slide in 
the  debate  for  reasons of  political  sensitivities  and common interest.  More surprising is  the 
omission  even  of  representatives  of  civil  society  to  voice  apprehensions  of  the  practical 
consequences of the application of Defamation of Religions legislation for the enjoyment of 
Human Rights for women. 
Rejection of State Authority
It must be noted that the concept of Defamation of Religions, in practice little different from the 
concept of Blasphemy, might as well  be used by non-state  actors (groups) to effectively  cut  
themselves off from state authority. Rejecting specific legal regulations or law enforcement as a 
form of governmental interference that defames religious belief, rules or practices might well 
contribute to increased tensions among society. This is more than a theoretical possibility, it has  
been a recurrent and historical threat for state stability. The most recent example was the most 
prominent supporter of the resolution itself: Pakistan, where the rejection of state authority is 
justified on religious arguments claiming the state as being anti-Islamic. Groups such as the 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan go as far as to justify their growing  insurgency and acts of violence 
against the state, society and religious minorities with arguments of blasphemy to fight against 
'Anti-Islamic forces' within – and against – their own country.227 
227 Human Rights Watch, “Pakistan: Massacre of Minority Ahmadis,” n.d., 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/05/31/pakistan-massacre-minority-ahmadis; United States Commission on 
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A government  officially  adopting  the  concept  of  criminalizing  Defamation  of  Religions  in 
official policy and therefore putting it into a legal framework, would fuel existing tendencies to 
splinter religious groups further off from governmental control. This should incentivise the need 
to  carefully  weigh  the  benefits  and  constraints  of  Defamation  of  Religions  laws  for  its 
supporters.
Rights of women
Neither in the criticism of Member States opposing the resolution, nor by NGOs present in the 
UN fora has any mention yet been made about the potential negative consequences for women. 
Combating  Defamation  of  Religions  can  result  in  increased  restriction  and  censorship  of 
criticism against  certain religious  traditions.  As such,  prohibition has  shown in practice  that 
criticism  aiming  at  patriarchal  and  discriminatory  practices  against  women  are  very  often 
included therein. This can severely impair the enjoyment of Human Rights for women, as Anti-
blasphemy laws in  this  regard  would work to  undermine  even speaking out  against  Human 
Rights violation against women, let alone the prosecution of such violations. While no concerns 
about women's rights have been voiced yet in the critical evaluation of the concept, such analysis 
most  definitely should be conducted.  A first  critical  step in  this  regard will  be  the chapters 
elaborating the concepts' compatibility with the Human Rights legal framework and in relation to 
women's rights.
International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, 229.
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 4.4  Development of the Resolution within the UN System
The following chapter gives a short overview of the development of the Defamation Resolution 
in the relevant UN bodies from 1999 onwards till today. The resolution has received varying 
degrees of attention and agreement over time; while its language evolved from a text meant to 
highlight concerns regarding the negative conceptions projected of adherents of Islam to a paper 
with unusually strong recommendations and demands for all members of the UN.
CHR – 1999/82: “Defamation of religions”
The resolution now known as “Combating Defamation of Religions” was first introduced to the 
United Nations in 1999 by Pakistan, in the Commission on Human Rights on behalf of the OIC 
under the agenda item 'racism'.228 The draft entitled “Defamation of Islam” was adopted, after 
amendments and extensive negotiations, as resolution 1999/82 “Defamation of Religions“. While 
having broadened its scope due to demands of other Member States, the resolution nevertheless 
kept its primary focus on Islam. Despite this, the resolution found agreement by all Member 
States represented in the Commission and was adopted in consensus without a vote.
The language of the text has been kept vague, yet strong, particularly within its operative clauses 
and with regard to defining the terms in use, but its underlying intention is quite obvious: 
The  resolution  framed  the  concept  of  Defamation  of  Religions  as  a  matter  of  religious 
intolerance, specifically in relation to Islam, and linked its meaning closely to what is referred to 
as  “negative  stereotyping  of  religions”.229 OP 2  further  explains  this  particular  wording  by 
expressing “[…] deep concern that Islam is frequently and wrongly associated with human rights 
violations and with terrorism”230. This qualm has also been brought forward as a reason for the 
necessity of the resolution. 
The resolution further highlights the role  of the media in  augmenting the aforesaid negative 
stereotyping231 and  calls  upon  Member  States  to  combat  religious  intolerance  within  their 
national legal framework.232 Considering that the resolution repeatedly urges for legal measures 
to be undertaken, it must have been foreseeable that this topic would resurface at a later stage as  
228The Commission on Human Rights was the preprocessor to the Human Rights Council until 2005 
229UN. Commission on Human Rights, Defamation of religions (1999/82), 1999 OP 1.
230Ibid. OP 2.
231Ibid. OP 3.
232Ibid. OP 4.
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a  source  of  dispute.  The resolution  closes  with  a  request  to  the  'High Commissioner'  Mary 
Robinson herself, as well as the 'Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance' and the 'Special 
Rapporteur on racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance' to pay attention 
to the issue of religious defamation and to report their insights to the members of Commission on  
Human Rights.233
Interestingly, the text of this resolution does not refer even once to any of the existing Human 
Rights instruments nor the UDHR itself, but contains singled out references to specific Human 
Rights, mainly those affecting freedom of religion and belief, and discrimination and violence on 
the grounds of religious intolerance. Instead of a strong reference committing to Human Rights 
as  such,  this  resolution  is  predicated  on  the  notion  that  “[…] discrimination  against  human 
beings on grounds of religion or belief constitutes an affront to human dignity”.234
Reservations made by the EU were not limited to the questionable use of language referring to 
Human Rights, but extended to the problematic legal definition of the term “defamation”, which 
they considered had no legal meaning attached to it.235 Some delegations, including those of the 
European Union, felt strongly that the resolution was unbalanced in its sole focus on Islam, and 
pushed the OIC to compromise on accommodating their concerns for the benefit to ensure a 
common accord for the adoption of the resolution.236 India also pointed out that the resolution 
was misplaced under the sub-item 'racism' and should rather be considered under “agenda item 
11 (Civil and political rights), sub-item (e) (Religious intolerance)”237. This conflation between 
racism and religious intolerance would become a major source for dispute in the coming years. 
Pakistan,  on behalf of the OIC, explained in a statement  made in a next  meeting, that “The 
reason  why  they  had  proposed  the  draft  under  the  agenda  item  on  racism  was  that  the 
phenomenon of intolerance against Islam concerned Muslims as a group because of what were 
presumed to be their religious beliefs.”238 India was also the only member-state that made careful 
reference in their statements to the question of the approach that the resolution took, noting that 
“the best way to combat defamation and negative stereotyping was to promote tolerance and 
233 Ibid. OP 6.
234 Ibid.
235 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 62nd MEETING, 55th Session, 1999, para. 
9.
236 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Combating Defamation of Religions,” Issues Brief, June 2, 2008, 2, 
http://www.becketfund.org/files/a9e5b.pdf; UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 
61st MEETING, 55th Session, 1999, 3, 9. 
237 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 61st MEETING, 55th Session, para. 5.
238 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 62nd MEETING, 55th Session, para. 2.
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strengthen legislation.”239 The European Union also made the remark that all  “States should 
endeavour to ensure that no religion was invoked as a pretext for violating human rights or 
conducting terrorist  activities.”240.  This statement  could easily have been misunderstood as  a 
side-blow on the issue of identifying Islam with terrorism and Human Rights violations, a major 
concern specifically made mention of in the resolution.241 
Despite the misgivings, the resolution passed in the Commission without being called for a vote, 
as the OIC compromised on the narrow focus on Islam that the introduced draft had contained.242
CHR – 2000/84: “Defamation of religions”
The resolution remained a carbon copy in 2000, but critical remarks made by Germany on behalf 
of the European Union in the previous session, and similar references in this session by Member 
States as well as by non-governmental organizations increased the tensions. Pakistan on behalf of 
the  OIC,  accused  those  statements  of  being  made  deliberately  to  defame  Islam,  allegedly 
portraying Islam as an ideological opponent to Human Rights and falsely connecting Islam with 
terrorism. The representative from Pakistan in turn claimed such accusations would serve as 
justifications for States to suppress Muslims within their populations.243 The European Union 
noted that doubts persisted whether the issue of Defamation of Religions should be dealt within 
the Commission on Human Rights at  all  and urged the OIC to refrain from introducing the 
resolution the next session. Nonetheless the EU remained in good-faith and joined consensus on 
the resolution.244
The Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief who had been mandated to take up the 
question of Defamation of Religions in his research, shared indeed the concerns raised by the  
resolution in 1999. But the Special Rapporteur also pointed to the concern he had in relation to 
efforts in combating the phenomenon of Defamation of Religions. He emphasised that “these 
should  not  be  used  to  censure  all  inter-religious  and  intra-religious  criticism.  Several  other 
communications  from  the  Special  Rapporteur  illustrate  the  danger  that  efforts  to  combat 
defamation  (particularly  blasphemy)  may  be  manipulated  for  purposes  contrary  to  human 
239 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 61st MEETING, 55th Session, para. 5.
240 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 62nd MEETING, 55th Session, para. 9.
241 UN. Commission on Human Rights, Defamation of religions (1999/82) OP 2.
242 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Combating Defamation of Religions,” 2.
243 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 67th MEETING, 56th Session, 2000, para. 
73.
244 Ibid., para. 75.
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rights.”245 Noteworthy, the Special Rapporteur referred in one part of his report to the use of 
blasphemy acts against the Ahmadi community in Pakistan.246
CHR – 2001/4: “Combating defamation of religions as a means to promote human rights,  
social harmony and religious and cultural diversity”
The  resolution  underwent  major  developments  in  2001.  The  new  version  of  the  resolution 
declares the act of combating the phenomena of Defamation of Religions a means to promote 
Human Rights, even in its resolution title. This emphasis on the promotion of Human Rights 
suggests indirectly that Defamation of Religions would need to be considered a violation of 
Human Rights in itself.247 This claim is inconsistent with the following framing of the subject:
The resolution suggests that combating Defamation of Religions should be viewed also as means 
to promote social harmony, and religious and cultural diversity. In other words, the resolution 
postulates Defamation of Religions to cause social disharmony and via this proxy, to lead to 
violations of  Human Rights.248 But  in  this  way the resolution further  defines the nature and 
meaning of Defamation of Religions itself, framing the link between Defamation of Religions 
towards Human Rights as negative, indirect and imperative: 
Negative as the linkage points towards the violation of Human Rights.
Indirect as Defamation of Religions does not directly lead to Human Rights violations but 
can lead to situations that could provide the grounds for it. 
Imperative as while the language does not claim Defamation of Religions to be the sole 
cause  for  such situations,  it  does  suggest  that  it  automatically  leads  to  Human Rights 
violations as its sole consequence. 
245 Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Mr. Abdelfattah Amor, CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,  
INCLUDING RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE, February 15, 2000, para. 111, http://daccess-
ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=E/CN.4/2000/65&Lang=E.
246 Ibid., para. 79.
247 UN. Commission on Human Rights, Combating defamation of religions as a means to promote human rights,  
social harmony and religious and cultural diversity (2001/4), 2001.
248 Ibid. PP 6.
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By outlining  the  meaning of  Defamation  of  Religions,  the  authors  of  the  resolution  created 
clearer  definitional  boundaries  for  this  concept.  And while  the  title  of  the  resolution  might 
suggest otherwise,  those characteristics define Defamation of Religions as  not constituting a 
Human Rights violation in itself. 
Another point to take note of in the resolutions 2001 version is the suggestion contained therein 
of a linkage between race and religion. While the resolution already had been introduced in 1999 
under  the  subitem 'racism'  and  Pakistan  on  behalf  on  the  OIC defended  this  approach,  the 
resolution gave in its version of 2001 more specific indication that these issues should be seen as 
connected.  It  does  so  by  referring  to  the  World  Conference  against  Racism,  Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance which was to be held in Durban later in that 
year, and a further note about racism and xenophobia in the operative part. As the language of the 
resolution sought to connect Defamation of Religions with acts of racism, it risks a conflation 
between the terms race and religion. Criticism has arisen that in fact the conflation between race 
and religion should be seen as a deliberate act, that is aimed at bringing cases of Defamation of 
Religions on an equal footing with generally accepted cases of Human Rights violations based 
on  racism.  This,  so  the  criticism  goes,  should  make  Defamation  of  Religions  more  easily 
acceptable as a Human Rights violation itself.
In keeping with its conception that Defamation of Religions is a matter of negative stereotyping 
primarily manifested in the voice of the media, the resolution also deplored “the use of print and 
electronic media to incite xenophobia against Islam or any other religion.”249
The resolution now entitled, “Combating defamation of religions as a means to promote human 
rights, social harmony and religious and cultural diversity” could not find adoption by consensus 
any  more  in  2001.  As  the  reservations  several  members  of  the  Commission  had  not  been 
accommodated to their satisfaction, the European Union called for a role call in an attempt to 
oppose the resolution. While the resolution found support with 28 Member States, it faced 15 
opposing votes and 9 abstentions. Besides like minded States such as Canada and the United 
States of America, the opposing votes remained limited to those of the European Union.
249 Liaquat Ali Khan, “Combating Defamation of Religions,” 1.
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CHR – 2002/9: “Combating defamation of religion”
In 2002, the resolution underwent changes in the light of the 9/11 terrorist attack that had taken 
place the previous year. The resolution now specifically mentioned those events as grounds for 
further negative projections of Islam in the media, with a particular reference to “Muslim values 
and traditions” being stigmatized.250
By not elaborating exactly what negative projections of Muslim traditions are being alluded to, 
the resolution conflates discriminatory remarks which ought to be rejected on grounds of existing 
Human  Rights  laws,  with  legitimate  criticism  against  certain  traditions  often  justified  by 
religious arguments. This was interpreted by Member States and critics from the civil society as 
an  attempt  to  shield traditions  assumed  significant  for  Muslim values  by  adherents,  against 
criticism from the outside. A central element that became a source of dispute can be found in the 
underlying, but barely hidden accusation that governments promote Defamation of Religions. 
Proponents of the resolution have used the language in its clauses to link governmental support 
to what is referred to in the resolution as “extremist organizations”. Both of them together are 
allegedly campaigning against Islam.251 
Pakistan, speaking on behalf of the OIC, noted in a statement that Muslims and Islam are victims 
of a defamatory campaign, that has been carried out deliberately and after 9/11 with increased 
intensification, implying the existing of a broad conspiracy. It further accused Human Rights 
Defenders, such as NGOs aiming at the promotion and protection of Human Rights, of being 
biased  and  ignoring  massacres  against  Muslims  happening  in  connection  with  aforesaid 
campaigns against Islam.252 
The  language  of  the  resolution  also  evolved  to  more  differentiated  and  detailed  advice  in 
references  regarding  legal  recommendations  on  addressing  Defamation  of  Religions.  The 
resolution now urges States to take measures to combat occurrences of intolerance and acts of 
violence  within  their  national  legal  framework.  Interestingly,  the  resolution  focuses  on 
recommendations on a domestic level, while the issues that need to be addressed with these legal 
instruments  appear  to  be  of  international  relevance.  The  paragraph  includes  a  note  that  all 
measures have to remain in conformity with international human rights instruments, in response 
250 UN. Commission on Human Rights, Combating defamation of religions (2002/9) PP 9.
251 Ibid. OP 5. : “Expresses deep concern at programmes and agendas pursued by extremist organizations and 
groups aimed at defamation of religions, in particular when supported by Governments;”
252 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 37th MEETING, 58th Session, 2002, para. 
88.
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to critical voices assuming that States might fall short in their obligation to protect other human 
rights in their attempts to combat the phenomenon of Defamation of Religions.253
The conflation of religious defamation with racism has been retained and further underlined by 
calling upon the Special  Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial  discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance to “examine the situation of Muslim and Arab peoples”. 
However,  it  was  not  this  conflation  of  race  and  religion  but  the  reference  to  the  Durban 
Declaration and Programme of  Action that  has  been more  critical  for  some Member States, 
above all among the WEOG countries. Disregarding all other misgivings, the clear statement in 
the text that welcomed the highly disputed declaration of Durban was, as expected, enough to 
trigger  resistance.  While  supporters  of  Durban  may  have  been  brought  in  favour  of  the 
resolution,  criticism  arose  among  non-Muslim  NAM  members  that  the  resolution  was 
unbalanced and overly oriented towards Islam, as noted by India in  an statement before the 
vote.254
It has to be pointed out that the first resolution that mentioned the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights was the 2002 version, although it did so only by referring to “common universal 
values“255 enshrined therein, not to rights as such. 
In an prior explanation of their impending vote, the European Union expressed its deep concern 
with the resolution, and implicitly said that the Defamation Resolution was needless by pointing 
out that the issues raised in the resolution were meaningfully addressed in other resolutions. 256 
For the first  time, the problematic  notion of the resolution applying Human Rights on ideas 
rather than individuals have been taken up in a statement of Spain on behalf of the European 
Union.257
Despite the discomfort among several Member States which had triggered the recorded vote in 
2001, the resolution gained more support this time and was adopted with 30 votes in favour.  
Nevertheless, 15 countries opposed the initiative and 8 more abstained. 
253UN. Commission on Human Rights, Combating defamation of religions (2002/9) OP 6.
254UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 47th MEETING, 59th Session, 2003, para. 
101.
255UN. Commission on Human Rights, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL - OFFICIAL RECORDS (E/2002/23  
- E/CN.4/2002/200), 2002, http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf OP 9.
256UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 39th MEETING, 58th Session, para. 30.
257Ibid., para. 31, 32.
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CHR – 2003/4: “Combating defamation of religions”
In 2003, in response to rising criticisms, the resolutions' language was drafted in an increasingly 
more ecumenical tone. The references to “all religions” increased and the general importance of 
“[…] tolerance, understanding among different cultures and mutual appreciation of cultural and 
religious  values”258 was  highlighted  in  various  forms  and paragraphs.  For  the  first  time  the 
resolution  specifically  examined  the  theme  of  law enforcement  and  various  executive  state 
affairs, by placing emphasis on the need for public officials to “[…] respect different religions 
and beliefs and do not discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief […]”259 in their work.
The resolution further regained momentum in 2003: Supporting votes increased from 30 to 32, 
while 14 remained not in favour of the resolution and 7 abstained.260 
CHR – 2004/6: “Combating defamation of religions”
Although little changed in substance in the 2004 version of the text, the initiative nevertheless 
lost  support  within  the  Commissions  membership.  Through  statements  made  by  the 
representative  of Pakistan speaking on behalf  of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC), the attempt to conflate race and religion was made more visual during the previous 60th 
session of the Commission on Human Rights. Under this session's sub-item of 'Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and all forms of discrimination', Pakistan's statement was entirely 
focused upon religion, noting for instance that “The Islamic world was seriously concerned that 
there  had  been  no  decline  in  the  defamation  of  Islam  and  attacks  against  its  values  and 
followers”, and pointing towards negative stereotyping as “[…] the media continued to portray 
Muslims as terrorists”261 These remarks,  made as they were at  a forum dealing with racism, 
clearly suggest that the phenomena of racism and Defamation of Religions were viewed upon as 
being  of  equal  nature.  This  approach  has  not  received  agreement  by  all  members  of  the 
Commission. While the conflation of race and religion was raised as a matter of concern by most 
Member States, it had been the unbalanced aim to protect a single religion that triggered the most  
criticism. Countries such as Guatemala or the Dominican Republic decided upon this ground to 
258 UN. Commission on Human Rights, Combating defamation of religions (2003/4), 2003 PP.
259 Ibid. OP 8.
260 Ibid.
261 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 14th MEETING, 60th Session, March 22, 
2004, 15, http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf.
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vote against the resolution, as they clarified in their statements.262
As a consequence the resolution lost support on a recorded vote for the first time. Only 29 votes 
were  given  in  favour  while  16  Member  States  opposed  the  resolution  and  7  remained 
abstaining.263 
CHR – 2005/3 and GA – 60/150: “Combating defamation of religions” 
In 2005, an operative clause was introduced, urging States “to prohibit the dissemination […] 
racist  and  xenophobic  ideas  and  material  aimed  at  any  religion  or  its  followers”264,  further 
conflating the term race  and religion,  and thus  putting the issue of  racism and the topic of 
Defamation of Religions again on an equal footing.
Moreover in 2005, a topic that hadn't been given much attention namely education, gained a 
more prominent place in the focus of the text. In the previous versions of the resolution, the text  
mentioned education as a necessary tool to spread tolerance, by pointing for instance, towards 
“the importance of education in ensuring tolerance of and respect for religion and belief”265. 
Consistent to the proposal from 2001 that Defamation of Religions was a means of contributing 
to  social  harmony266,  the  2005 resolution emphasized  the  need to  combat  the  defamation  of 
religions  through “education and awareness-raising”  inter  alia in  human rights  forums.  This 
extension of scope haunts critics in such human rights fora as the Human Rights Council itself,  
where their remarks became vocally disqualified as attempts at defaming Islam. The topic of 
education became the primary vehicle to call for combined efforts on a regional and international 
level  to  combat  Defamation  of  Religions,  pointing  towards  a  need  for  “strategizing  and 
harmonizing actions”267.
The resolution not only found extension in its scope but also in its reach. In 2005, the initiative 
found its way to New York when Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC, introduced a carbon copy of the 
text first introduced at the Commission of Human Rights, as a UN General Assembly resolution. 
262 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 45th MEETING, 60th Session, 2004, para. 
78, 81.
263 UN. Commission on Human Rights, Combating defamation of religions (2004/6), 2004.
264 UN. Commission on Human Rights, Combating defamation of religions (2005/3), 2005, OP. 9.
265 UN. Commission on Human Rights, Combating defamation of religions (2004/6), PP. 16.
266 UN. Commission on Human Rights, Combating defamation of religions as a means to promote human rights,  
social harmony and religious and cultural diversity (2001/4).
267 UN. Commission on Human Rights, Combating defamation of religions (2005/3), OP. 12; United Nations 
General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/60/150) ([New York]: UN, 2005), OP. 12.
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It should be stated that the composition of the members of these two bodies are significantly 
different.  While  the  UN  General  Assembly  constitutes  of  a  universal  membership,  the 
Commission of Human Rights is limited to only 53 seats. Hence the General Assembly is a more 
representative body of the United Nations, illustrating the general opinion on a subject more 
accurately, than the smaller Commission on Human Rights.
A comparison between the voting results in both bodies is particularly interesting and valid as the 
voting took place in both forums over a nearly identical text. The only difference in the two 
resolutions was that in its General Assembly's version, the resolution requested the Secretary-
General to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution to the membership in its next 
session, instead of requesting the 'Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance' to do so, as was done in the version of the 
Commission on Human Rights. In the Commission, 60%268 of the members voted in favour of 
the  resolution.  With  31  supporting  countries,  this  has  been  the  best  result  achieved  by  an 
adoption through a roll call for the Defamation Resolution till then. With 53% support, the vote 
in the General Assembly however, had shown barely half of the UN membership in favour of the 
resolution.269 The introduction to the General Assembly with its broader UN membership led to a 
more in-depth analysis than had been the case before; taking a closer look at the concept and 
language in use. Alarmed at what was perceived by them as an erosion of the right of freedom of 
expression,  concerns were being voiced regarding Human Rights now in New York as well. So 
far, criticism had remained limited to the narrow focus on Islam and the conceivably problematic 
conflation of the terms race and religion; from here on out, criticism would increasingly focus on 
questions of freedom of expression and related political and civil rights. The implication with 
those thematic area had also been raised by India in every statement the country had made so far  
in regard to the Defamation Resolution, pointing out that the topic was on of political and civil  
right, not one to be discussed under sub-item 'racism' of the Human Rights agenda. In fact, the 
Defamation  Resolution  was  then  introduced  as  sub-item  71(b)  “Human  rights  questions, 
including alternative  approaches for  improving the  effective enjoyment  of  human rights  and 
fundamental freedoms”, instead of under the item dealing with questions of the elimination of 
racism and racial discrimination.270
268  Resolution adopted by a recorded vote of 31 to 16, with 5 abstentions. → 59,61% votes in favour. 
269 UN. Commission on Human Rights, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL - Draft Report on the Commission  
on Human Rights (E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.6), 2005, chap. IV, http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf.
270 United Nations, “Documentation listed by agenda items - 60th session of the United Nations General 
Assembly,” n.d., http://www.un.org/ga/60/documentation/themes.html.
91
 4 The Defamation Resolution and its Political Context
The change of the voting results also must be seen under light of the changing composition of the 
Commission. While countries supportive of the concept such as China entered the Commission, 
some countries sceptical of the resolution such as Chile left it.271 Hence, the relatively small 
changes  do  not  necessarily  reflect  a  change  in  the  political  dynamics,  but  the  changed 
composition of the Commission. The changing voting patterns in the General Assembly after 
2005  give  a  more  reliable  reflection  of  the  political  dynamics  and  approaches  towards  the 
concept and resolution as the universality of membership ensures a stable composition of the 
body.
The Defamation Resolution was adopted in the Commission on Human Rights with 31 votes in 
favour,  16 opposing votes  and 5 abstentions272;  and in  its  General  Assembly  version with a 
recorded vote of 101 to 53, and with 20 abstentions.273
GA – 61/164: “Combating defamation of religions”
In 2006, the United Nation instituted a reform replacing the Commission on Human Rights with 
the  new Human Rights  Council.  With the  structural  reform,  the  composition  of  the  Human 
Rights body changed accordingly. This must be taken into account when analysing the changing 
voting patterns on the resolution adopted by the Commissions' successor. 
As well in 2006, the Defamation Resolution of the 61st General Assembly session introduced 
new language  on  the  balance  of  rights,  touching  the  question  of  limitations  of  the  right  to 
freedom of  expression  under  certain  circumstances.  Article  19 of  the  ICCPR states  that  the 
exercise of the right of freedom of expression may be subject to certain restrictions,  only if 
necessary “For respect of the rights or reputations of others” and “For the protection of national  
security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”274 In a critical move, the 
proponents of the resolution suggested a significant expansion of the scope of Article 19 by 
adding the protection of “respect for religions and beliefs”275 as the grounds for restriction of the 
freedom of expression.
271 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 45th MEETING, 60th Session, 83; UN. 
Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 44th MEETING, 61st Session, 2005, 16.
272 UN. Commission on Human Rights, Combating defamation of religions (2005/3).
273 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the General Assemply, 60th Session, 64st meeting,  
(A/60/PV.64) (New York: United Nations, December 16, 2007).
274 United Nations, ICCPR, Article 19.
275 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HRC/Res/4/9), OP. 10; United Nations 
General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/61/164), OP. 9.
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This served as the main grounds for criticism that the resolution would now not be compatible 
with the provisions of Human Rights law, and in fact, would constitute their violation.
Furthermore, the language of the paragraph dealing with this sensitive issue makes reference to 
restricting the right, rather than restricting the right to exercise a human right, as is the proper 
phrasing found in the relevant Human Rights instruments, such as the ICCPR, Article 19. 
There is a crucial difference in restricting the exercise of a right under certain circumstances and 
the limitation of a human right as such. The fact that this significant difference is blurred by the 
language  used  in  the  resolution,  provides  grounds  for  accusations  that  the  resolution would 
deliberately be phrased as such, in order to serve as a tool to justify the systematic undermining 
of Human Rights. 
Nevertheless,  the  resolution  was  adopted  by  a  recorded  vote  of  111  votes  to  54,  with  18 
abstentions.276
HRC – 4/9 and GA – 62/154: “Combating defamation of religions”
The  positions  countries  have  taken  towards  resolutions  that  are  thematically  related  to  the 
Defamation  Resolution  also  reflect  their  political  position,  aims  and  goals  in  the  wider 
perspective. These interests give valuable insights into the approaches different countries adopt 
and the underlying reasons for their stances towards the Defamation of Religions resolution.
Of special importance in this regard is the 2007 Human Rights Council resolution renewing the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief.277
Pakistan,  representing  the  position  of  the  OIC,  criticised  the  resolution  for  its  inclusion  of 
“respect for norms about the right to change one’s religion,”. Although the right to changes one's 
religion is a Human Right that was agreed upon in the relevant Human Rights instruments, the 
issue of apostasy is one that Muslim Member States feel strongly about.278 The OIC aimed at 
deleting the respective reference in the resolution279 and Saudi-Arabia and Algeria went as far as 
276 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the General Assemply, 60th Session, 64st meeting,  
(A/60/PV.64).
277 UN Human Rights Council, Draft Resolution - Elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination 
based on religion or belief (A/HRC/6/L.15/Rev.1), A/HRC/6/L.15/Rev.1, 2007.
278 Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/6/L.15/Rev.1  made by Pakistan on behalf of the  
Organisation of Islamic Conference. Mr. Masood Khan. (UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, n.d.), 
rtsp://webcast.un.org/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixth/hrc071214pm-eng.rm?start=01:43:42&end=01:48:20.
279 Pakistan on behalf of the OIC, Amendments to Draft Resolution A/HRC/6/L.15/Rev.1, A/HRC/6/L.49, 2007, 
http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/7135195.html.
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to criticise the resolution and its language of tolerance as being against the Shari'ah and hence 
incompatible  with  Islam.280 Pakistan  on  behalf  of  the  OIC,  further  demanded  a  stronger 
denouncement  of  religious  stereotyping  in  conformity  with  the  idea  of  the  Defamation 
Resolution. Pakistan also rejected provisions aiming to remind States of their responsibility to be 
reliable in their Human Rights related reporting, by urging state's to reply favourably to inquiries 
of the mandated Special Rapporteurs.281
The HRC resolution also exacerbated accusations against other Member States that alleged that 
these States support campaigns against Muslim minorities under their jurisdiction. By adding 
new  language,  it  imputes  their  active  involvement  in  such  campaigns  to  “[…]laws  or 
administrative measures that have been specifically designed to 'control' and 'monitor' Muslim 
and Arab minorities, […]”282.
The resolution was adopted in the Human Rights Council after the EU called a recorded vote  
with 24 countries in favour, 14 opposing votes and 9 abstentions283; and in its General Assembly 
version also by a recorded vote of 108 to 51 with 25 abstentions.284
HRC – 7/19 and GA – 63/171: “Combating Defamation of Religions”
In 2008, the dynamics further changed. Although Egypt stepped in as an important player both in 
the  OIC  and  in  the  African  group  and  helped  to  combine  the  supporters;  the  numbers 
nevertheless show a decline in the general support for the resolution. For the first time in the 
history of the Defamation Resolution, the opposing votes together with the countries abstaining 
outnumbered the countries favouring the resolution. In other words, adopted by a recorded vote 
of 21 to 10, with 14 abstentions in the HRC, the support for the resolution had dropped below 
50%.285 The continuous decline in support may be understood in the context of the negotiations 
around another related resolution to renew the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
280Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/6/L.15/Rev.1  made by Saudi Arabia. Mr.  
Abdullah Abbas Rashwan (UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, n.d.), 
rtsp://webcast.un.org/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixth/hrc071214pm-eng.rm?start=01:58:09&end=02:00:33; 
Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/6/L.15/Rev.1  made by Algeria. Mr. Idriss  
Jazyiry (UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, n.d.), 
rtsp://webcast.un.org/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixth/hrc071214pm-eng.rm?start=02:31:24&end=02:35:22.
281Pakistan on behalf of the OIC, Amendments to Draft Resolution A/HRC/6/L.15/Rev.1.
282UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HRC/Res/4/9), OP. 3.
283Ibid.
284United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the General Assemply, 62nd Session, 76th meeting,  
(A/62/PV.76) (New York: United Nations, December 18, 2007).
285UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HRC/Res/7/19), 2008.
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Expression.  Although  Canada,  as  the  main  facilitator  of  that  resolution,  made  compromises 
regarding  the  limitations  of  rights  after  long  negotiations  dating  back  to  2007,  the  OIC 
nevertheless  attempted  to  introduce  further  language  addressing  the  'abuse  of  the  right  of 
freedom of expression'. 
A respective  amendment  introduced  as  4C-bis  passed  on  a  recorded  vote  and  led  to  the 
withdrawal of the original sponsors of the resolution.286 The resolution, including the disputed 
clause that introduced the idea of an 'abuse' of a human right – the fundamental right of freedom 
of expression – passed in a vote with 32 to 15 abstentions. The idea that a Human Right could 
itself be abused, found further acceptance beyond the group of supporters of the resolution. Thus 
the representative of India, in an explanation of their vote on the resolution in 2009, stated that 
the issue of negative stereotyping of religions “was best addressed in the context of religious 
intolerance or the abuse of freedom of expression.”287
Another resolution related to the Defamation Resolution was the one renewing the mandate of 
the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and 
related intolerance. Egypt attempted to introduce language expressing the concept of Defamation 
of Religions by proposing that the mandate of the Special Rapporteur should be extended to the 
issue of 'contempt for religion'. This paraphrase of the term Defamation of Religion using the 
synonym of  'contempt'  of  religion,  has  found  its  inclusion  in  the  Defamation  of  Religions 
resolution itself in a clause requesting the “High Commissioner for Human Rights to […] submit 
a study compiling relevant existing legislations and jurisprudence concerning defamation of and 
contempt for religions[…]“288. While this language did not find wider support in the Council in 
this case, a listing of “Anti-Semitism, Christianophobia, Islamophobia” and a general reference 
to religious discrimination found its inclusion into the mandates renewal. 
The resolution was adopted in the Council by a recorded vote of 21 to 10, with 14 abstentions289 
and later this year in the General Assembly by 86 votes to 53, with 42 abstentions.290
286 OP 4C-bis as it reads: “To report on instances where the abuse of the right of freedom of expression constitutes  
an act of racial or religious discrimination taking into account Articles 19(3) and 20 of the [ICCPR] and that 
General Comment 15 of the Committee on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination which stipulates that the 
prohibition of the dissemination of all ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred is compatible with the 
freedom of opinion and expression.”
287 UN. General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 64th Session, 42nd meeting, (A/C.3/64/SR.42), 
para. 67.
288 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HRC/Res/7/19), OP. 16.
289 Ibid.
290 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the General Assemply, 63rd Session, 70th meeting,  
(A/63/PV.70) (New York: United Nations, December 18, 2008).
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HRC – 10/22 and GA – 64/156: “Combating defamation of religions”
In 2009, the HRC version of the resolution saw further inter-connectedness of the subjects of 
Defamation of Religions and the incitement on a jurisdictional level. The resolution indicated a 
relation between incitement laws and Defamation of Religions.
Surprisingly, the OIC reverted to its ICCPR reference and attempted to extend the scope of the 
legitimate restriction of the exercise of the fundamental right of freedom of expression. While in 
2008, the resolution still  retained its language indicating that the need to protect 'respect for 
religion'  is  legitimate  grounds  for  the  limitation  of  expression;  in  2009,  this  language  was 
replaced with the phrase “general welfare”291. This was even more vague language, as it was less 
specifically pointing towards Defamation of Religions. The paragraphs now also referred to the 
respective clauses in the ICCPR – Article 19 and 20. The same clause in the General Assembly 
resolution, while not taking note of the respective ICCPR articles, underwent complete deletion 
of  the  phrase  “respect  for  religion  and  belief”,  rather  than  replacement  through  the  vague 
expression of “general welfare” as in the HRC.
The HRC resolution welcomes in a pre-ambulatory paragraph the recent reports of the Special 
Rapporteur  on  contemporary  forms  of  racism,  racial  discrimination,  xenophobia  and  related 
intolerance “in which the Special Rapporteur highlighted the serious nature of the defamation of 
all religions and the need to complement legal strategies,”292 This language seems to indicate that 
the  Special  Rapporteur  would  have  underlined  the  need  for  additional  legal  initiatives;  an 
argument  also  constantly  raised  in  conversations  with  diplomats  of  the  OIC.  But  the 
recommendation drawn by the Special Rapporteur in their original wording, read far less clearly 
as a call for complementary legal measures. In his Report submitted to the Council at its 9 th 
session,  the  Special  Rapporteur  outlines  the  need  to  “combine  legal  measures  with  an 
intellectual, cultural and ethical approach that takes account of the processes, mechanisms and 
representations at the origin of these manifestations of discrimination over time;”293 This must 
not necessarily be interpreted as an additional need for legal strategies, but could as well be read 
as a need to combine existing ones with approaches other than legal ones.
291 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HCR/Res/10/22), 2009, OP. 10.
292 Ibid.
293 Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,  
Doudou Diène, Report on the manifestations of defamation of religions and in particular on the serious  
implications of Islamophobia on the enjoyment of all rights, September 2, 2008.
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In a joint statement in April 2009, the  Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of 
religion or belief and Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression emphasised that they welcomed a shift that seemed to take place away 
from the language of 'Defamation of Religions' towards the more widely accepted concept of 
“incitement to racial or religious hatred”.294 
Within the debate, the strong proponent of the concept, Pakistan started using language of 'hate 
speech', which is typically used as synonymous to 'incitement to racial or religious hatred', but 
did not show any readiness to distance itself from the concept as such. In reaction to the criticism 
of Defamation of Religions stifling freedom of expression, Pakistan, speaking  in the HRC on 
behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, said in the Council that the OIC would 
attach “great importance to the exercise of freedom of belief and expression, but the exercise of 
this  right  carried with it  duties  and responsibilities,  including the need to  fight  against  hate  
speech.”295 Hence, the OIC would see the limitation of freedom of speech justified in such cases, 
but as attached to the debate about the adoption of the Defamation Resolution, the statement 
implicitly suggests cases of Defamation of Religions to be included within the language of 'hate 
speech'. This assumption is further affirmed as Pakistan also reiterated in the same statement that 
“Negative stereotyping or defamation of religions was a modern expression of religious hatred 
and xenophobia.”296 and that these phenomena would also “spread not only to individuals but to 
religions and belief systems”297 The European Union in turn noted that “the notion of a moral and 
social responsibility of the media as expressed in the resolution went well behind the special 
duties and responsibilities”.298
In this connection, the representative of Chile gave a very strong explanation of their vote: While 
admitting that there was a need to prohibit the misuse of freedom of expression in the form of 
incitement to violence, the representative held that international law was already in place to deal 
with such incidents. However, the “concept of the defamation of religion took them in an area 
294 Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,  
Githu Muigai, Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, and Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, “Joint Statement 
to freedom of expression and incitement to racial or religious hatred.”
295 United Nations, “HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL ADOPTS SIX RESOLUTIONS AND ONE DECISION ON 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, AMONG OTHERS (Press 
Release - 2 October 2009),” October 2, 2009, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/6A69FF0F95283CE7C12576430046793B?opendocument.
296 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
298 Ibid.
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that could lead to the actual prohibition of opinions.”299
Within  the  same  session  of  the  HRC,  the  resolution  on  religious  intolerance,  traditionally 
introduced  by  the  European  Union  and  having  found  adoption  by  consensus  so  far,  was 
surprisingly called to a vote by South Africa. The abstaining countries of the OIC as well as the  
only member state voting against the resolution – South Africa, had been pushing hard during 
negotiations for the introduction of stronger language on the limitation of freedom of expression. 
The European Union, represented by Sweden, once more explained their position towards the 
concept of Defamation of Religions which would severely limit  “freedom of expression and 
endangered the very tolerance that allowed people of different faiths to co-exist.”300
Considering that the conflict surprisingly also expanded towards other initiatives it is doubtful 
whether the positive notion in the joint statement by the Special Rapporteurs that debate would 
result  a  more  acceptable  term,  is  actually  true.  Considering the  statements  made by various 
representatives, the conflict around the terminology of Defamation of Religions and the strings 
attached for the interpretation and application of international Human Rights law seem in fact to 
be tighter and more problematic.
In the HRC version, the Defamation Resolution votes was adopted with 23 Council members in 
favour to 11 opposing and with 13 abstentions.301 In the General Assembly, the resolution gained 
the lowest support to date, with only 80 votes to 61, and 42 abstentions302, one vote less than a 
even a few weeks before when it had been adopted in the 3rd Committee.303
HRC – 13/16: ”Combating defamation of religions.”
In 2010, the initiative kept losing support and only gained 20 votes in favour to 17 opposing and 
8 abstaining Council members – an all time low in support for the resolution.
The United States made a very strong explanation of their position before the vote, pointing out 
that the Defamation Resolution “has become an instrument of division”304 and that prohibiting 
299 Ibid.
300 UN. General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 64th Session, 42nd meeting, (A/C.3/64/SR.42), 
para. 61.
301 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HCR/Res/10/22).
302 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the General Assemply, 64th Session, 65th meeting,  
(A/64/PV.65) (New York: United Nations, December 18, 2009).
303 UN. General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 64th Session, 42nd meeting, (A/C.3/64/SR.42), 
para. 69.
304 Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/13/L.1  made by the United States of America.  
Ms. Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe (UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, n.d.), 
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speech cannot be a way to promote tolerance. As said in the General Assembly they repeated at 
the HRC, that the concept would continue to be “used to justify censorship, criminalization and 
in some cases violent assaults and deaths of political, racial and religious minorities all around 
the world”305 The United States also pointed out in both bodies that “It was a central tenet of 
human  rights  law that  rights  were  held  by  individuals,  not  by  Governments,  institutions  or 
religions.”306
In a speech in front of the 3rd Committee of the General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of racism, racial  discrimination,  xenophobia and related intolerance, Mr. 
Githu  Muigai,  who had  been mandated  by  the  Defamation  Resolution  to  take  into  account 
Defamation  of  Religions  in  his  work,  noted  that  focus  should  be  given  to  the  rights  of 
individuals,  who  needed  protection  from  racial  and  religious  intolerance,  discrimination  or 
violence.  He  further  took  note  that  the  controversy  and  dispute  around  the  terminology  of 
“defamation of religions” and “incitement to racial or religious hatred” regrettably had distracted 
attention from the real problems affecting the people on the ground.307 In his report for the 12th 
session  of  the  HRC,  the  Special  Rapporteur  on  contemporary  forms  of  racism,  racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Mr. Githu Muigai, who had been mandated 
by the Defamation Resolution in the previous year to report on the manifestations of defamation 
of religions, and particularly on the ongoing serious implications of Islamophobia, vis a vis the 
enjoyment of all rights by their followers; made following significant statement: “Indeed, the 
strategic response to hate speech is more speech”308; stifling of freedom of expression could not 
be a sufficient response in combating religious hatred and hate speech, as merely symptoms of 
deeply rooted causes: intolerance an bigotry.309 With regard to the latest Human Rights Council 
resolution 13/16 on Combating Defamation of Religions, the Special Rapporteur emphasised in 
regard of the matter of legal measures against defamatory statements that “the implementation of 
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/thirteenth/hrc100325am1-eng.rm?
start=02:41:36&end=02:46:08.
305 Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/13/L.1  made by the United States of America.  
Ms. Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe; UN. General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 64th  
Session, 42nd meeting, (A/C.3/64/SR.42), 66.
306 Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/13/L.1  made by the United States of America.  
Ms. Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe; UN. General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 64th  
Session, 42nd meeting, (A/C.3/64/SR.42), 65.
307 Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,  
Githu Muigai, “Statement held at the 3rd Committee, General Assembly, 64th Session” (United Nations, 
November 2, 2009), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/racism/rapporteur/docs/SpeechGA64.pdf.
308 Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,  
Githu Muigai, Report on the manifestations of defamation of religions, and in particular on the serious  
implications of Islamophobia, on the enjoyment of all rights by their followers, July 1, 2009, para. 42.
309 Ibid.
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sanctions, if any, should in no way be of a criminal nature”310
In  the  vote  of  the  HRC resolution  13/16,  the  decline  in  support  for  the  resolution  even in 
traditional strongholds became evident. With the exception of South Africa, no non-OIC member 
of the African group supported the Defamation Resolution. And while 5 countries of the African 
group voted in favour, equally 5 members either abstained or opposed the resolution.311 Without 
counting the votes of the OIC members, the African group would have supported the initiative 
with only 25%.
Concluding remarks
The positions are clearer than ever before: While Pakistan and the OIC frame Defamation of 
Religions as a form of Human Rights violation that needs to be prohibited by means of limiting 
freedom of expression, opponents judge the concept to be incompatible with the Human Rights 
framework  at  best  and  an  insidious  attempt  to  undermine  Human  Rights  principles  and 
international law at worst. 
In the following part of the thesis therefore, it should be researched and clarified whether or not 
the  concept  of  Combating  Defamation  of  Religions  is  compatible  with  the  Human  Rights 
framework. It further should be asked whether the concept provides added value to efforts in 
eliminating discrimination, hatred and violence based on religious intolerance, or – as critics of 
the concept believe – it in fact provides the underlining grounds for increasing religious conflicts 
within societies.
 
310Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,  
Githu Muigai, Report on the manifestations of defamation of religions, and in particular on the ongoing serious  
implications of Islamophobia, for the enjoyment of all rights by their followers, July 12, 2010, para. 78.
311A/HRC/Res/13/16 - Against: Zambia ; Abstaining: Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar, Mauritius ; In favour: 
Senegal, South Africa, Djibouti, Egypt, Nigeria
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 4.5  Analysis of Voting Patterns 
An analysis of the voting patterns of different regional groups should add to the understanding of 
the development of the resolution as outlined in the chapters above. Voting generally takes place 
along the lines of regional groups. The positions of individual countries are highly influenced by 
the general position of the regional group that they are a part of. Differing perspectives on a 
specific  topic  might be sacrificed  for the  sake of  keeping ranks closed in political  alliances 
within those regional voting groups. Undoubtedly a whole variety of other considerations are of 
equal  or  even  higher  importance;  the  country’s  own  ideological  stance  as  well  as  political 
calculations like trading one vote for another  play a significant role  in determining a States 
position. Some countries simply suffer from a lack of the necessary resources to be cover all UN 
bodies  adequately  or  be  concerned  with  all  the  resolution  brought  to  consideration  for  the 
Member  States.  Due  to  their  more  pressing  issues  such  as  poverty  they  look  upon  the 
Defamation  Resolution  with  a  certain  indifference.  Some  however,  might  be  additionally 
pressurized by regional powers that they are economically or politically dependent on to vote in 
line of their stance on the subject. 
It is, unfortunately, barely possible to explain in-depth these specific considerations of every UN 
member-state or attempt to analyse the balance of interests of each that leads to their respective 
voting patterns. While the value of such review would remain limited, it makes sense to have a 
closer look at the larger entities within the UN system, namely regional groups. An analysis of 
voting patterns along regional groups provides valuable understanding regarding the political 
dynamics  surrounding  the  resolution  as  well  as  the  shifting  perspectives  of  the  concept  of 
Defamation  of  Religions  itself.  An examination  of  votes  held  by  individual  Member  States 
serves as an indication also of the changing position of partners within the regional groups itself. 
Indeed, Member States often speak on behalf  of their entire group explaining their  common 
position on the subject. The review of voting patterns of such regional groups will allow for 
better prediction regarding the future of the concept within the UN system. 
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Explaining the meaning of Y-A-N votes
Voting  on  resolutions  is  a  relatively  simple  procedure.  If  Member  States  cannot  agree  to  a 
resolution  being  adopted  by  consensus,  a  vote  is  called.  In  the  following  procedure,  each 
countries may vote in favour (Y), oppose the initiative (N), or abstain on the voting (A). Often 
more interesting than a change from a 'No' to 'Yes' vote, is the decision of Member States not to 
support the resolution and abstain. In the world of diplomacy, this is already a strong sign of 
disapproval. Also a lack of 'Yes' votes does not necessarily mean any movement away from a 
particular concept. Often the lack of physical presence of the diplomat in question can explain 
the 'missing' Yes vote of a traditional supporter. It should also be mentioned that States can (and 
regularly do) choose to 'act absent' while being physically in the room. Although this indeed can 
be interpreted as a change in the perception of a concept or resolution, there is no practical way 
to check the physical presence of a diplomat acting absent in retrospect. 
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 4.5.1  Regional Groups in the United Nations 
When it comes to votes on resolutions, regional groups within the UN deserve special attention 
as such votes usually occur roughly along specific regional divides.312 The Organisation of the 
Islamic  Conference  (OIC) on  whose  behalf  the  resolution  was introduced,  is  not  a  regional 
voting  group itself,  but  its  membership is  spread throughout  the other  groups with  differing 
strength of representation. Naturally, one can expect the OIC to support its own initiative. Hence, 
it is of added value to look upon the voting patterns of regional groups with consideration to their 
OIC members. As has been illustrated previously, it made quite a significant difference to simply 
count the supporting votes within the African Group as a whole or to have a closer look at the 
voting patterns of its non-OIC members. Therefore in this analysis, regional groups are primarily 
considered in their non-OIC composition. Still it can be predicted that the greater the number of 
OIC members within a group, the greater their influence on the position of the group itself. This 
fact is critical when taking into account that the OIC members are not found to be equally spread 
throughout the various regional groups:
The OIC founds its biggest representation in the African Group with 53% of all members of the 
group belonging as well to the OIC, and the Asian Group with a relative share of 44%.
312 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Combating Defamation of Religions,” 2.
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The support of OIC members for their own resolution is barely surprising.313 More interesting is 
the position of non-OIC members towards the resolution. Hence, subtracting the OIC members 
draws a more relevant picture for the understanding of the changing support for the resolution. 
Also the comparison supports the assumption that the influence of the OIC is rising in relation to 
its relative representation in the regional groups. It is obvious that the greater the membership of 
the OIC, the higher its influence is on the stance of the whole group regarding the resolution. As 
such, part of the reason for the support of the resolution must be found in political interests,  
rather than in conceptual agreement to the theme of Defamation of Religions. 
314
313 Note: Albania, full OIC member, did abstain the resolution as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, with observer 
status in the OIC, on several occasions. 
314 Note: Normalized African Group Data refers to a assumed voting pattern if absent States of this group would 
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 4 The Defamation Resolution and its Political Context
The position of the Western European and Other Group (WEOG) is as clear and evident as the 
position of the OIC. Opposing both the concept and resolution, not a single WEOG member has 
ever voted in favour of the resolution.315 As becomes overtly evident, the OIC and WEOG are 
natural opponents in the struggle surrounding acceptance of the concept and resolution. Their 
positions on the subject are undoubtedly clear and changes in their voting patterns are unlikely, 
yet significant. Of far greater interest and influence, however, are the dynamics in other groups; 
the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), the African Group and the Asian Group. 
These shall be analysed in the following sub-chapters. There is also no significant change in the 
voting of the Eastern European Group (EE), and as such, these voting groups will be excluded 
from the following examination that focuses on the dynamics and developments of the voting 
patterns. 
had been present – see the chapter dealing with the African Group for more details.
315 Note: It is this strong stance and difference between the OIC and the WEOG that might bring into mind the 
infamous idea of an 'clash of civilizations'. This thought is shared by not just a few diplomats and other relevant 
actors, and hence risks to become somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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 4.5.2  The African Group
The African Group consists of 53 Member States, with more than half (28 countries) as members 
of the OIC at the same time. With about 53% of all African countries being OIC members, the 
organisation has a stronghold in the African Group. Some major regional players such as Egypt 
and Libya have exceptionally high influence within the  Group. Therefore, a particular strong 
support for the resolution within the group may be expected. And indeed, the African group 
remains to date the strongest ally of the OIC in defending the resolution and concept behind it.  
However, it is noteworthy to compare the difference between the voting patterns between the 
African Group as a whole and the non-OIC members of the Group, as it reveals a somewhat less 
consistent  picture.  As  shown  in  the  graphs  below,  the  support  for  the  resolution  has  been 
declining recently, with or without the supporting votes of the OIC.
The support for the resolution is obviously consistently declining, with an interesting peak in 
2008 when two countries, Cape Verde and Liberia, decided to openly oppose the resolution. The 
representative of Cape Verde went as far to take the floor in the General Assembly to emphasis 
that “the text had not struck the proper balance” and pointed to “the need to guarantee the full 
freedom of religion and belief, along with the freedom of choice for those who wanted to change 
their religion.”316 Moreover, since 2008 even within the African group, less Member States voted 
in favour (9 votes, 2008) than countries that were not supporting the resolution any more (14 
votes, 2008). It should be noted that although the supportive votes remained intact with 9 Yes 
votes in 2005 as well as in 2009 for the non-OIC members of the African Group, the numbers for 
316United Nations General Assembly, “Press Release - GA/10801 - GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTS 52 
RESOLUTIONS, 6 DECISIONS RECOMMENDED BY THIRD COMMITTEE ON WIDE RANGE OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, SOCIAL, HUMANITARIAN ISSUES,” December 18, 2008, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10801.doc.htm.
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2005 should be taken with a grain of salt. It would be more accurate to assess the support for the 
resolution in the early stages of the resolution at the level of the General Assembly with 2006 
results of the voting than the ones of 2005. This is due to the notable absence of members of the  
African Group, potentially supportive of the resolution, during the vote of 2005. Of course there 
is no way to claim with certainty that the absent countries would have voted in favour if present. 
But all members of the group that had been absent in the vote of 2005 and was present in 2006, 
indeed voted in favour for the resolution. Hence, it may be safely assumed that the voting in 
2005  was  distorted  by  the  significant  differences  in  the  election  turn-out,  rather  than  a 
spontaneous shift in their perspective on the resolution. I therefore assume the results in 2005 
would have shown a far greater support for the resolution had the Member States of the African 
group in question been present. Under such an assumption the resolution would have enjoyed an 
overall support within the African Group (excluding OIC members) of 60% compared to the 
actual 44.44% in 2005. 
To give a more accurate picture of the development of the voting outcomes, it is more reliable to 
use the 2006 voting records as the basis for further analysis. Looking at the numbers from 2006 
to 2009 in the GA voting results, the decline of support for the resolution adds up to 55.55% 
within the African Group (excluding OIC members). Using the assumed voting results of 2005, 
if absent States would have voted the same way in 2005 as they did then in 2006, we see a 
decline of 46.66% in the support,  as the figure below shows. In both cases, the data  shows 
clearly that even within what is traditionally the most supportive group for the resolution – the 
African Group – support is on the decline.
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The evident decline of support in the group when singling out its non-OIC members (indeed 
more Member States abstaining in their vote than expressing their support) can be explained with  
their increasing discomfort of the tendency of the resolutions language to blur the difference 
between religious intolerance and racism. A general misgiving over the conflation of the terms 
'race' and 'religion' are shared mostly by sub-Saharan States, not limited only to a matter of the  
Defamation Resolution.317 As outlined in previous chapters, the resolution's language puts great 
effort into linking the nature and characteristics of Defamation of Religions to one of racism. 
Arguing  successfully  that  Defamation  of  Religions  is  just  another  form  of  racism,  would 
suddenly make existing international laws dealing with racism equally applicable to Defamation 
of Religions. Hence, in the unlikely case that existing international Human Rights law is made 
applicable to Defamation of Religions, it would not be necessary anymore for proponents of the 
resolution to press for new legislation . Indeed, proponents of the concept within the OIC have 
begun to argue from this perspective that Defamation of Religions should be seen as already 
prohibited by the provisions of ICCPR and ICERD. They mostly cite Article 20 of the ICCPR in 
this regard, pointing towards the obligation of States to prohibit advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred. In addition they use the provisions of the ICERD, as Article 4 stipulates the 
prohibition of the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred and incitement to 
racial discrimination.318
Many African States reject the idea of Defamation of Religions being in itself a matter of racism, 
while in principle continuing to be open to the idea and concept of Defamation of Religions. This  
explains the declining support of these nations for the resolution. The element of connecting race 
and religion, or rather 'acts of racism' with 'Defamation of Religions', is central to the resolution. 
It links the disputed idea of Defamation of Religions towards an issue commonly understood to 
be a severe Human Rights violation, and hence adds much needed justification to the weaker 
concept. Therefore, it is unlikely that the OIC would distance itself in any near future from using 
language conflating both issues. This also predicts that the OIC will be hard put to convince 
members of the African Group to remain supportive of the resolution, let alone regain any lost 
support in the group.
The voting patterns of the African Group are best reflected in the results of the votes in the  
General Assembly. The HRC voting is less representative due to its non-universal composition 
317 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Religious Defamation - Issues Brief,” 4.
318 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, 229.
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but  can be helpful to  observe patterns  and trend of regional  groups.  In the last  vote  on the 
Defamation Resolution A/HRC/Res/13/16, 5 out of 10 African countries represented in the HRC 
did not support the resolution any more.319 Surprisingly even one of the OIC members in the 
African group – Cameroon – decided to abstain,  and Zambia openly opposed the resolution. 
With the exception of South Africa, no non-OIC member of the African group supported the 
Defamation Resolution. And while 5 countries of the African group voted in favour, equally 5 
members either abstained or openly opposed the resolution.320 Without counting the votes of the 
OIC members, the African group would have supported the initiative with only 25%. This clearly 
reveals how much support the initiative is  actually losing in its traditional stronghold,  when 
taking into consideration the disproportionate number of OIC members in the African group 
compared to other voting groups. It shows that the African group is far less supportive of the 
resolution than it appears to be with the inclusion of OIC votes. 
319 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HCR/Res/13/16).
320 A/HRC/Res/13/16 - Against: Zambia ; Abstaining: Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar, Mauritius ; In favour: 
Senegal, South Africa, Djibouti, Egypt, Nigeria
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 4.5.3  The Asian Group
With 53 Member States, the Asian Group is as large a regional group within the United Nations 
as  the  African  Group,  but  shares  a  fewer  OIC  members,  making  up  44%  of  the  groups 
composition.  At  first  sight,  the resolution receives  relatively stable  support within the  Asian 
Group. Here again, as before in the African Group, the OIC membership of group members 
should to be taken into account. Looking at the numbers of the Asian group show declining, but 
still vast support for the concept. This is – as in the case of the African Group – due to the 
constant support for the concept of the OIC members of the group. In fact, the OIC could not 
gain substantial support for the resolution with other members of the Asian Group. The support  
even declined  acceleratingly till  2009, when for the first  time, 9 No votes were opposing 9 
supportive Yes votes, as the graphic below illustrates.
Unfortunately, members of this group tend to remain silent in explaining their position towards 
the resolution in  official  meetings.  With the exception of India,  few statements are  made in 
regard to the Defamation Resolution. India, the traditional opponent of Pakistan (who played a 
prominent role in the formulation of the idea of the concept and resolution), made specific notes 
regarding  the  scope  and  nature  of  the  provisions  contained  in  the  resolution  from an early 
beginning. Typically, the representatives of India would point toward the narrow focus on Islam 
and would reject the notion of 'non-Muslim countries' as referred to in the resolutions language, 
pointing out that “there were 140 million Muslims living there, which hardly qualified it [India] 
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as a non-Muslim country.321 India also claims that the resolution would better fit into the agenda 
of religious tolerance or civil and political rights, rather than racism.322 Opposing this stance, 
China's statements point towards the consequences for Muslims in the aftermath of September 11 
attacks, which would justify the resolutions consideration under the agenda of racial hatred.323 
This represents the opinion of the countries in favour of connecting the issue Defamation of 
Religions with matters of racism, as the OIC aims to do. While the influence of the OIC seems 
traditionally greater within the African Group, the resolution has more support within the Asian 
Group. This supports  the argument  made in  the previous section that  despite  the  traditional 
support of the African group for the OIC, some of their members feel increasing discomfort with 
the  resolutions  tendency  to  conflate  religious  intolerance  and  racism,  an  issue  that  African 
countries feel particularly strongly about. Such conflict might weigh less in the considerations of 
members of the Asian group. 
While the resolution has compared to other groups most support within the Asian Group, it also 
has the highest relative increase of opposing votes of all regional groups, with votes rejecting the 
resolution nearly doubling between 2007 and 2009. In 2009, equally as many non-OIC member-
state of the Asian group supported the resolution as opposed it, while the abstaining countries 
were on the decline. Interestingly, it is the Asian Group where countries have taken a clear stand 
and where the norm to abstain is diminishing. 
321 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 47th MEETING, 59th Session, para. 101.
322 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 67th MEETING, 56th Session, para. 76-77.
323 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 44th MEETING, 61st Session, para. 15.
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 4.5.4  The Latin American and Caribbean Group
The Group of Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC) has 33 members and encompasses 
nearly the whole area of America and the Caribbean, besides Canada and the United States.  
Compared to the other voting blocks, the GRULAC has shown a tradition of greater in-group 
consistency in their voting patterns. In informal statements made by members of the group, it 
was evident that many of them are waiting for their neighbour to speak out first in opposition of  
the  resolution  to  voice  their  own dissent.  The  same  policy  could  be  seen  when  GRULAC 
members began to feel increasingly uncomfortable with the resolution and abstained as a larger 
entity after 2006. This should not indicate however, that the GRULAC group can be understood 
as a consistent political entity- Some Member States such as Cuba or Venezuela, remain vocal 
supporters  of  the  resolution.  This  does  not  necessarily  mean  those  countries  would  aim  to 
express a stronger stance for religious freedoms with their voting. It is quite with reason that 
countries decide to vote for the resolution for reasons other than that, as for instance to 'vote 
against  the  West'.  Traditionally,  the  ideological  underpinnings  of  socialist  governments  are 
hostile towards the social role of religions.
GRULAC has the least numbers of OIC members in its group compared to the Asian or African 
Group. Hence the difference between non-OIC voting patterns and those of the group as a whole 
show little difference. Due to its lack of representation in the group, the OIC can claim little 
influence on the groups position towards the resolution as well. 
112
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Support from GRULAC
in GA votings
Y
A
N
Year of Resolution
N
um
be
r o
f V
ot
es
 4 The Defamation Resolution and its Political Context
Compared to the other regional groups reviewed in this paper, the GRULAC is very outspoken 
on this  topic.  In  every  fora,  be  it  the  HRC or  the  3 rd committee  of  the  General  Assembly, 
GRULAC members use various opportunities to explain their  position on the initiative on a 
regular basis. Due to these ample sources of statements by many GRULAC member throughout 
the history of the resolution, above all those whose enjoy influential positions in the group; a 
clear  picture  can  be  drawn  not  only  of  the  development  of  voting  behaviour,  but  also  its 
underpinning conceptions. All Member States in one way or another, expressed their position 
rejecting and condemning religious intolerance, hatred and discrimination. Many indeed shared 
the concerns outlined in the resolution, but declared that the chosen approach of addressing them 
was  the  wrong  one.324 The  GRULAC members  critical  towards  the  concept  agree  with  the 
arguments of WEOG, focusing mostly on Defamation of Religions being a flawed concept not in 
conformity with international law, stifling freedom of expression and putting religious minorities 
at risk rather than protecting them. It has further been criticised by GRULAC countries that the 
resolution does not condemn acts of violence and Human Rights violations executed in the name 
of  religion  and the  related responsibility  of  religious  leaders  in  this  regard.  In  addition,  the 
problematic conflation of the issues of race and religion is mentioned regularly.325
324 Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/13/L.1  made by Uruguay. Mrs. Laura Dupuis  
Laserre (UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, n.d.), 
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/thirteenth/hrc100325am1-eng.rm?
start=02:27:29&end=02:28:14; Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/13/L.1  made by  
Mexico. Mr. Juan jose Gomez Camacho (UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, n.d.), 
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/thirteenth/hrc100325am1-eng.rm?
start=02:30:43&end=02:33:31.
325 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 39th MEETING, 58th Session, para. 35-37.
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The Role of the Holy See
The Catholic Church has considerable influence on GRULAC's position. Not only did a 
representative of the mission of Holy See to the United Nation reveal to me in person that such 
influence existed and was executed in connection to the resolution, but documented evidence in 
form of statements made in UN fora shows that some countries even refer to the Catholic Church 
in their explanations of vote or position.326 The Holy See did not only lobby for their stance on 
the initiative behind the scenes but took the floor itself in 2008 to overtly declare their  
perspective on the topic of Defamation of Religions. Their representative, Reverend Bene, stated 
that “the notion of defamation of religions risked removing the focus away from the basic right 
of individuals and groups and to the protection of institutions, symbols and ideas;” Further, “it 
could lend itself locally to support for laws that penalized religious minorities and stifled 
legitimate dialogue among persons of different faiths and cultures.”327
Flawed concept
In the last HRC session, the representative of Chile spoke out that “we are talking about rights of 
individuals of persons”328 as subject of international law and underlined that “it is not religion 
that is subject to human rights it is the persons”329.Considering these statements, it can be safely 
claimed that the understanding of the concept of Defamation of Religions being inherently 
flawed and incompatible with international Human Rights law as shown by this paper, is shared 
by the GRUCAL members that are not supportive of the initiative.
Freedom of Expression
Countries have expressed reservations that the concept is incompatible with the principles of 
freedom of expression set forth in international Human Rights law. Brazil, in a very clear 
statement in the 64th GA session, clearly stated that the “concept of defamation of religions was 
not consistent with international human rights law”330 and that the “human rights challenges 
identified in the resolution should be addressed in a context that was not detrimental to the 
326 Ibid., para. 36.
327 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 63rd Session, 46th meeting,  
(A/C.3/63/SR.46), para. 33.
328 Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/13/L.1  made by Chile. Mr. Carlos Portales (UN 
Human Rights Council, Geneva, n.d.), 
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/thirteenth/hrc100325am1-eng.rm?
start=02:17:41&end=02:24:46.
329 Ibid.
330 UN. General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 64th Session, 42nd meeting, (A/C.3/64/SR.42), 
para. 70.
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protection of […] freedom of expression”.331 In the same tone, Colombia explained that their 
delegation “abstained in the vote because the use of ambiguous and diffuse concepts such as 
defamation of religion could lead to unjustifiable limitations on freedom of expression that ran 
counter to the definitions of that right in the relevant international instruments […]“.332 
Rights of minorities
In the course of questions regarding the concepts compatibility with the principles of freedom of 
expression, Member States voiced their apprehension over negative consequences for the 
freedom of religion and the rights of minorities. Chile made a relevant point in HRC session 10 
in 2010, in saying that “you can not exercise your religion if you have no right to express it”333 
and referred to the need to focus on the protection of individuals when it comes to freedom of 
religion and the rights of minorities. Similarly, Guatemala decided to vote against the resolution 
on grounds of the resolution ignoring violations of Human Rights against individuals possessing 
a different religion than the official state religion.334
Narrow focus on one religion
Interestingly both the arguments posed and the voting behaviour follow a typical pattern of 
development: A country previously supportive of the resolution that subsequently changes its 
position towards abstention, would typically state irritation over the exclusiveness of the 
approach and the narrow focus of the resolution on Islam as an explanation for the shift. Only in 
a later stages would the country add criticism and misgivings regarding freedom of expression 
and principle flaws behind the concept to their explanations of their vote (EoVs). Examples of 
countries that have undergone such transition or are in a state of such flux are inter alia Chile, 
Brazil, Dominican Republic335, Costa Rica, Honduras336 or Jamaica. While a similar pattern could 
be observed in other regional groups as well, only the numerous statements of countries of the 
GRULAC truly gives considerable evidence for this pattern.
331 Ibid.
332 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 63rd Session, 46th meeting,  
(A/C.3/63/SR.46), para. 51-52.
333 Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/13/L.1  made by Chile. Mr. Carlos Portales.
334 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 44th MEETING, 61st Session, para. 14.
335 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 45th MEETING, 60th Session, para. 78.
336 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 44th MEETING, 61st Session, para. 8.
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Voting Development
Due to the many statements it has made including in the early development of the resolution,  
Chile provides the perfect case of the typical development of the average GRULAC member-
state in changing their position regarding the resolution. 
In 2004, Chile declared that “while, on previous occasions, [Chile] had voted in favour of the 
corresponding resolution”, it would further abstain because the resolutions' focus “primarily on 
Islam” would “not guarantee the equal protection of all religions from discrimination” 337
In its next step in 2009, Chile while still abstaining on the vote, raised questions over the 
proposed limitation of freedom of expression, indicating their misgivings about the misuse of 
Article 20 of the ICCPR prohibiting propaganda and advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred. The Chilean delegation closed their statement by noting that “measures to counter 
defamation of religions should not be used to undermine the right to freedom of expression, 
which was essential to strengthening the rule of law and the democratic process”.338 
Then in the negotiations of the Defamation Resolution in HRC session 2010, Chile appeared as 
an outspoken opponent against the concept and resolution. The country then voted against the 
resolution and indicated in its explanation of the vote their understanding of the approach as 
flawed in failing to address the rights of individuals, and placing minorities at greater risk by 
hampering freedom of expression. 
Chile also referred to the outcome of the Expert seminar on Articles 19 and 20 organized and 
held by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and spoke out 
against the resolution saying that the concept had adopted the wrong approach, and that the 
language of the resolution could not lead to an universal or common way to address the stated 
concerns.339
This illustrated the pattern well; Chile began with voicing its irritation over exclusiveness of the  
resolution, shifted then towards more substantial criticism regarding potential implications of the  
resolution for other Human Rights and ended up by rejecting the concept as a whole as being 
flawed and incompatible with international Human Rights law.
337 UN. Commission on Human Rights, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 39th MEETING, 58th Session, para. 43.
338 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee, 63rd Session, 46th meeting,  
(A/C.3/63/SR.46), para. 50.
339 Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/13/L.1  made by Chile. Mr. Carlos Portales.
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Many GRULAC members show a similar pattern and development in their voting behaviour and 
given explanations. It is therefore predictable that the resolution will lose more support in the 
group. This is even more true as with the departure of Chile, Argentina340, Mexico341 and Brazil, 
some of the more influential countries have decided to abandon the initiative. 
340 Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/13/L.1  made by Argentina. Mr. Alberto J.  
Dumont (UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, n.d.), 
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/thirteenth/hrc100325am1-eng.rm?
start=02:34:17&end=02:36:49.
341 Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution A/HRC/13/L.1  made by Mexico. Mr. Juan jose Gomez  
Camacho. http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/thirteenth/hrc100325am1-eng.rm?
start=02:30:43&end=02:33:31
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 5  Compatibility with the Human Rights Framework
As stated in the discussion on Human Rights earlier, this concept itself remains disputed. General 
doubts and criticisms regarding the principles of Human Rights include most prominently, the 
characteristics of its universality and the nature of its interdependence. More specific emphasis 
has been placed on different types of rights with reference to cultural particularities being used to 
justify a resetting according to regional or domestic priorities. 
As explained in previous sections, the concept of Defamation of Religions has received much 
criticism regarding its effect on the enjoyment of Human Rights. It is said to undermine Human 
Rights under  the pretext  of cultural  particularities,  instead of protecting them under specific 
cultural conditions and considerations. The criticism that has been raised regarding the concept 
of Defamation of Religions have been grave enough to convince the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights to conduct an expert seminar addressing the underlying Human Rights concerns 
behind the concept of Defamation of Religions. The expert seminar was held in October 2008 
with the participation of 12 experts and over 200 observers, including from Governments, United 
Nations agencies and representatives from the media and civil society. The report of this event 
concentrates particularly on the criticisms linked to the right of freedom of expression and the 
ambiguous interpretation of the articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR.342
In the sub chapters below, these concerns and criticisms are taken up into the general context of 
the concepts themselves as well as the resolutions compatibility to the existing Human Rights 
framework.
342United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS - Addendum - 
Expert seminar on the links between articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political  
Rights: “Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,  
hostility or violence”, para. 1-3.
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 5.1  Protection of Individuals, Groups and Ideas
As discussed in a previous chapter, the legal term 'defamation' is typically defined as the spread 
of  falsehood,  with  the  intent  to  harm  an  individuals'  reputation  and  livelihood;  and  anti-
defamation  laws  are  understood  as  instruments  that  protect  individuals  from such  libellous 
activities. In accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights framework, every individual 
should be protected from incitements to discrimination, hostility or violence aimed against them. 
Individuals are the defined beneficiaries of Human Rights, and the formulation and defence of 
their rights is meant to protect their human dignity. Consequently, Human Rights instruments and  
declarations neither refer, nor apply to ideas, regardless of whether those ideas are secular or 
religious.  Essentially,  ideas  themselves  do  not  receive  the  protection  of  the  Human  Rights 
framework, but rather individuals enjoy the specific right to adhere to any religion or worldview 
of their choice. 
Similarly,  an idea cannot  be subject  to  defamation but  adherents  of  a  religious idea can be 
defamed on the basis of their beliefs. In fact, the Defamation Resolution highlights examples of 
such instances of individuals falling victim to defamation as being core issues of concern for the 
resolution.  These  cases  are  framed  as  the  proclaimed  consequences  or  even,  the  typical 
symptoms of the phenomenon of Defamation of Religions. Following this understanding, some 
argue that implementing legal prohibitions against Defamation of Religions wouldn't pose any 
“[...]  greater problems than prohibiting hate speech against  racial,  ethnic,  or religious groups 
[...]”343. This argument overlooks a significant difference between the two concepts: Hate speech 
prohibitions  protect  individual  adherents  of  specific  groups  against  incitements  of  hatred, 
discrimination or violence. Indeed the prohibition of such speech is a mandatory obligation for 
State Parties. Legal measures to combat Defamation of Religions, however, attempt to shield 
against  speeches  or  other  forms  of  expressions  that  might  be  interpreted by  members  of  a 
religious group as unacceptable on grounds of their religious convictions. From a practical point 
of view, this means that any such Defamation of Religions or blasphemy legislation  calls into 
question which religious and non-religious world-views are acceptable, which can be voiced in 
the public square; and – most importantly – who should be in the legitimate position of both 
authority and expertise to decide this. This poses a difficulty that becomes pre-eminently relevant  
with regard to religious minorities, whose teachings contradict the convictions of the domestic 
343 Liaquat Ali Khan, “Combating Defamation of Religions,” 1.
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religious majority. The implications of this will be discussed in detail in one of the following 
chapters.
It can be claimed that a different reading of the term 'religion' as it is used in the Defamation 
Resolution, suggests that the concept behind the resolution would in fact attempt to protect not 
ideas, but the rights of (religious) groups. Under this light, the perception that the concept aims 
to  protect  certain  ideas  rather  than  individual  human  beings  could  arguably  be  just  a 
misapprehension, possibly resulting from the difficult and vague language used in the resolution. 
But again, even with regard to group rights, General Comment 31, that evaluates the nature of 
the  general  legal  obligation  imposed  on  States  Parties  to  the  ICCPR,  clearly  defines  the 
“beneficiaries of the rights recognized by the Covenant”344 as individuals. The General Comment 
does however, mention that many of the rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the ICCPR – 
most  prominently,  the  freedom  to  manifest  one’s  religion  or  belief345,  the  freedom  of 
association346 and the rights of minorities347 – may be exercised and enjoyed in community with 
others.348 The possibility that these rights may be enjoyed by individuals together in groups, does 
not extend the application of the right itself to groups as such. As Human Rights are limited to 
individuals, even when enjoyed in groups,, they can not apply to any groups including of course 
religious organisations or institutions. 
Regardless of whether religion is understood as an idea or as a group, the rights and freedoms set 
out in the ICCPR do not apply to religion as such. Rather these rights apply to individuals, who 
indeed might be adherents of aforesaid religious ideas or groups and might exercise and enjoy 
their rights in private or together in a community. 
In conclusion, the concept of Defamation of Religions is aimed at protecting ideas against the 
violation of rights that are only applicable to humans. This puts into question the terminology of 
'Defamation of Religions' as such. In other word, the concept is flawed and it is doubtful if it has  
any relevance in the Human Rights debate in its current articulation. 
344 United Nation Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant,” 9.
345 United Nations, ICCPR Article 18.
346 Ibid. Article 22.
347 Ibid. Article 27.
348 United Nation Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant,” 9.
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 5.2  Freedom of Expression
The  Freedom of  Expression  is  one  of  the  fundamental  rights  set  out  by the  Human Rights  
framework. The ICCPR sets out the legal standards for freedom of opinion and expression in 
Article  19. Within this freedom, the right  to  hold an opinion cannot be regulated,  but other 
aspects such as the right to express opinion may be subject to certain limitations for specific 
purposes, as set out in the provisions of the ICCPR349:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
Incidents  relating  to  the  intersection  of  religious  feelings  and  freedom  of  expression  have 
continuously polarized societies,  public opinion and political  leadership.  And as a result,  the 
question arises as to whether the appropriate answer to these incidents could be a redrawing of 
“the  demarcation  line  between  freedom  of  expression  and  hate  speech”350;  in  essence  an 
extension  of  the  purposes  under  which  certain  limitations  of  freedom  of  expression  are 
applicable. 
Supporters of the Defamation Resolution argue that Defamation of Religions constitutes a form 
of psychological assault, a form of religious discrimination and an insult to human dignity.351 
Hence, limiting the freedom of expression could be justifiable for the benefit of ensuring social 
harmony  and  the  protection  of  the  respect  for  religion.  The  concepts'  proponents  have 
subsequently  argued  for  the  need to  limit  freedom of  expression  in  order  to  to  protect  the 
freedom of religion.
Article 19 of the ICCPR, that provides for the circumstances under which such restrictions may 
apply, includes the statement that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression “carries with 
it special duties and responsibilities”.352 It is this vague reference that is used by supporters of the 
Defamation  Resolution  to  justify  their  attempt  at  redrawing  the  line  between  freedom  of 
expression and freedom of religion. The argument is that Defamation of Religions constitutes an 
349 United Nations, ICCPR, Article 19.
350 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS - Addendum - 
Expert seminar on the links between articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political  
Rights: “Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,  
hostility or violence” Para 1.
351 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HCR/Res/10/22) PP; United Nations 
General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/63/171) OP 3.
352 United Nations, ICCPR Article 19, Paragraph 3.
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abuse of the freedom of expression and a violation of the duties and responsibilities that come 
with its exercise. The fulfilment of these duties and responsibilities (although not elaborated in 
the ICCPR) would be essential for ensuring the right of freedom of expression in the first place. 
Imposing a restriction of the aforesaid right on the grounds of Defamation of Religions would 
therefore  be  an acceptable  measure,  even if  not  covered by the  provisions  contained in  the 
Covenant. But, as the High Commissioner on Human Rights outlined in light of the Defamation 
of Religions discussion regarding the need to balance the freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression,  both  these  essential  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  are  interdependent,  not 
contradictory to  each other.353 This  is  also reaffirmed by the  understanding of  the  nature of 
Human Rights as agreed upon in the VDPA as “universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated”354.  Despite  Human Rights  being  defined as  indivisible,  the  High Commissioner 
nevertheless mentioned in connection with the drawings of Muhammed in the Danish newspaper 
Jyllands  Posten,  the  “need  to  explore  ways  and  means  to  adequately  address  the  issue  of 
religious intolerance by striking the right balance between freedom of expression and freedom of 
religion”355
From a legal point of view, freedom of expression as one of the basic human rights should not be 
limited, except where necessary and provided for by international legal instruments. Any other 
limitation is incompatible with – and a violation of – internationally binding Human Rights law. 
Hence, regardless of the concepts' usefulness in realizing its proclaimed goals, the question of its 
legal compatibility to the Human Rights framework remains. Especially relevant is the ICCPR, 
whose  articles  19  and 20 define the  legitimate  circumstances  for  restrictions  relating  to  the 
exercise of freedom of expression.  But  first  and foremost  article  19 guarantees  the right  for 
everyone to hold opinions without interference and to subsequently enjoy the right of freedom of 
expression through any form and media of his/her choice.
As argued previously, the resolution falls short in providing the necessary criteria for Defamation 
of  Religions  to  distinguish  between  legitimate  criticism  and  what  could  be  understood  as 
353 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS - Addendum - 
Expert seminar on the links between articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political  
Rights: “Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,  
hostility or violence” Para 3.
354 United Nations, VDPA Part I, Para 5; United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the 3rd Committee,  
63rd Session, 46th meeting, (A/C.3/63/SR.46), 43.
355 UN. Secretary-General, Combating defamation of religions : report of the Secretary-General. ([New York]: UN, 
2006), para. 11.
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speeches that need to be prohibited. Moreover, Defamation of Religions framed as the negative 
stereotyping  of  religion  does  not  constitute  the  case  of  advocacy  of  religious  hatred  that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence within the scope of articles 19356 
and 20357 of the ICCPR. Only if the conditions contained within this framework are fulfilled is it 
legitimate  under  international  Human  Rights  law to  restrict  the  right  to  –  and  fundamental 
freedom of – expression, and only for the purposes set out in the respective provisions of the 
ICCPR. 
Not surprisingly the resolution seeks to in fact  extend the scope of the conditions wherein the 
exercise of freedom of expression may be restricted.  The resolution does this by suggesting 
additional legitimate grounds for such restrictions that are outlined below.
The proponents of the resolution introduced language that proposes the addition of the case of 
'respect of religion' as further grounds for limiting the exercise of freedom of expression. The 
Defamation Resolution of the 61st General Assembly session first introduced this new language 
on the balance of rights, drafting the Operative Paragraph 9 as an extension to the respective 
Article 19 of the ICCPR, reading: 
“Emphasizes  that  everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of  expression,  which  should  be  exercised  with  
responsibility and may therefore be subject to limitations as provided by law and necessary for respect of the 
rights or reputations of others, protection of national security or of public order, public health or morals and 
respect for religions and beliefs;”358
In  the  long  run,  this  language  could  not  find  the  necessary  support  with  the  wider  UN 
membership  and  was  subsequently  abandoned  by  the  sponsors  of  the  resolution  in  the 
negotiation process in 2008.359 The disputed language was then replaced in 2009 by the more 
vague terminology “and general welfare”360, but nonetheless remaining an attempt to extend the 
356  ICCPR, Article 19, reads:
1.Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2.Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart  
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art,  
or through any other media of his choice.
3.The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and  
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided  
by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
357  ICCPR, Article 20, reads: 
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or  
violence shall be prohibited by law.
358 United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/61/164), OP. 9., [emphasis M.G]
359 United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/63/171) OP 10.
360 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HCR/Res/13/16) OP 10.
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scope outlined  in  Article  19(3)  for  grounds of  restricting freedom of  expression  beyond the 
legitimate  boundaries  of  the  provision.  Further,  General  Comment  No.  10 elaborates  on  the 
application of article 19 and clarifies the terms and conditions of the restrictions that may be 
imposed  by  State  Parties:  these  restrictions  must  be  necessary  for  the  achievement  of  the 
purposes for which they are imposed, and the legitimate purposes themselves are limited to those 
laid down in the respective sub paragraphs a) and b) of paragraph 3.361
In this context, the resolution has also been criticised in that it views the possibility to restrict the 
exercise of freedom of expression as obligatory where defamation of religion occurs, while the 
limitations to when restrictions may apply are viewed as optional and extendable. In a meeting 
organized by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to elaborate on related issues, experts 
outlined the fact that actually, the reverse is true. While restrictions for the purposes set out in 
Article 19 might be used as a last resort, they do not constitute any obligation for State Parties to  
apply them. On the contrary,  the limitations on the purposes for which such restrictions are 
applicable are not optional but of binding character.362 Henceforth, any extension of the purposes 
for the restrictions of the right of freedom of expression is illegitimate. 
Under this light, the attempt of the resolution to extend the scope of article 19(3) is incompatible 
with the framework of the Human Rights instruments; this is because the resolution is in effect 
calling upon Member States to implement legal measures that would violate international Human 
Rights law.
The resolution further conflicts with existing Human Rights law, as it tends to blur the distinction  
between restricting the exercise of rights and limiting rights themselves:
The  resolution  uses  language  in  such  a  way  that  it  suggests  that  the  right  of  freedom  of  
expression should be subject to restriction rather than emphasising the exercise of that right. The 
paragraph reads that: “[…] everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which should be 
exercised with responsibility and may therefore be subject to limitations”363. Read in its reverse 
order, but expressing essentially the same, this languages states that the right may be subject to 
361United Nation Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 10: Freedom of expression (Art. 19),” June 
29, 1983, para. 4, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/2bb2f14bf558182ac12563ed0048df17?
Opendocument.
362United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS - Addendum - 
Expert seminar on the links between articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political  
Rights: “Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,  
hostility or violence”, para. 12, 13.
363United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/61/164) OP 9.
124
 5 Compatibility with the Human Rights Framework
limitations,  as  the  right  should  be  exercised  with  responsibility.  On  the  matter  of  such 
restrictions, General Comment No. 10 takes explicit note of the fact that “[…] when a State party 
imposes certain restrictions  on the  exercise  of  freedom of  expression,  these  may not  put  in 
jeopardy the right itself”364. Essentially, Human Rights as such may not be limited but restrictions 
to their exercise may apply as imposed under certain, well-defined circumstances.
This distinction is blurred in the resolution, and it is again the vagueness of the language which 
provides grounds for the accusation that the resolution was deliberately phrased in such a way to 
better serve as a tool to justify the systematic undermining of Human Rights. 
Concluding remarks
The resolution is not in conformity with Article 19(3) of the ICCPR in aiming to extend of the 
scope of the purposes for the restriction of freedom of expression by adding either “respect for 
religions and beliefs “  or “general  welfare” to them. Additionally,  the resolution is  in effect 
calling upon combating the phenomenon of 'Defamation of Religions' on a legal basis by limiting 
the freedom of speech to precisely the extent that goes far beyond the legitimate scope of Article  
19(3)  and  20  of  the  ICCPR.  The  resolution  is  also  urging  State  Parties  to  adopt  such 
recommendations  on  a  legal  base,  thereby  effectively  calling  upon  governments  to  violate 
existing Human Rights law.
364 United Nation Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 10: Freedom of expression (Art. 19),” 4.
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 5.3  Freedom of Religion and Belief 
This chapter will discuss the implications of Defamation of Religions vis a vis the freedom of 
religion and belief. Of specific interest are the rights of persons belonging to religious minorities 
and of vulnerable groups such as women. Separate chapters will be devoted to each of these 
groups to take their specific concerns into consideration.
Essentially,  the  Defamation  of  Religions  resolution  closely  links  the  issue  of  freedom  of 
expression to that of the freedom of religion and belief. The main assumption that proponents of 
the Defamation of Religions concept make is of a inherent conflict between these two rights; 
leading to their call for a redrawing of the demarcation line between them skewed in favour of 
the latter freedom. This builds upon the tradition of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
acknowledgement in 2006, where the need to balance the freedom of expression and the freedom 
of religion was recognised as necessary in order to explore possible means to address the issue of 
religious intolerance.365 In this regard, supporters of the resolution claim that prohibiting freedom 
of speech that may be considered defamatory towards other religious beliefs would amount to an 
active protection of the freedom of religion, and thereby be justifiable.
In this  regard,  Amyebi  Ligabo, Special  Rapporteur on freedom of expression,  has expressed 
concern  regarding the  sacrifice  of  free  expression  for  the  sake  of  religious  feelings.366 It  is 
questionable whether  less speech actually  could lead to  more religious freedom.  In  fact,  the 
Special  Rapporteur  on contemporary forms  of  racism, racial  discrimination,  xenophobia and 
related intolerance,  Githu Muigai, emphasised in his report  on Defamation of Religion,  that: 
“Indeed, the strategic response to hate speech is more speech: more speech that educates about 
cultural differences; more speech that promotes diversity; and more speech to empower and give 
voice to minorities,”367 The resolution aims at protecting religion itself from injury to reputation, 
rather than protecting the freedom of adherents of a religion to exercise their rights, including the 
right to express their religion freely. The main argument of the resolution is that the defamation 
of religion would impede the right of freedom of religion and belief itself. As discussed in the 
chapters above, the underlying concept remains  flawed in this regard.  In the expert  seminar 
organized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in October 
365 UN. Secretary-General, Combating defamation of religions, para. 11.
366 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Combating Defamation of Religions,” 3-4.
367 Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,  
Githu Muigai, Report on the manifestations of defamation of religions, and in particular on the serious  
implications of Islamophobia, on the enjoyment of all rights by their followers, para. 42.
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2008 in Geneva, Mohamed Saeed M. Eltayeb outlined that the “freedom of religion or belief did 
not  protect  religions  or  beliefs  per  se”368.  He further  expressed  his  view that,  “the question 
whether  criticism,  derogatory  comment,  insults  or  ridicule  of  a  religion  encroached  on  the 
believer’s right to freedom of religion or belief could only be determined by examining whether 
such acts negatively affected the various aspects of religious freedom of the believer.”369
To evaluate the resolutions'  compatibility with the Human Rights framework, it  is critical to 
examine  whether  the  consequences  of  the  suggested  means  of  addressing  Defamation  of 
Religions outweigh their proclaimed benefits or not. To understand what effects recommended 
legal measures to combat Defamation of Religions may have on the enjoyment of freedom of 
religion, the far reaching nature of the right itself  needs to be taken into account.  The 1981 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion 
and Belief outlines the fundamental freedom of religion and belief in its Article 1.1:
Everyone  shall  have  the  right  to  freedom of  thought,  conscience  and  religion.  This  right  shall  include 
freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and  
teaching.370
The freedom of religion and belief is a far reaching right, and all of its interdependent aspects 
need to be meaningfully addressed to provide for proper protection mechanisms for the right as a 
whole. The resolution, however, falls short not only in adequately outlining the need to protect 
this right but also even in addressing the right as a whole taking account of all of its facets. This 
would not have been as problematic, had the resolution not called for concrete action which 
impacts the enjoyment of Human Rights.  However,  not taking into consideration the various 
aspects of the freedom of religion can result in stifling that right with regard to those aspects, 
rather than providing better protection to that right as the resolution proclaims it does. A core 
aspect of the right that remains unaddressed in the resolution, for example, is the right to change 
one's religion at free will. Questions arose over the manifestation of one's religion, particularly if 
it  is  perceived as defamatory to another  religion.  Essentially,  the right  for and protection of 
368 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS - Addendum - 
Expert seminar on the links between articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political  
Rights: “Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,  
hostility or violence”, para. 41.
369 Ibid.
370 United Nations, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on  
Religion or Belief Article 1.1.
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freedom of religion and belief becomes critical when different religions meet; either in the form 
of  different  religious  groups  that  share  a  common public  space  or  in  the  form of  different 
understandings within one religion. In both circumstances,  strong protection mechanisms are 
required  to  ensure  the  enjoyment  of  the  individuals  right  to  freedom of  religion  and belief 
without interference or conflict. 
As was outlined in the chapter addressing criticism against the resolution, it  is impossible to 
prove  the  universal  truth  of  a  religious  claim,  and  some  of  the  truths  presented  naturally 
contradict each other. In practical terms, one religious teaching defames another and under the 
solution presented by the resolution, it then becomes the imperative of state authorities to decide 
which religious argument is given preference in the public square and which must remain silent. 
In  practice  then,  blasphemy  laws  tend  to  be  “used  to  intimidate  reform-minded  Muslims, 
sectarian opponents, and religious minorities, or to settle personal scores.”371 The tendency of the 
resolution to stifle freedom of expression, along with the lack of references to core aspects of the 
freedom  of  religion  and  the  practical  tradition  of  blasphemy  legislation  to  predominantly 
prosecute those with dissenting opinions; puts persons belonging to religious minority groups at 
greater risk of Human Rights abuses. 
The consequences for minorities deriving from the practical implementation of outlawing so-
called defamation of religion will be elaborated in detail in the next chapter. The application of 
methods to combat Defamation of Religions in the form of Anti-blasphemy laws against reform-
minded Muslims in practice also affects other vulnerable groups such as women. As such, a 
separate  chapter  is  devoted to  the question of  Women's  Rights  in  context  of  Defamation  of 
Religions.
In short, the analysis conducted in this paper shows that the concept proclaimed in the resolution 
is inconsistent with the Human Rights framework's freedom of religion and belief, as it aims to 
protect religion itself. In this regard, the Defamation of Religions resolution also fails to 
recognise core aspects of freedom of religion and belief as set forth in Human Rights law. As 
will be shown in the following chapter, the resolution in fact achieves quite the opposite of the 
proclaimed aim of protecting the freedom of religion and belief. It severely impedes the rights of 
religious minorities, and prevents the voicing of demands for women's rights. 
371 US Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report 2006 - Pakistan,” 2006, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71443.htm.
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 5.4  Rights of Persons belonging to Minorities
This  chapter  aims to  examine  the  compatibility  of  the  resolution  with  the  rights of  persons 
belonging  to  minority  groups.  The  Human  Rights  framework provides  for  minorities  in  the 
ICESCR, the ICCPR, the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,  
Religious and Linguistic Minorities (A/Res/47/135), Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and ILO's Convention 169. Of 
further significant  relevance for the enjoyment  of freedom of religion and belief  for persons 
belonging to minorities are inter alia, Articles 18, 19, 20 and 27 of the ICCPR, General Comment  
22 on the interpretation of Article 18 of the ICCPR and the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief.
The specific need for the Human Rights protection of minorities, premised on being a vulnerable 
group, has been recognized in the Human Rights discourse. Several provisions attempt to take 
minorities  into  considerations,  such  as  Article  27  of  the  ICCPR  on  the  rights  of  persons 
belonging to minorities, which reads: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture,  
to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.372
The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic 47/135, which was 
inspired by Article 27 of the ICCPR, reaffirms and specifies that:
States  shall  take  measures  to  create  favourable  conditions  to  enable  persons belonging  to  minorities  to 
express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs, except 
where specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to international standards. 373 
The Declaration requires States Parties to construct and maintain favourable conditions for the 
religious (or other) identities of minorities and adopt appropriate legislative measures to protect 
them.  The ICCPR further  emphasises  that  persons  belonging to  minorities  have  the  right  to 
participate in policy making that affects their livelihood and minority group.374
The rights of minorities in this context do not only apply to religious minorities only but also to 
groups who refrain from holding any religious belief. The Human Rights Committee General 
372 United Nations, ICCPR, Article 27.
373 United Nations, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic  
Minorities, para. 2.
374 Brice Dickson, “The United Nations and Freedom of Religion,” 354.
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Comment No 22 underlines in this regard: 
The Committee draws the attention of States parties to the fact that the freedom of thought and the freedom of 
conscience are protected equally with 'the freedom of religion and belief.'375
The Comment further clarifies: 
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (which includes the freedom to hold beliefs) […]  
encompasses freedom of thought […]. […] this provision cannot be derogated from, even in time of public  
emergency.376
The  Defamation  Resolution  is  greatly  concerned  with  the  rights  of  minorities,  above  all  of 
Muslim migrant  communities  in  Western societies;  in  terms of  their  rights  to  manifest  their 
religion, their reputation and their general well-being. The resolution proclaims these groups as 
specifically vulnerable, and urges for additional protection mechanisms for them, their religious 
beliefs and value systems. 
The resolution points out in its pre-ambulatory part:
Noting with deep concern the serious instances of intolerance, discrimination and acts of violence based on 
religion or belief, intimidation and coercion motivated by extremism, religious or otherwise, occurring in many 
parts of the world, in addition to the negative projection of certain religions in the media and the introduction and 
enforcement of laws and administrative measures that specifically discriminate against and target persons with  
certain ethnic and religious backgrounds, particularly Muslim minorities following the events of 11 September 
2001, and that threaten to impede their full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,377
The resolution continues  to  frame the issue of  Defamation of Religions  as primarily  one of 
minorities when stating in its operative clauses that it,
Notes with deep concern the intensification of the overall campaign of defamation of religions and 
incitement to religious hatred in general, including the ethnic and religious profiling of Muslim 
minorities in the aftermath of the tragic events of 11 September 2001;378
The language further highlights issues such as “the denial of fundamental rights and freedoms of 
members of target groups, as well as to their economic and social exclusion;”379 and “laws or 
administrative measures specifically designed to control and monitor Muslim minorities”.
375United Nation Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Art. 18).”
376United Nation Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Art. 18),” July 30, 1993, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15 para 1.
377United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/64/156) PP.
378UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HCR/Res/10/22) OP 5.
379Ibid. OP 6.
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In short,  the issues raised in the resolution as negative consequences deriving from cases of 
Defamation of Religions include: discrimination of religious minorities, inter alia by regulation  
and  laws affecting  negatively  the  equality  of  religious  minorities;  coercion and  pressure 
exercised  on  their  religious  belief  systems;  and  their  reputation  threatened by  unfavourable 
media reporting. 
While extensively concerned with the right of Muslim migrant minorities in Western societies, 
the resolution however does not address domestic religious minorities in Islamic countries and 
does not take into account the possible side effects of legal measures to combat Defamation of 
Religions that negatively impact those minority groups.
When it  comes to different  religions and beliefs,  and their  interaction with one another,  the 
resolution does welcome efforts to strengthen mutual understanding and respect. It also outlines 
the role of education for the promotion of tolerance and diversity and underlines the need for 
cross-cultural  and inter-faith harmony.380 While indeed pointing towards the need to improve 
inter-religious dialogue, understanding and tolerance, it is noteworthy that most of the stipulated 
provisions address the issue as one among cultures and societies, but barely ever within societies. 
The matter is referred to as a more international one, urging nations, civilizations, and religions 
to interact with each other in harmony and respect. Questions of inter-faith dialogue between 
regions  within  a  state  or  society  are  barely  mentioned  in  the  resolution.  When it  comes to 
domestic  initiatives,  the  resolution  calls  solely  for  legal  measures  combating  religious 
defamation rather than actions to actively promote tolerance.381 And while the resolution raises 
legitimate concerns regarding religious minorities and their enjoyment of Human Rights,  the 
recommendations for addressing them are in themselves grounds for concern as they can be seen 
to work to negatively affect the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups rather than protect 
them. Of particular concern is the potential impairment of the enjoyment of freedom of religion 
and  belief  for  minorities  under  the  implementation  of  recommendations  stipulated  in  the 
resolution.  The main facets of concern regarding freedom of religion are many and are well 
covered in Article 1.1 of the 1981 Declaration, which reads:
Everyone  shall  have  the  right  to  freedom of  thought,  conscience  and  religion.  This  right  shall  include 
freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and  
teaching.382
380 United Nations General Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/64/156).
381 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HCR/Res/10/22); United Nations General 
Assembly, Combating defamation of religions (A/Res/64/156).
382 United Nations, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on  
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Ideological Context of Concerns for Minorities' Rights
To assess the meaning of the resolutions language it must be placed in the relevant political 
context  that  it  emerged  from and  similarly,  the  misgivings  pointed  to  by  opponents  of  the 
resolution must be considered in their ideological, religious and political context. 
The predominant preoccupation of the freedom of religion for members of religious minorities 
lies in the right to manifest their religious belief, in particular when exercised in public where it 
might interfere with the religious beliefs held by the majority. In other words, the act of freely 
exercising their right to manifest their religion would include all fundamental forms of religious 
manifestation:  Teaching,  worship,  practice  and  observance383,  in  particular  when  exercised 
visually  in  the  public  square.  The  right  of  religious  minorities  to  exercise  their  freedom of 
religion can be impaired when their activities involve specific interpretation, such as in the case 
of teaching as a form of missionary activity. Acts of practising faith and worshipping deities may 
be seen as defamatory of a different religious teaching.
Manifestations of religious belief when exercised by religious minorities, often serve as grounds 
for  accusation  of  missionary  activity,  because  they  relate  to  the  highly  sensitive  issues  of 
apostasy and changing of religious affiliations. While not exclusively an issue limited to Muslim 
societies, contemporary resistance against freedom of religious choice, in connection to matters 
of coercion and apostasy, is mostly contained within Islamic States. Shari'ah law, which is the 
basis for the legislative systems of many OIC members, forbids conversion from Islam to any 
other  religion.  A particular  problem is  that  apostasy virtually  equals  a  defamatory statement 
against Islam in itself. A conversion is in effect proclaiming by implication that Mohammed is 
not the prophet, or at least is neglecting the fundamental belief of Islam of the Holy Qur’an, as 
the universal and absolute truth and word of God.384 In other words, apostasy is interpreted as 
blasphemy, and as such considered a religious crime under existing Blasphemy or Defamation of 
Religions laws. Subsequently, as the religious practices of minorities may be viewed upon as 
potentially leading to apostasy when having a proselyting effect, the derived blasphemy rules 
from the  Shari'ah's  perspective  on  apostasy particularly  has  implications  for  the  freedom of 
expression  of  religious  minorities.  It  is  enough  of  a  threat  that  the  manifestations  of  their 
religious practices of minorities, when taking place in the public space, could weaken or shaken 
a Muslim's faith. This fear is also reflected in the CDHRI, which states “Information […] may 
Religion or Belief Article 1.1.
383 Taylor, Freedom of religion : UN and European human rights law and practice, 210.
384 Delling, Malin, “Islam and Human Rights,” 31.
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not be exploited or misused in such a way as may […] harm society or weaken its faith.”385 
Obviously, any deliberate attempt of religious minorities to proselytise is even more vehemently 
rejected.  Unsurprisingly,  the countries  most  supportive of the resolutions recommendation to 
combat  Defamation  of  Religions  by  legal  measures  which  in  effect  limit  the  freedom  of 
expression,  are  also  the  ones  most  resistant  to  the  idea  of  an  explicit  right  to  change ones 
religion.  The  Human  Rights  Committee  clarified  that  Article  18(3)  of  the  ICCPR includes 
exactly that; the right to change or to maintain religion at will. At the same time it is essential to 
note that freedom of religion and belief also contains protection from coercion. The provisions 
are meant to protect freedom of choice of ones religion, inter alia the choice to maintain ones 
religion, thereby protecting individuals from coercion that would impair the enjoyment of this 
right.386 While several OIC members do not recognise the right to change ones religion, they do 
however interpret any proselytising activity that would lead adherents of Islam to fall from their 
belief as the kind of coercion that is outlawed by the Covenants provisions.
The Defamation of Religions resolution reflects this fear held by many Islamic countries of faith 
being weakened also in form of referring to potential coercion resulting from Defamation of 
Religions  to  change  one's  religious  belief:  The  Defamation  Resolution  urges  States  to  take 
measures within their legal systems to protect against discrimination, intimidation and coercion 
resulting from defamation of religion.387 This legitimises the targeting of expressions of ones 
religion that could have a proselyting effect (or could lead to the apostasy of adherents of State 
religion) by domestic blasphemy legislation. In this perspective, concerns are raised regarding 
the religious practices of minorities, for instance by the Turkish delegate in the course of drafting 
the Convention on religious intolerance, in voicing that “freedom to worship or assemble, and to 
establish  and  maintain  places  of  worship  […]  would  encourage  proselytising”388 Countries 
stifling the freedom to manifest  ones religion, make a clear distinction between majority and 
minority groups in this regard. Naturally, disseminating the teachings of the official or dominant 
religion is tolerated and in some cases even encouraged, while it is the expression of minority 
religions in public space that is seen as a threat to State religion and often hypocritically framed 
as  threat  to  the  freedom  of  religion.  Contrary  to  the  prejudice  in  mainstream  opinion  that 
suggests that such ideas are solely inherent to Islam, the fear and rejection of proselytising is 
385 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) Article 
22 (c).
386 Taylor, Freedom of religion : UN and European human rights law and practice, 339.
387 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HCR/Res/10/22), OP. 13.
388 Taylor, Freedom of religion : UN and European human rights law and practice, 66.
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much more connected to matters of national and cultural identity and thus extends far beyond the 
Islamic  world.  As  Tylor  reveals,  Armenia,  Bulgaria  and  Greece  are  such  examples  where 
“Orthodox  or  State  religion  is  part  of  the  national  identity  and  seen  to  be  threatened  by 
competing religions which proselytise.”389 Continuing in the same line, there are new trends such 
as the political momentum in many countries aiming to reduce the influx and influence of new 
religious ideas on society, by protecting traditional State religions through measures of law and 
regulations.390 First and foremost, but not exclusively, in Islamic countries where domestic law is 
deeply interlinked with religious law,  state  provisions  and regulations  deriving from religion 
serve  to  disadvantage  new  religious  movements.  The  problematic  result  is  that  religious 
jurisdiction is enforced over non-adherents, limiting their rights as minorities. The emergence of 
political parties pushing for a legal system based entirely on religious law further aggravates this 
conflict.391 Attempts to protect adherents from religious discrimination have led to legal concepts 
aimed at prohibiting speeches inciting religious intolerance. It has also been a matter of great  
apprehension that such provisions could serve in practice to cut down on the rights of religious 
minorities to manifest their religion in certain ways, specifically in the public sphere. 392 
As  already  outlined  in  the  chapter  discussing  the  criticism the  resolution  has  received,  the 
Defamation  of  Religions  resolution  does  not  take  into  account  the  natural  contradictions  of 
different religious teachings. While all religions claim universal truth, these opinions expressed 
might be looked upon as blasphemous by adherents of a different religion. As already pointed out 
in a previous chapter, adherents of Islam view upon Muhammed as the prophet of God, but  
adherents of Christianity would reject this in accordance to their own religious teachings as false 
claim. Vice versa, when a Muslim would argue Jesus not being the reincarnation of God, this 
would essentially  be considered  as defamatory or  blasphemous towards Christian faith.  It  is 
highly doubtful, that any OIC member so vocally promoting the idea to outlaw such Defamation 
of Religions would want to go as far as to strip Muslims of their right to state the Qur'anic  
teachings, that Jesus is indeed a prophet, but not the reincarnation of God.393 It is evident, that 
religious teachings inherently carry the risk of containing a neglect of other religions' teachings, 
and the probable results of laws and their enforcement deriving from these grounds cannot be 
assumed to be anything but  unequal.  Such contradictions  might  very well  be interpreted by 
389 Ibid., 65.
390 Ibid., 3.
391 Ibid., 4.
392 Ibid., 3.
393 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Religious Defamation - Issues Brief,” 11.
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adherents of a particular religious teaching as defamation of their religion. Each religion claims 
some sort of truth that people of other faiths might feel offended by. This is a fortiori, as religions  
tend to claim their truths as universal and exclusive, leaving very little room for accepting the  
claims of truth made by other faiths.
The Defamation of Religions resolution attempts to expand the scope of legitimate limitations of 
the right to manifest ones religion for the purpose of protecting 'respect for religions', in its HRC 
Resolution 4/9, Article 10:
Emphasizes that  everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of  expression,  which  should  be  exercised  with 
responsibility and may therefore be subject to limitations as provided by law and necessary for respect of the 
rights or reputations of others, protection of national security or of public order, public health or morals and  
respect for religions and beliefs394
Freedom of expression is an essential  component of the manifestation of religion,  hence the 
proposed limitation would affect freedom of religion or belief in the course of its operation. It 
would clearly amount to limiting manifestations of religious beliefs where their exercise would 
be considered disrespectful to a 'religious truth' of a different belief. In short, the exercise of 
minorities' religion, in matters of its manifestation, inter alia teaching and public worshipping, 
can be perceived as forms of expression defaming State religion. The Defamation Resolution is 
the  most  far  reaching of  attempts  at  the  international  level  that  aim to  protect  religions  by 
creating State obligations to outlaw blasphemy. It also carries the greatest risks for religious 
minorities in doing so, as the enforcement of legal measures to combat Defamation of Religions 
“requires  a  judgement  based  on  the  subjective  sensibilities  of  the  listener  rather  than  the 
objectively ascertainable speech of the speaker”395 
When, as mentioned above, the purpose of state regulations serves the interest of reducing the 
influence of religions other than the traditional majority state religion, the risk for the enjoyment 
of rights for persons belonging to religious minorities becomes  paramount. It must be clearly 
said that limitations  or prohibitions  of expression of religious  minorities deriving therefrom, 
aiming  to  protect  State  religion  and  shield  its  teaching  from  opposing  ideas,  impair  the 
enjoyment of freedom of religion and belief, and violates international Human Rights law. 
Within this contextual setting and considering the vague language of the resolution, determining 
the  boundaries  of  Defamation  of  Religions  is  difficult,  especially  considering  the  strong 
394 UN. Human Rights Council, Combating Defamation of Religions (A/HRC/Res/4/9) OP 10 [emphasis Matthias 
Gattermeier].
395 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Religious Defamation - Issues Brief,” 11.
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measures advocated by the resolution to combat the phenomenon. In short, the concern is that 
Defamation of Religion or blasphemy legislation rules upon the exercise of freedom of religion 
of  minorities  as  being  proselyting  activity  threatening  the  integrity  of  the  Muslim  faith.  In 
practice, it unrighteously targets persons belonging to religious minorities when prohibiting or 
prosecuting speeches inciting religious intolerance or hurting religious feelings. This fits in the 
framework where the 'Defamation of Religions' resolutions constitute an attempt to globalise 
domestic Anti-Blasphemy laws that already exist in many of the OIC countries that are pushing 
for  the  resolution  and  the  outlawing  of  defamatory  and  blasphemous  remarks  by  amending 
international law. The introduction of the concept into UN discussions created a legitimacy that 
serves as an international cover for existing, often very harsh Anti-Blasphemy laws in Islamic 
countries.396 As  pointed  to  in  the  chapter  elaborating  on  the  interaction  between  Islam  and 
Human  Rights,  one  needs  to  keep in  mind that  ignoring  rights  of  religious  minorities  in  a 
document on human rights is just another way of allowing it to continue to happen not only with 
impunity, but with minimal attention.
Ground Consequences of Legal Implementation
The risks and effects on the enjoyment of Human Rights of persons belonging to minorities, 
above  all  religious  minority  groups,  of  legal  measures  to  combat  Defamation  of  Religions 
become  overt in  their  implementation  on  the  ground,  foremost  in  jurisdiction  and  law 
enforcement.  In  practice  Anti-Blasphemy  laws,  as  the  usual  application  of  legal  initiatives 
combating Defamation of Religions, are evidently biased towards the discriminatory prosecution 
of  religious  minorities.  As  the  Special  Rapporteur  for  freedom  of  religion  or  belief,  Asma 
Jahangir, has recognised in her reports to the HRC and General Assembly, on the domestic level 
“numerous examples of persecution of religious minorities” were “result of excessive legislation 
on religious offences […]”.397 In Pakistan, for instance, domestic anti-blasphemy laws outlaw 
defamation of religion as a criminal offence, and include punishments as severe as the death 
penalty.  The broad provisions  of  Articles  295 and 298 of  Pakistan's  Penal  Code  have  been 
consequently used to intimidate and prosecute members of religious minorities, including other 
Muslim groups.398
396Ibid., 2.
397Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, Elimination of all Forms of Religious 
Intolerance, interim report submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 61/161, 2007, para. 29.
398United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, 229.
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Pakistan  consists  of  over  96% Muslims,  but  it  is  predominantly  religious  minorities  of  the 
remaining 4% of the population that are accused of blasphemy. In fact about 50% of all cases 
since the introduction of the respective Articles 295 and 298 of Pakistan Penal Code till 2005 
have targeted non-Muslim individuals.399 Allegations of blasphemy, which are often proven false, 
nonetheless  “result  in  the  lengthy  detention  of,  and  sometimes  violence  against,  Ahmadis, 
Christians,  Hindus,  and  members  of  other  religious  minorities,  as  well  as  Muslims.”400 In 
particular,  religious  minorities  continue  to  be  charged  on  “flimsy,  insubstantial  and 
uncorroborated  evidence”401 as  having  violated  blasphemy  law.  The  consequences  for 
stigmatised victims of blasphemy allegations are tremendous, even if they are acquitted under 
false accusations. Many have been forced into hiding or have sought refuge abroad for being 
threatened by violence and receiving death  threats.402 But some have fallen victim to violent 
mobs,  following the acquittance of their  groundless cases.  While  blasphemy laws target and 
prosecute both Muslims and non-Muslims when a brought to court as a case against mainstream 
Islam, “in cases where the religious feelings of a minority religion were insulted, the blasphemy 
laws  were  rarely  enforced  and  cases  rarely  brought  to  the  legal  system”403.  Similarly  in 
Afghanistan,  the  General  Directorate  of  Fatwa  and  Accounts  declared  Baha'i  religion  as 
blasphemy and converts from Islam as apostates.404 
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, a law firm defending the right of freedom of religion of 
individuals  belonging  to  religious  minorities,  has  collected  case  examples  from around  the 
world,  wherein  it  is  evident  that  religious  minorities  are  disproportionately  targeted  under 
defamation of religion jurisdiction on the grounds of the interests of the religion of the majority.  
This includes as well cases of minority opinion within majority religion. For instance in Iran, a 
“member of the pro-reform Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution was sentenced to death for 
calling  for  the  reformation  of  religion  in  which  people  should  not  'blindly  follow'  religious 
leaders” and an Egyptian professor from “Cairo University was declared an apostate for teaching 
his students to read certain parts of the Qur'an metaphorically”405
399 Nina Shea, Testimony of Nina Shea, Director Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom: PAKISTAN’S  
ANTI-BLASPHEMY LAWS, 2009, www.hudson.org/files/documents/SheaPakistan108.pdf.
400 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, 68.
401 Javaid Rehman and Susan C. Breau, Religion, human rights and international law : a critical examination of  
Islamic state practices (Leiden ;;Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 435.
402 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, 229.
403 US Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report 2006 - Pakistan” unpaged.
404 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, 146.
405 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Religious Defamation - Issues Brief,” 11. Also providing additional 
examples: “In other instances, anti-blasphemy laws punish mere trivialities. In November 2007, a Sudanese 
court sentenced a British teacher to fifteen days in jail for “insulting religion,” after she named a class teddy 
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In  short,  Anti-Blasphemy laws  such  as  seen  in  the  case  of  many  OIC countries,  inter  alia 
Pakistan, Iran or Afghanistan have proven to create a culture of religious intolerance within the 
society.406 This notion is reaffirmed by UN officials alike. The Special Rapporteur for freedom of 
religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, herself expressed her concerns in her reports to the General 
Assembly  Defamation  of  Religions  measures  would  promote  an  “atmosphere  of  religious 
intolerance”.407 Such jurisdiction outlawing Defamation of Religions also serves the purpose of 
silencing members of the various religious minorities.408 In this line of argument, Asma Jahangir 
pointed out that “[…] domestic blasphemy laws […] protect only the prevailing religion in the 
State concerned, or they are applied in a discriminatory sense.”409
The use of blasphemy legislation to outlaw defamatory remarks of religion, shows an obvious 
pattern in prosecuting religious minorities particularly,  in comparison to the majority.  As the 
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty410 concluded, blasphemy jurisdiction as the legal expression 
of Defamation of Religions measures “do not help […] minorities. Such laws only benefit those 
who are in the majority and have the power to determine what is acceptable speech in the public 
square.”411
It can be postulated that a case of religious defamation or disrespect of religion is most likely to 
be  made by  the  religious  majority  which  has  the  power  to  determine  public  discourse  and 
opinion deciding what forms of religious expressions are acceptable in the public square and 
which ones are to be prohibited. As critics have pointed out “[…] much of the persecution and 
discrimination  has  resulted  not  from 'defamation  of  religions'  but  from state  action  against 
religious minorities and dissenters, who promote viewpoints that are often considered offensive 
to the majority religious populations in each of these countries.”412
bear Mohammed. The bear had been named after a popular student in class who was also named Mohammed.  
The teacher was pardoned and deported the following month.47 “ as well becket fund source
406 Rehman and Breau, Religion, human rights and international law : a critical examination of Islamic state  
practices, 434.
407 Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, Elimination of all Forms of Religious 
Intolerance, interim report submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 61/161, para. 77.
408 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, 5.
409 Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, Elimination of all Forms of Religious 
Intolerance, interim report submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 61/161, para. 70.
410 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty is a public interest law firm working for the protection of the free 
expression of all religious traditions.
411 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Combating Defamation of Religions,” 7.
412 Ibid.
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Concluding Remarks
While the Defamation of Religions resolution does not violate Human Rights law in this regard 
directly in its stipulated provisions, it  is inconsistent with the Human Rights framework as a 
whole.  As  is  clear,  the  concept  of  combating  Defamation  of  Religions  in  its  practical 
implementation, has shown to lead to legal regulations, law enforcement and prosecution which 
impair the enjoyment of Human Rights of persons belonging to minorities, first and foremost 
with regard  to  their  fundamental  freedoms of  religion or  belief.  The Defamation Resolution 
encourages States to consider implementing laws and regulations impeding those persons' rights. 
In this regard it also must be noted that often freedom of religion is less a concern for religious 
minorities, and rather relevant for Muslims converting to a different religion. The strong feelings 
that conservative adherents of Islam hold about the questions of apostasy, free choice and the act 
of  changing  ones  religion  negatively  affects  religious  minorities,  as  they  pose  a  threat  as 
alternatives for Muslims  in  terms of conversion.  As such, their  rights,  above all  freedom of 
expression, are often sacrificed for the sake of preventing conceivably missionary effects of the 
manifestation of their religious belief and protecting mainstream Islam. Legal initiatives deriving 
thereof to combat Defamation of Religions in the form of Anti-Blasphemy laws and other forms 
of limitations of the freedom of speech in practice empower the ruling majorities against the 
weak minorities. 
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 5.5  Rights of Women
The role of women is often overseen, sometimes neglected and mostly downplayed but remains 
of  crucial  importance  to  human  development.  However,  women  have  been  subject  to 
discrimination  throughout  our  history  in  almost  all  societies  through  various  means  of 
suppression that have served well to stifle their rights. Religion, having been part of our societies 
and cultures for as long as mankind has existed, is by no means excluded from the structures that 
have  served  as  instruments  for  the  suppression  of  women.413 Unfortunately  the  subject  of 
women's Human Rights in the context of religion, is often instrumentalised for ideological and 
political debates in which some religions are framed as superior to 'others' that allegedly remain 
backward and primitive. Such attacks serve specific political purposes, draw upon the unspecific 
fears of people, and are often motivated by racism and xenophobia414. Although potential areas of 
tension between women's rights and religions are clearly not an issue exclusive to one religion415, 
such widespread false accusations framed upon religious intolerance, add to the negative image 
of Islam in particular. On the other hand, it is also true that a constant hostility, suspiciousness 
and  negative  projection  in  societies,  primarily  through media,  has  led  to  an  over-sensitivity 
shared  by  many  Muslims  that  tends  to  immediately  dismiss  any  criticism  as  just  another 
deliberate affront against Islam itself.
Unsurprisingly, a central objective in the call for combating Defamation of Religions is to reject 
and prohibit this negative stereotyping of Islam. The misuse of the question of women's rights 
and religion as a tool for short sighted political  purposes conflates and blurs the boundaries 
between legitimate criticisms on discrimination against women based on religious arguments, 
and politically motivated attacks inciting religious intolerance. This is due to the fact that the 
Defamation Resolution does not contain any mechanism for the protection of rights of women, 
nor does it contain any provision or reference touching upon this subject. Also generally, the 
resolution does not differentiate between legitimate criticisms of religious teachings or practices 
and Defamation of Religions. Criticism over violations of women rights could be easily mistaken  
– wittingly or unwittingly – for blunt, deliberate attacks against Islam as such and would provoke  
413 Mashood A. Baderin, “The Role of Islam in Human Rights and Development,” in Religion, Human Rights and 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 348.
414 Take for an example the election poster of the Viennese election champagne 2010 of the Austrian right wing  
party 'FPÖ', stating that they would protect 'free women' ; indicating thereby that Muslim women would be  
suppressed by Islam (symbolized by the headscarf)
415 Christine Chinkin, “Women's Human Rights and Religion: How Do They Co-Exist?,” in Religion, Human 
Rights and International Law (Leiden ;;Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 53.
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counter-reaction in the form of silencing the critical voices whose legitimacy has been thereby 
denied.  In other words,  the rights of women are at  risk of being stifled under arguments to 
combat the phenomenon of Defamation of Religions, as is promoted within the resolution today. 
There  are  many reasons  for  which  women's  rights  can  be  endangered  in  religious  contexts 
including particularly, religious teachings aiming to establish the superiority of men, cultural 
values  with  a  similar  purpose  that  are  not  overtly  prescribed  but  are  justified  by  religious 
teaching, disputes over the balancing of rights with the view that one can outweigh another, 
misunderstandings and suspicions of cultural imperialism and many more. 
Conflation of culture and religion
There is some discrepancy between claims made for the freedom and equality of women and 
those made in the name of religion. Practices that violate rights of women, while often a legacy 
of  certain  traditions,  may  be  justified  on  the  grounds  of  religious  teachings  when  specific 
elements serving that purpose are singled out. This is not to say that violations of rights for 
women would occur because of some specific religious provisions, but they may be justified in  
their name. 
It must be acknowledged that many of the adverse attitudes attributed to Islam are not Islamic in 
their legal or religious sense.416 Rather, many traditional practices grown into the conscience of 
society  are  often  intermingled  with  religious  traditions,  and  arguments  based  on  religious 
teachings are used to justify the conservation of existing norms and practices. 
Women's rights are exceptionally endangered when, as Chinkin points out, both cultural  and 
religious arguments support the proclamation that the social status of women be determined by 
community norms. When it comes to social policies, the decision making process remains the 
right of the male members of the community; but when it comes to compliance of the norms set 
up  it  is  the  women's  role  in  maintaining  community  honour  that  is  seen  as  paramount.417 
Remarkably, women themselves are not involved even in matters that directly relate to their own 
social space, which is an even more critical omission when their opinions are contradictory to 
existing traditional values. The exclusion of women's opinion and denial of their expression is 
then justified with religious arguments.  Regardless, if  those practices are seen as part  of the 
416 Mashood A. Baderin, “The Role of Islam in Human Rights and Development,” 350.
417 Chinkin, “Women's Human Rights and Religion: How Do They Co-Exist?,” 59.
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religious  canon  and  defended  as  such,  to  frame  criticism  on  them  would  be  regarded  as 
blasphemous or defamatory in the context of this resolution. 
Balance of freedom of religion over women's rights.
Although  discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  religious  opinion is  obviously  prohibited  by  the 
Human Rights standard, the right of freedom of religion and belief serves as a valid argument to 
deny  women's  equality  and  freedoms,  when  their  empowerment  is  seen  to  counter  the 
requirements of their religion. Where discrepancies between claims for women's equality and 
contradicting claims of religious requirements meet, tensions arise. The idea of the justifiable 
neglect of the rights of women on the basis of religious teachings or manifestations is grounded 
in the misapprehension that some rights and freedoms deserve greater protection and and hold 
more value than others. Examples of such trade-offs would be for instance, holding facets of 
religious freedoms with reference to the exercise of their teachings above principles of equality 
of men and women or rights such as freedom of expression.
However, it should be noted that the right to manifest ones religion is  not unlimited but falls 
under  restrictions  when  necessary  to  protect  the  freedoms  and  Human  Rights  of  others  as 
outlined in international law, most prominently the ICCPR.418 This evidently must include the 
rights of women.419 Hence, any justification of the violation of the Human Rights of women on 
grounds of religious freedom must be rejected in the strongest terms. 
Cultural Imperialism and Incompatibilities between Shari'ah and Human Rights law
Women's rights are often rejected on the basis that the concept of Human Rights is a Western 
construct; its claim for universality is only a vehicle of Western imperialism to impose their own 
norms over local ones. Within this logic, Human Rights are oppressive of the particularities of 
local culture and religion that ought to be protected against the imperialism of the Human Rights 
project.420 The denial  of  women's  rights is  perceived as the defence of  ones  own customary 
values. One should not forget that women's rights have indeed been instrumentalised for political 
purposes, such as to add moral justification for US military invasion in Afghanistan421.  Such 
418Taylor, Freedom of religion : UN and European human rights law and practice, 292.
419Chinkin, “Women's Human Rights and Religion: How Do They Co-Exist?,” 55.
420Chinkin, “Women's Human Rights and Religion: How Do They Co-Exist?.”
421Ibid., 58.
142
 5 Compatibility with the Human Rights Framework
instances undoubtedly fuel suspicions that women's rights are being used as a strategy of cultural 
imperialism  to  undermine  local  social  cohesion  that  is  exemplified  and  safeguarded  by 
traditional family values. The empowerment of women, when seen as an imposition resultant 
from a lost war against a greater enemy, cannot be expected to be welcomed with open arms.
Most Islamic States view women's rights in the form recognised by international Human Rights 
instruments such as the 'Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women',  as  being  at  least  partially  incompatible  with  Shari'ah  law.  This  was  evident  by 
statements and reservations made by those States in the course of the adoption of CEDAW. Most 
objections  were  made in  connection to  the  question of  the  equality  of  men and women,  in 
particular  with  regards  to  Articles  2,  9  and  29422;  and  these  objections  were  defended  with 
reference to the higher authority of Shari'ah law. Above all, Article 2 was seen as unacceptable 
and willingness to comply to the contained provisions was either limited to those circumstances 
which would “not run counter to the Islamic Sharia.”423 or entirely denied its binding character 
“as they conflict with Sharia law” in principle.424 The incompatibilities identified, it was argued, 
were a result of the inherent cultural bias of the instruments towards western concepts, ignoring 
the cultural  particularities that made the provisions of CEDAW subject to conflict.  On these 
grounds,  Iran,  Somalia  and  Sudan  remain  the  only  countries  that  are  non-signatory  to  the 
Convention.
Concluding Remarks
As argued before, the application of concepts to combat Defamation of Religions in the form of 
Anti-blasphemy  laws  against  reform-minded  Muslims,  in  practice  also  affects  women  as  a 
vulnerable group. In Afghanistan for instance, a student was charged for religious crimes under 
blasphemy law for  disseminating material  on  women's  right  in  Islam and was  subsequently 
sentenced to death; a punishment that was later transformed to 20 years imprisonment to avoid 
international pressure over Human Rights concerns.425 Examples like these make it obvious that 
advocacy of women's rights can be easily stifled and even effectively prosecuted against, under 
allegations of defaming Islam or its teachings. Hence, legal initiatives to combat Defamation of 
422 United Nations, “Declarations, Reservations and Objections made by State Parties to CEDAW,” n.d., 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm.
423 Egypt, Ibid.
424 Bangladesh, Ibid.
425 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, 144.
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Religions must be seen as critical, in particular as the Defamation Resolution is not concerned 
about the protection of freedom and does not actively call for women's rights. Unfortunately, till 
today,  the  resolution  does  not  even  recognise  any  intersection  between  women's  rights  and 
freedom of religion. The proponents of the resolution do not seem to be concerned about the role  
of  women and the  implications  for  their  rights  if  mechanisms of  combating  Defamation  of 
Religions are imposed. Women are simply not mentioned a single time in the resolution, not even 
as a potential victim of instances of Defamation of Religions, as though they do not exist in the 
scope of the phenomenon at all.426
It  must  be recognised that conservative interpretations of Islamic sources can and do  impair 
various rights to different extents for women.427 Patriarchal, male-dominated governments hold a 
monopoly on the interpretation of Islam, and may judge arbitrarily, guided by self-interest and 
lacking higher accountability mechanisms. This negatively affects the Human Rights of women, 
for instance in Saudi Arabia, where full equality before the law is far from being established, as 
their rights to freely express themselves, peacefully assemble or simply move freely in public are 
systematically curtailed.428 In conclusion, conservative interpretations often serve short-sighted 
political purposes, and is instrumentalised for sake of male dominated political power and the 
conservation of traditional values denying women's rights.  As for the resolution's concept  of 
Defamation of Religions, this adds to the probability that the concept will be misused as a tool to 
undermine the Human Rights and fundamental freedoms of women, by stifling criticisms of the 
discriminatory practices against women that are justified by religious arguments. The concept 
serves to shield States from any kind of criticism, constructive or otherwise, by arguing that it  
defends Islam and rejecting criticism as negative stereotyping.
A call by the resolution to implement sound mechanisms to protect women's human rights and a 
definite clarification on which forms of expression are perceived as legitimate and which are not, 
would do much to improve the situation. It would help to discourage the misuse of the concept as  
a tool to stifle women's rights. This is critical because not taking women's rights into account in 
this difficult context is just another way of allowing Human Rights violations against women to 
continue to happen with impunity in the name and justification of religion and its protectionist 
mechanisms.
426 Compare with the Defamation Resolutions as far as up to A/HRC/Res/13/16
427 Mashood A. Baderin, “The Role of Islam in Human Rights and Development,” 349.
428 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, 88.
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 6   Conclusion and Hypotheses Formation 
In this last chapter I formulate hypotheses that I suggest for testing in further research. Those 
results are grounded / based on underlying assumptions I have made in beginning of the thesis. 
Over  the  course  of  the  research  the  assumptions  made in  the  beginning of  the  paper  were 
reaffirmed. Hence, here I repeat those assumptions and elaborate how those have been supported 
by my research. 
Assumption 1:
There is no significant difference between legislation to 'Combat Defamation of Religions' 
and traditional 'Anti-Blasphemy' laws.
From a legal point of view, there is little difference between the two concepts of Defamation of 
Religions legislation and Anti-blasphemy law in their practical application. The consequences of 
existing Anti-Blasphemy laws executed in many countries, including the strongest proponents of 
the resolution, illustrate the effects that legal measures to combat Defamation of Religions have 
on the enjoyment of Human Rights on the ground. In addition, one can say that the Defamation 
Resolution attempts to  raise domestic  blasphemy legislation to  the level  of international law 
under the new term of Defamation of Religions.
Assumption 2:
The proclaimed means of combating Defamation of Religions as proposed in the resolution, 
are incompatible with international Human Rights law, in particular with respect to the 
right  of  freedom  of  expression  and  the  enjoyment  of  freedom  of  religion  by  persons 
belonging to vulnerable groups. 
Through an examination of various facets related to this question, it has become evident that the 
resolution is in fact not compatible with international Human Rights law. Several facts have been 
identified which uphold this conclusion: 
The resolution calls upon States (and welcomes their compliance with those calls) to implement 
legal measures that would violate international law, most prominently Articles 19 and 20 of the 
ICCPR. Crucially, in aiming to extend the purposes for the restriction of freedom of expression 
by adding either 'respect for religions and beliefs' or 'general welfare' to them, the resolution is 
145
 6  Conclusion and Hypotheses Formation 
evidently in contradiction of Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. Hence, the resolution is in effect calling 
upon States to directly violate internationally binding Human Rights law.
Moreover,  the  findings  of  this  research  confirm,  that  such  legislation  severely  impairs  the 
enjoyment of Human Rights,  above all for vulnerable groups such as religious minorities or 
women. 
Assumption 3:
The  strong  language  in  the  resolution  recommending  means  to  address  the  issue  in 
combination  with  the  lack of  a  clear  definition of  Defamation  of  Religions,  opens  the 
concept to misuse, particularly because it puts the State firmly in charge of deciding which 
ideas may be expressed in the public square and which may not. 
This paper has shown the resolution's language to be problematic for Human Rights due to its 
selective dichotomy of vague and strong language, which opens the door for conceivable misuse 
as a tool to shield States from criticism, to mainstream public opinion, and undermine Human 
Rights principles. 
Assumption 4:
The  terminology  of  the  concept  is  inherently  flawed  in  proclaiming  the  protection  of 
religious ideas rather than human beings, and as such is misplaced for the Human Rights 
discourse. 
A central finding of this research is that the concept of Defamation of Religions is aimed at 
protecting ideas against the violation of rights, which are essentially only applicable to human 
beings. This confirms that the concept itself is flawed and puts to question the terminology of  
'Defamation of Religions' as such. Further, this raises serious doubts as to whether the concept in 
its current articulation, has any relevance in the Human Rights debate altogether. 
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 6.1  Hypotheses on the Political Developments 
The EU argues persuasively that the terminology employed by the resolution is flawed and the 
concept has no relevance in the context of Human Rights. This argument has not only been taken 
up by countries outside the WEOG but also by powerful regional players such as Brazil. The 
argument seems to be valid, because the alternative language suggested such as 'incitement to 
religious hatred' is arguably better suited for meeting the concerns contained in the resolution, 
and is a more legal implementable language for any practical purpose. A more detailed content 
analysis of the member-states' Explanation of Votes that changed their position from previously 
supportive to a more reserved one, could be used to confirm following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1:
If the OIC retains the terminology of the specific expression 'Defamation of Religions', 
the resolution will continue to lose support throughout the UN membership. 
The patterns in GRULAC indicate a growing concern over the implications of the concept of 
combating Defamation of Religions for the freedom of expression. There is evidence to suggest 
that  these concerns have translated into a  reluctance  by GRULAC to support the resolution, 
which attempts to use the language in its clauses to extend the scope of Article 19 of the ICCPR 
in restricting the freedom of expression.
Hypothesis 2:
If  the  OIC  further  aims  at  extending  the  scope  of  Article  19  ICCPR  through  the 
resolutions language, the resolution will lose substantial support among GRULAC.
While African states have not articulated their position on the issue of the linkage between race 
and religion in the course of the defamation resolution too well; they have however placed their  
reservations against a conflation of racism and religious intolerance at various other occasions 
the UN bodies. 
147
 6  Conclusion and Hypotheses Formation 
Hypothesis 3:
If the OIC continues linking Defamation of Religions with the issue of racism, the Sub-
Saharan states of the African Group will begin to revoke support for the resolution. 
Similarly, the narrow focus on Islam and by association, effectively singling out one specific 
religion and side-lining others, is seen as highly problematic by a substantial part of the UN 
membership. While concerns over the lack of inclusion were frequently posited by member-state 
as explanation for a change in their position away from the resolution, the case of GRULAC has 
shown that these concerns are merely the tip of the iceberg.  More substantial  concerns over 
Human Rights implications and the terminology of Defamation of Religions as such, have often 
been voiced in subsequent years. This could indicate that concern regarding the non-inclusive 
approach of the resolution is merely used as a first step in shifting positions vis a vis the concept, 
rather than a substantial reservation determining the countries rejection of the resolution. This 
leads me to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4:
Until concerns over possible Human Rights implications deriving from the resolutions 
language are dealt with, the accommodation of concerns regarding the narrow focus of 
the resolution on Islam alone, will not help the OIC in their efforts to sustain the support 
for the resolution.
As elaborated  on  previously,  the  concept  of  Defamation  of  Religions  differs  little  from the 
concept of Blasphemy, and might as well be used by non-state actors (groups) to effectively cut  
themselves off  from state authority. As discussed in this paper,  groups such as the Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan  have  been using  allegations  of  anti-Islamic policies of  the  government  to 
justify their increasing violence against state authorities and the civilian population in Pakistan. 
Not necessarily leading to an intensely violent conflict  as with the example of Pakistan,  the 
rejection by non-state actors of specific legal regulations or law enforcement on the grounds of 
being blasphemous, might well contribute to increased tensions among society. This might be an 
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even greater problem for multi-religious societies, societies with religious tensions or societies in 
which social groups representing extreme or intolerant religious ideas operate. In this context I 
formulate two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5:
If Defamation of Religions becomes a jurisdictional tradition, the concept is likely to be 
employed  by  religious  extremist  groups  to  justify  cutting  themselves  off  from  state 
authority. 
Hypothesis 6:
If Defamation of Religions legislation is  prosecuted indiscriminately and particularly 
harsh, this tends to lead to higher social hostility among the society.
 6.2  Hypotheses concerning Human Rights Implications
Many reports and evidence given, suggest that accusations of blasphemy have been frequently 
used as an effective tool to settle personal scores and gain private (economic) advantage. The 
allegation do not need to be substantial for such strategy to eliminate eg: unwanted competition 
to be successful. Firstly, because allegations of blasphemy, even if they are proven false later, 
nonetheless often result in an initial lengthy detention. Secondly, because even if victims of false 
blasphemy  accusations are  acquitted they often face  threats  by religious  extremists  and are 
forced into hiding. On the other hand, during the research for this thesis no indication has been 
found that false accusations have been prosecuted for defamation. I therefore hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7:
If Defamation of Religions legislation does not criminalise false allegations of defamation 
as a punishable offence, it will tend to be misused for revenge and personal benefit.
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Conservative  interpretations  of  Islam have  been  used  to  restrain  various  rights  for  women. 
Patriarchal, male-dominated governments hold a monopoly  on the interpretation of Islam and 
judge arbitrarily, guided by self-interest with a lack of higher accountability mechanisms. This 
negatively affects the rights of women, as criticism interpreted as going against the dominating 
interpretation of Islam is outlawed by Anti-blasphemy jurisdiction. The Defamation of Religions 
resolution in fact, encourages the greater establishment of such Anti-blasphemy laws; and where 
they already exist, the resolution provides an international cover to justify them by bringing the 
concept to the international stage. Hence, the Defamation Resolution operates contrary to the 
objectives  of  Human  Rights  and the  obligation for  States  deriving  therefrom to  protect  and 
promote  equal  rights  for  women  and  men.  Surprisingly,  the  question  of  the  effects  of  the 
resolution on women's enjoyment of Human Rights has not yet received any attention, either by 
proponents or within more critical examinations of the concept. It is especially problematic that 
the resolution does not  take into account  women as  notable subjects  to  whom the proposed 
initiatives may apply or interfere with. To quote Malin Delling, “Not dealing with the rights of 
women […] in an Islamic document on human rights [which the Defamation Resolution claims 
to  be,  M.G.]  is  consequently  only  a  hypocritical  way  of  allowing  these  discriminations  to 
continue.”429
Hypothesis 8:
If  Defamation  of  Religions  legislation  as  proposed  is  used  in  conservative  Islamic 
Countries to silence public criticism, the rights of women, in particular, will be severely 
impaired.
The other category identified as exceptionally vulnerable to potential misuse of the concept of 
combating  Defamation  of  Religions  as  articulated  in  the  resolution,  is  that  of  religious  
minorities.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  recommendations  and  provisions  of  the  Defamation 
Resolution do not conform with its proclaimed goal to provide protection to persons belonging to 
religious minorities in the exercise of their rights as provided for in international Human Rights 
law. On the contrary, the resolution calls for measures that would impair individual enjoyment of 
Human Rights, such as their right to manifest religion in public square. Hence, the Defamation 
Resolution  and  its  underlying  concept  is  not  compatible  with  the  existing  Human  Rights 
429 Delling, Malin, “Islam and Human Rights,” 37.
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framework for the protection of rights of persons belonging to minorities, most notably religious 
ones. It becomes evident that the Defamation Resolution does not serve the interest of religious 
minorities, neither Muslim minorities in Western societies nor the various religious minorities 
within Muslim States.
This research has  shown that  the problematic  implications  of  the  concept  of  Defamation of 
Religions are  particularly relevant  for Muslims converting to a different religion.  The strong 
feelings that conservative adherents of Islam hold about the questions of apostasy, free choice 
and  the  act  of  changing  ones  religion  negatively  affects  religious  choice,  as  conversion  of 
Muslims is seen as forbidden by Islamic teaching and perceived as a insult and threat to Islam.
From these considerations, I derive the following three hypotheses for further examination:
Hypothesis 9:
Where  Defamation  of  Religions  finds  implementation  into  national  legislation,  its 
practical execution in the form of prosecution of individuals in court tends to target 
persons belonging to  religious minorities  to  a  disproportionately  greater extent  than 
majorities; thus being discriminatory and violating freedom of religion.
Hypothesis 10:
Where  Defamation  of  Religions  legislation  is  implemented  in  Islamic  countries,  the 
conversion  from  Islam  tends  to  be  interpreted  as  a  criminal  offence  under  this 
legislation, and thereby violates the human right for freedom of religion.
Hypothesis 11:
If differing opinions within a religion are perceived as threat to the dominant religious 
teaching Defamation of Religions legislations tends to be instrumentalised as a tool to 
mainstream the accepted religious interpretation.
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German Summary – Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Seit 1999 bringt die Organisation der Islamischen Konferenz eine Menschenrechtsresolution zum 
Thema 'Defamation  of  Religions'  in  die  Foren  der  Vereinten Nationen ein,  die  sich  mit  der 
negativen Stereotypisierung von Religionen, insbesondere des Islam durch Medien, beschaftigt. 
Die Resolution stellt  die  Diffamierung von Religionen als  eine Verletzung der  menschlichen 
Wurde dar, sowie in weiterer Konsequenz als Menschenrechtsverletzung. Als Reaktion wurden 
Bedenken laut welche die Kompatibilitat des Konzepts mit den grundlegenden Prinzipien der 
Menschenrechte in Frage stellten. Vor allem das Recht auf freie Meinungsaußerung wurde durch 
die  in  der  Resolution  vorgesehenen  Maßnahmen  als  massiv  gefahrdet  angesehen.  Die 
vorliegende Arbeit knupft an diese Kritik an und durchleuchtet die Vereinbarkeit des Konzepts 
mit  den  Menschenrechten.  Zu  diesem  Zweck  wird  die  Resolution  auf  ihre  rechtlichen 
Implikationen hin uberpruft und eine Analyse der politischen Dynamik innerhalb der Vereinten 
Nationen durchgefuhrt. Dabei stehen die juristischen Auswirkungen des Konzepts fur den Schutz 
des Individuums, insbesondere in Verbindung mit Fragen der freien Meinungsaußerung und der 
Rechte  religiöser  Minderheiten,  im  Vordergrund.  Die  politische  Analyse  inkludiert  eine 
Untersuchung  der  Abstimmungsmuster  der  Mitgliedsstaaten  uber  die  Resolution  in  den 
verschiedenen Gremien der Vereinten Nationen, sowie deren offiziellen Statements in diesem 
Zusammenhang, und dient dazu die zukunftige Entwicklung der Resolution besser abschatzen zu 
können.  Folglich konnte nachgewiesen werden, dass das durch die Resolution vorgeschlagene 
Konzept  zur  Bekampfung der  Diffamierung von Religionen mit  dem Menschrechtsstandards 
nicht kompatibel ist. Vielmehr, hat das Konzept schwerwiegende Implikationen fur verschiedene 
identifizierte Menschenrechte. Weiters konnte bestatigt werden, dass sich in die Gesetzgebung 
zur  Bekampfung  von  Diffamierung  von  Religionen  konzeptionell  nicht  von  traditionellen 
Blasphemiegesetzen unterscheidet. Die politische Situation ist zudem von einem Stillstand der 
Positionen  gekennzeichnet,  Verhandlungen  zur  Resolution  finden  in  einer  Atmosphare  des 
gegenseitigen  Misstrauen  und  wechselseitigen  Verdachtigungen  statt.  Die  Ergebnisse  der 
vorliegenden Arbeit legen nahe, Konzept und Terminologie von 'Defamation of Religions' fur die 
juristisch  und  konzeptionell  besser  geeignete  Sprache  von  'incitement  to  religious  hatred' 
aufzugeben.  Zudem  zeigt  sich  die  Notwendigkeit,  Anliegen  von  Minderheiten  sowie  eine 
unentbehrliche  Gender-perspektive  als  zentrale  Elemente  in  die  Bewertung  des  Konzepts 
einzubinden, um Menschenrechtsimplikationen uberhaupt adaquat beurteilen zu können.
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